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Abstract
It is true that Jurgen Moltmann does not systematically 
construct a theology of God’s history. However, his 
theological discussion of different themes and doctrines 
shows that God has a history. Therefore, the aim of this 
thesis is to give an analysis to his theology of God’s 
history and historicity.
Moltmann starts his theology by contrasting God’s self­
revelation in the promise with that in the epiphany of the 
eternal present. Chapter 1 traces revelation as epiphany in 
the Canaanite religion, Parmenides’ philosophy and 
contemporary doctrine of revelation and analyses its 
analogical characteristic. Revelation as promise is 
scrutinised in chapter 2 so as to display its dialectical 
structure, significance and offei’ a background for further 
understanding of God’s self-revelation in the Christ event.
The analogical principle of knowledge and its use in 
Platonic philosophy and Thomas Aquinas’ natural theology 
which Moltmann heavily criticises is discussed in chapter 
3. Its ontological and epistemological character that makes 
God’s self-revelation and being ahistorical is to be 
emphasised. In contrast to the analogical principle 
Moltmann proposes the dialectical principle which is 
embodied in the Christ event. Its meaning and significance 
for God’s history is the subject of chapter 4.
Chapter 5 and 6 engage in Moltmann’s revolution in the 
relationship between God’s historical act in the cross 
event and his inner being, the economic trinity and the 
immanent trinity. Chapter 5 clarifies the relationship of 
the cross event to the inner divine life and relevant 
criticism while chapter 6 explicates the primary 
determination of God’s inner life to his outer act in 
history. Moreover, God as love in Moltmann’s theology is 
given a detailed examination in regard to God’s self­
limitation and self-de-limitation in eternity and in 
history.
Moltmann’s understanding of God’s history in the Christ 
event creates conditions for historical transformation of 
this world. This is discussed in chapter 7. This thesis is 
concluded in chapter 8 with an analytical summary of 
Moltmann*s approach to God’s history, the character of 
God’s history and God’s historicity, and an appreciative 
appraisal of Moltmann’s theological breakthroughs and 
insights.
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Introduction
God’s history is a thread, if not the thread, in 
understanding Jurgen Moltmann’s theology. It is true that 
Moltmann’s theological development can be divided into two 
different stages,that is, the whole of theology in one 
focal point (his great trilogy Theology of Hope, The 
Crucified God and The Church in the Power of the Spirit) 
and the part as a contribution to the whole (his Messianic 
Theology). However, the perspective of such an 
understanding of this feature of Moltmann’s theology is 
methodological rather than material. Once Moltmann’s whole 
works are read through, one will find that God’s history is 
a prominent feature pervading his theological discussion of
different themes and doctrines.
R. Bauckham observes that Moltmann "regards the earlier 
trilogy as preparatory work" for his Messianic Theology. 
In other words, Moltmann’s earlier trilogy "provides the
foundation on which he can build in the form of more
detailed studies of major doctrines". Likewise, 
concretely, Moltmann’s earlier trilogy can be seen as the
1 HTG, p.168; J. Moltmann, "Foreword" in R. Bauckham, 
Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Basingstoke: 
Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), pp.ix-x.
2 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making,
p.l.
3 Ibid., p.2.
theological foundation of God’s history while his Messianic 
Theology is not merely being developed against this
background but also in turn supplements with further and 
detailed explication and development of God’s history from
different doctrines.
In a word, although Moltmann does not yet 
systematically construct a theology of God’s history, this 
feature of God’s history permeates his theological 
development. Therefore, this thesis aims to offer an 
analysis of his theology of God’s history and historicity 
by starting with the question: Under what conditions or in 
what contexts is God’s history initiated?
Basically, this study can be divided into three parts. 
The first part consists of chapters 1-4 focusing on the
historical character of God’s self-revelation whereas the
second part comprises chapters 5 and 6 discussing the 
relationship between God’s inner divine life and his 
historical act, especially in the Christ event. Chapter 7 
is the third part, in which the significance of God’s
history for the historical transformation of this world is
explicated. Finally, chapter 8 is a conclusion giving an 
analytical summary and appreciative appraisal of Moltmann’s 
theology.
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1 Revealing in the Epiphany
1,1 Ontological and Epistemological Conditions for God’s
History
Does God have a history? "... Moltmann’s theology as a 
whole is impregnated with a sense that God has a history 
. says J, B. Webster in an article discussing Moltmann’s 
The Crucified God J What Webster says is not that 
Moltmann’s theology is something about God’s history as 
such, but that in his theology God’s history is implied. 
Surely, Moltmann does not discuss God’s history as such,
but talks of it under certain conditions or in certain
contexts. Nevertheless, for Moltmann, God has a history. If 
God really has a history, then a question should be
answered: Under what conditions or in what contexts is
God’s history initiated? In Theology of Hope, obviously, 
God’s history emerges in the context of his revealing the 
future of the world in his promise. Then, first of all,
God’s history cannot be separated from his revelation to 
the world in Moltmann’s theology. This is the
epistemological condition. A further question can be asked: 
What is God’s being that allows him to reveal himself in 
this way in which his history is being initiated? In other
words, how is the epistemological condition that initiates
1 J. B. Webster, "Jurgen Moltmann: Trinity and 
Suffering", Evangel 3/2 (1985), p.4.
9
God’s history possible, in regard to God’s own being? This 
is about ontology asking the conditions of possibility for
such a revelation.
1.2 Two Ways of Revelation
In his Theology of Hope Moltmann discusses the contrast
between epiphany religions and the biblical religion of 
opromise. As analyzed by C. Morse, Moltmann’s overall 
strategy of argument in Theology of Hope is that "the ideas 
which he affirms are explained by contrasting them with 
those which he refutes" with the form "not that, but
9this." The whole of Theology of Hope is based on his 
rejection of epiphany religions but affirmation of the 
biblical religion of promise.4
What makes the religion of the promise different from
that of the epiphany? Profiting from his contemporary 
studies of Old Testament and comparative religion, Moltmann 
does not understand that by taking "revelation" as the
criterion of distinction so as to label them as "natural
religion" and "revealed religion". First of all, the * I
6 TH, pp.42-43, 95-101.
C. Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann *s Theology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), p.27.
I R. Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 
P.27.
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examination in the field of comparative religion finds out 
that the "epiphany religions" around Israel are all 
"religions of revelation" in their own way? "Any place in 
the world can become the epiphany of the divine and the 
pictorial transparency of the deity." The contrasting 
concepts of "revelation" and "natural" are not adequate to 
be applied to understand their essential difference.
Moltmann criticizes the way in which those theologians
begin their examination of revelation from a formal notion
of revelation as "the disclosure of what is concealed" or
" the manifestation of what is hidden". Both R. Bultmann
and K. Barth are criticized as formalist in their 
0understanding of God’s revelation. They both derive the 
theological content of "revelation" from the word 
"revelation"? Bultmann understands by revelation "the 
disclosure of what is veiled, the opening up of what is 
hidden."^ Barth says the same: "A closed door is opened;
J TI1, p.43.
® Ibid., p,42.
1 G. O’Collins, "Spes 
Interpretation 22 (1968), p.40,
8 TH, p.44.
Quaerens Intellectum",
3 Ibid.
R, Bultmann, Existence and Faith: Short Writings of 
Rudolf Bultmann, trans. S.M. Ogden (London: Collins, 1964), 
p, 68.
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a cover removed. A light shines in the darkness, a question 
finds its answer, a puzzle its solution."44
In Moltmann’s view, they both do not first ask "what is 
the reference and bearing of the revelations of God in the 
Old and New Testaments",42 but "set out from a general 
explanation of terms". In other words, they do not, from 
the very beginning, distinguish the revelation of the
biblical religion from that of the epiphany religions.
Consequently, the Christian doctrine of revelation, in both
their hands, is turned into the proofs of God. For
Bultmann, revelation is understood within the framework of 
a new proof of God from human existence.^ For Barth, the 
self-revelation of God is the ontological proof of God
IKhimself, ' The doctrine of revelation, then, belongs either
to anthropology -- as an answer to the question of God as
asked by humanity and given along with the questionableness
of human existence -- or to the doctrine of God -- as an
answer to the proofs of God or to the proof of his non­
provability. Moltmann concludes:
K. Barth, Against the Stream: Shorter Post-War 
Writings 1946-52, trans. E.M. Delacour and S. Godman 
(London: SCM, 1954), p.205.
12 TH, p.45.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
16 Cf. Ttf, pp.43, 45.
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Two little attention is paid to the fact that the 
expressions for ’’revelation" in the biblical 
scriptures have completely broken out of their 
original religious context and are employed with a 
meaning of a different kind. This different kind of 
meaning is mainly determined by the events of 
promise.
Therefore, the crucial point Moltmann emphasizes is that:
the difference does not lie already in the assertion 
of divine 'revelation9 as such, but in the different 
ways of conceiving and speaking of the revelation and 
self"manifestation of the deity.
The theology of the Old Testament shows that "the words and 
statements about the 'revealing of God’ in the Old
Testament are combined throughout with statements about the 
'promise of God’". God’s revelation and his promise, then 
are not separable from each other. Moltmann goes further: 
"God reveals himself in the form of promise and in the 
history that is marked by promise."89
In this way, the distinction between the biblical
religion and the epiphany religions is proposed to lie in 
the different ways of God’s self-manifestation. Then, what 
are the characteristics of these two different ways of
revelation? How do they view the history of the world? What 
kind of God and his "history" will they lead to? In the 
following sections these respects will be studied first 17 18 19
17 TH, p.45,
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. , p. 42 .
89 Ibid.
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through the examination of the Canaanite religion, Greek 
philosophy and the theologies of Barth, Bultmann and W. 
Pannenberg.
1.3 Revelation as Epiphany
In Moltmann’s view, the way of revealing by epiphany is 
21first expressed in the religion of the Canaanite peasant. 
And later, this epiphany religion ’’forms the presupposition 
and the abiding foundation of the natural theology of Greek 
philosophy of religion, and of oriental philosophies of 
religion”. In contemporary theology, the forms of 
thinking of Barth and Bultmann on revelation and 
eschatology "are entirely the thought forms of the Greek 
mind, which sees in the logos the epiphany of the eternal
present of being and finds the truth in that”. Even 
Pannenberg’s ideas of revelation and eschatology cannot 
avoid being criticized as the extension of the Greek cosmic
n Itheology6’ and remaining within the thought structure of 
Greek cosmic theology in principle.^
21 Ibid., pp.98-99
22 Ibid., p. 9 9 .
23 Ibid,, P-40.
U Ibid., P-77.
25 Ibid., p, 79.
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Through Greek philosophy, the world-view of the
Canaanite religion gets its philosophical expression,
especially in Parmenides’ philosophy of God, on the one
hand, and it influences the Christian theological
tradition, even into the twentieth century, on the other
hand. "Wherever revelation and eschatology are interpreted
with reference to the eternal in the present,.,, a
theological equivalent to epiphany religion is to be 
9(5seen". It is therefore very important to trace such a 
development in understanding the essence of this kind of
revelation.
1.3.1 The Canaanite Religion
According to Moltmann, the uniqueness of Israel’s
religion emerges in the process of tense struggle with the 
2?religion of Canaan throughout its history in Palestine.
In the view of V. Maag, the former is the nomadic religion
whereas the latter is the peasant religion. It seems to
Maag that the distinction between these two religions is 
due to their different forms of living when he says: 
"Nomadic religion is a religion of promise. The nomad does 
not live within the cycle of seed-time and harvest, but in
9fi Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.28.
27 TH, p.96.
28 Ibid,
15
29the world of migration. However, as noted by Moltmann, 
this cannot explain the fact that ’’when Israel passed from
the nomadic and semi-nomadic life to the settled life of
Canaan it did not . . . abandon the nomad religion and the
God of promise” in favour of the gods of Canaanite 
30religion, Moltmann points out that the crucial key to the
process of conflict of these two religions is seen very
clearly in the relationship to God, and here in turn in the
ideas of the appearing and revealing of God. It is their 
conceptions of God’s disclosure that determine their 
difference, not the life forms.
Essentially, the religion of Canaan is a kind of 
hierophany. According to M. Eliade, ’’hierophany”
refers to any manifestation of the sacred in whatever 
object throughout history. Whether the sacred appear 
in a stone, a tree, or an incarnate human being, a 
hierophany denotes the same act: a reality of an 
entirely different order than those of this world 
becomes manifest in an object that is part of the 
natural or profane sphere.
"But these revelations occurred in mythical time, at the 
extratemporal instant of the beginningeverything in a
certain sense coincided with the beginning of the world,
Cited from TH, p.96.
30 Ibid. , p.97.
Ibid.
3? M» Eliade and L, E. Sullivan, "Hierophany", in The 
Encyclopedia of Religion vol.6, ed. M. Eliade (New York: 
Macmillan and London: Collier-Macmillan, 1987), p.313.
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33with the cosmogony.” Reality, then, is viewed as the 
primordial totality which comprises the primordiality and
A I
the totality. And hierophany is the disclosure of this
absolute extratemporal beginning' of everything. 
Accordingly, God’s disclosure of himself, in such a 
religion, is in a way of ahistorical appearing through 
something, some place or somebody which is present. Every 
hierophany is a repetition of the very first beginning. The 
revelation of God, then, is the epiphany of the eternal 
present, the absolute beginning.
This kind of religion has a view of double tracks of
time, namely, profane time and sacred or mythical time.
These two times are heterogeneous. The sacred time is a 
time "of the modality of the gods, which is coupled with
q C
immortality” whereas the profane time is a time "of the
qp
modality of human being, which is coupled with death”.
To the people of epiphany religion, life in profane
time is without meaning because it is in the state of 
37"becoming”. He tends to set himself in opposition to
33 M. Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. W. 
R. Trask (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), 
p.105♦
q I’ M. Eliade, The Quest; History and Meaning in 
Religion (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1969), pp.79, 80, 87.
3*5 Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, p,36.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. , p.35.
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history, regarded as a succession of events that are
irreversible, unforeseeable, possessed of autonomous 
38value. Furthermore, from the point of view of ahistorical 
39people, "suffering” is equivalent to "history". It is 
thereby very important for him to break through the profane 
time and participate in the sacred time, so as to "find the 
meaning of life not in historical change but in contact 
with changeless eternity",^ on the one hand, and to 
overcome the threat to human existence from the forces of
chaos and of annihilation through the epiphany of the
eternal present, on the other hand.
"A hierophany marks a breakthrough from profane to 
42magico-religious time. It may be repeated by rituals
which "re-create the conditions of the world in which the
sacred originally appeared, and at that moment when the
sacred manifests itself again in the same way,
extraordinary power overwhelms the profane succession of 
time". Profane time, duration and history are all 
abolished and humanity returns to the very beginning in
this hierophany. However, the eternal present reality
Ibid., p.95.
Ibid., p.97, n.2.
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.27.
41 TH, p.99.
49 Eliade and Sullivan, "Hierophany", in The 
Encyclopedia of Religion vol.6, p.315.
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breaks through the chaos and discloses itself. 
Consequently, time is regenerated from profane to sacred
again and again through rituals, rites and festivals. Its
irreversibility is annulled by this eternal return or 
cyclic recurrence. The past is but a prefiguration of the 
future while the future is a repetition of the past. 
Consequently, nothing new happens in the world.
In hierophany, God reveals himself in the eternal
present so that humanity can live in a continuous present 
against the continuous changing of the world. The history 
of the world, then, is being totally devalued because, in 
the epiphany religion, reality is seen as the primordial 
totality, which is eternal present, not historical.
A K1.3.2 Parmenides’ Concept of Being
Being the founder of the Eleatic School from a
j a
philosophical and historical view, Parmenides argues 
against the reality of change and is believed to be the 
first Greek to reach the notion of atemporal eternity/? He
Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 89-90.
45 »For an excellent account of Parmenides philosophy,
see W.K.C. Guthrie, .4 History of Greek Philosophy vol. II: 
The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp.1-79.
1 A
F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol.I: Greece 
and Rome (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1956), p,47.
4 7 L. Taran, Parmenides: A Text with Translation, 
Commentary, and Critical Essays (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1965), p.175.
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offers a philosophical grounding for the view-point of
unchangeable reality and against the perspective of
changeable, which are expressed in terms of hierophany in 
epiphany religion, so as to protect the self-identity 
without difference of Being.48 49 50 * * *
In his poem, Parmenides speaks of three ways of
inquiring into truth. The first is "that it is, and it is
not possible for it not to be".48 The second is "that it is
not, and that it is bound not to be".88 The third way is
that "to be and not to be are regarded as the same and not
the same".^ Parmenides’ criterion of discerning the right
way amongst these three is that "one should both say and
think that Being is; for to be is possible, and nothingness 
52is not possible , The existence of Being, then, must be 
thinkable, since "for the Greek the faculty of thought 
(Nous) involves immediate apprehension of an object, the 
existence of which was presupposed by its very
r Aoperation,"” But "nothing cannot be the object of speech 
or thought, for to speak about nothing is not to speak, and
™ Ibid., p.181.
49 K. Freeman, Ancillia to the Pre-Socratic 
Philosophers: A complete Translation of the Fragments in 
Diels, Fragments der Vorsokratiker (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1948), p.42, frg. 2.
50 Ibid.
Ibid., p.43, frg. 6.
88 Ibid.
88 J. B. Wilbur and H. J. Allen ed. , The Worlds of the 
Early Greek Philosophers (New York: Prometheus Books, 
1979), p.104.
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to think about nothing is the same as not thinking at 
ail . It is because nothing as a non-existent object of
c cthought becomes a contradiction in terms. In this case, 
the second way is ruled out. Being (existence) and non­
Being (nothing, non-existence) contradict one another, and 
must mutually exclude each other.
The third way, for Parmenides, is the beliefs of 
mortals , false but popular. It treats existence and non­
existence as the same and as not the same. They are the
same because things sometimes exist and sometimes do not 
(that is, there is change), and some things exist which 
contain less of being than others and therefore contain 
some non-existence (that is, there is difference). They are 
not the same because they have different meanings.In 
Parmenides’ view, this is intolerable: "for this (view) can
KOnever predominate, that which is not exists". The reason
for ruling it out is based on the mutual exclusiveness of 
the first way and the second way: "it is, or it is not",33 54 * 56
54 Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol. I, p.49.
Wilbur and Allen, The Worlds of the Early Greek 
Philosophers, p.104.
56 Freeman, Ancillia to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 
p.43, frg, 6.
D. J. Furley, "Parmenides of Elea", in The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 5 , ed. P. Edwards (New York: 
Macmillan and London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), p.48.
58 Freeman, 
p.43, frg. 7.
Ancillia to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers,
59 Ibid., frg. 8.
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either existence or non-existence but not both. If the
second way is false, then it is not possible for the third 
way which combines the first and the second to be true.
W. Jaeger asks: ’’Why does Parmenides pose the sharp
alternatives of Being and Not-being at the outset as basic 
PAfor his whole doctrine?” Obviously, the setting of Being 
and non-Being is for the purpose of denial of a tertium
Quid between Being and non-Being. Owing to the structure of 
’’both is and is not" of the third way, it is necessary to 
deny firstly the existence of non-Being, so as to falsify
the third way by the logical principle: "it is, or it is 
not", Parmenides’ central concern is the eternity of
p 1identity and the impossibility of difference of Being. He
cannot allow that change happens from Being to non-Being
and from non-Being to Being because it would violate the
law of identity. The great fragment 8 is precisely on the
permanent identity of Being:
Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for 
it is whole of limb, without motion, and without end. 
And it never was, nor will be, because it is now, a 
whole all together, one, continuous; for what creation 
of it will you look for?...
W. Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek 
Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1947), pp.100-101.
fi 1 Tardn, Parmenides: A Text wi th Translation,
Commentary, and Critical Essays, p.181.
62 Ibid. , p.188.
p n
Freeman, Ancillia to the Pre~Socratic Philosophers,
p. 43,
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It is here Moltmann^ and other scholars^ claim that
A|»
Parmenides’ Being is a kind of eternal present.
Parmenides, in fragment 8, "tries to deduce a number of 
the essential attributes of that which truly is". His 
argument proceeds on the assertion of the non-existence of
non-Being and the principle of excluded middle: "it is, or 
it is not". However, what he wants to demonstrate are 
merely the negative predicates of Being which is
ungenerated,
immovable,
imperishable, homogeneous, continuous, 
69unchangeable, complete, and unique. These
predicates deny all the positive attributes that would 
70imply the existence of non-Being so as to exclude all
64 TH, p.28.
Cf. Taran, Parmenides, p.175, n.l.
66 There are different view-points amongst scholars of 
Parmenides on the issue of whether he reaches the concept 
of "eternal present" in the sense of timelessness. The 
crucial point is about the interpretation of frg. 8.5.: 
either elimination of duration in favour of eternal present 
or maintaining duration in which Being is infinite in 
respect of time. The former is atemporal eternity whereas 
the latter is infinite everlasting duration. However, the 
former is prevailing amongst scholars and it is accepted to 
interpret Parmenides’ concept of Being in this study. 
Bibliography on this, see D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea, 
Fragments: A Text and Translation with an Introduction 
(Toronto/Buffalo/ London: University of Toronto Press, 
1984), p.34, n.39.
Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek 
Philosophers, p.101.
68 Taran, Parmenides: Text with Translation,
Commentary, and Critical Essays, p.192.
Ibid., p.193
Ibid.
69
70
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71difference within Being itself. In other words, starting
with the concept of Being itself, Parmenides proves the
self-identity of Being as non-difference with itself. He
affirms Being as an all which is one, that is, it is a 
non-differential totality. It has no imperfections and 
lacks nothing. Then, "the true concept of reality excludes 
motion, change, and becoming". This is the way of truth.
When Parmenides claims that "it never was, nor will 
be, because it is now, a whole all together", he is 
asserting the atemporality of Being. From the very
beginning, Parmenides has to deny the possibility of the 
co-existence of Being and non-Being so as to rule out
difference, which would make process from Being to non­
Being and vice versa possible. In this way, Being is not
something in process with any change. If time is understood
in terms of process and Being is not in process, then Being 
is timeless. Therefore, Moltmann says that "this ’being’ 
does not exist 'always’... It has no extension in time". 
So, "it never was, nor will be". Moreover, Being is a 
simple totality without differentiation in any sense. It is
a whole all together, one. Because of its perfection, it
Ibid., p.194.
7? J. V. Luce, Introduction to Greek Philosophy
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1992), p.53.
73 Ibid.
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TH, p.28.
involves no temporal succession of earlier and later. Past
orand future tense does not apply to it. Therefore, "it is 
now". Its now is a perfect one out of time, the eternal
present.
Parmenides* Being, then, is characterized as timeless, 
eternal present firstly because it is a simple and perfect
totality.
There are several points in Parmenides’ argument and 
conclusion that are noteworthy. Firstly, Being is revealed 
in and determined by thought. Parmenides’ whole argument 
manifests fully his famous fragment 3: "it is the same 
thing to think and to be". Therefore, the existence and the 
content of Being are disclosed by the nature of thought 
that existence must be thinkable and Being’s content is 
that of thought, that is, the three principles of thinking, 
which are the ways Being discloses itself.
Secondly, non-Being is ruled out and becoming is 
impossible. By the principle of being thinkable, non-Being
is being denied. By the principles of excluded middle and 
non-contradiction, and the non-existence of non-Being, 
"both is and is not" is falsified. In this way, non-Being 
is not integrated into Being as a part of it so that 
becoming is unreal. Consequently, Being’s identity is a 
simple one which corresponds to the principle of identity
» Ibid.
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in thought. Then, the static character of thought
determines the non-dynamic nature of Being through its
three principles of thinking. The philosophical grounding 
of Being’s eternal present revelation is rooted in such a 
kind of thinking.
Thirdly, the denial of history and the knowledge of 
history. Because history implies change in itself and
change is not thinkable and everything unthinkable is not
real, history is unthinkable and unreal. It cannot be
grasped by thought. Therefore, there is no way for the
knowledge of history. Reality must be viewed as the eternal
present of Being rather than the ever changing of history. 
Moreover, change would imply that Being is imperfect and 
lacks something. It would not be the totality in itself so
that it changes from one imperfect state to another
imperfect one. However, being the eternal present, Being is
the whole of all together.
Fourthly, the "eternal presence " of Being is not only 
a plain description of its timelessness but also a
qualifying word which denotes the completeness, totality,
Oneness, wholeness, altogetherness of Being itself. All
predicates such as ungenerated, imperishable, immovable,
indivisible point to its perfection from a negative
perspective. Conversely, the changeable and historical
world is not complete in itself. The only way of getting
26
rid of it is through contemplating the eternal present
Being so as to grasp reality again.
Parmenides’ concept of Being is a rational version of 
the primordial atemporal totality in epiphany religion. It
offers a philosophical grounding for viewing reality as
eternal presence, and at the same time universalizes the 
way of its disclosure and its being grasped in rational 
thinking. Parmenides is not concerned with the ontological 
status of the changeable world since, for him, it is an 
illusion. The fundamental reason is that ” the phenomenal
world as such is not a different world from that of true
Being; what appears as changing is only the result of a 
rearrangement that is hidden to the sense". Then, change 
and eternity are but two sides of one coin. Nevertheless, 
his distinction of change and eternity anticipates Plato’s 
doctrine of two worlds, namely, the unchangeable ideas and
the phenomenal world, where the latter is not illusory but
only less real compared with the former. But both
Parmenides and Plato agree on the primacy of the former
over the latter.
Moltmann observes that even where the modern age thinks 
in Kantian terms, Parmenides’ concept of God as the 
epiphany of the eternal present of Being is at bottom
Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol. I, p.48. 
77 Taran, Parmenides, pp.187-188, n.31.
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78intended. The merit of Parmenides’ concept of Being is 
inherited once again in modern philosophy, especially as 
expressed in Kant’s two levels of reality. In this way, 
contemporary Christian theology is influenced deeply by 
Parmenides’ thought mainly through the influence of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy.
1.3.3 Barth’s and Bultmann’s Doctrine of Revelation
1,3.3.1 Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy
Before Barth’s and Bultmann’s present-orientated
revelation is examined, it is worth understanding Kant’s 
79philosophy first. This is because both Barth’s and 
Bultmann’s theologies are under the influence of Kant in 
several aspects.
As C. Sutton points out, Kant starts his philosophy by 
postulating two levels of reality.88 These Kant calls 
"appearances" or "phenomena" , contrasted with "thing’s-in- 78 79 80 * *
78 TH, p.40.
79 .For a brief introduction to Kant’s philosophy and 
his influence on theology, see the following books. S.J. 
Grenz and R.E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the 
World in a Transitional Age (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 
1992), pp.25-30; D. Allen, Philosophy for Understanding 
Theology (London: SCM, 1985), pp.203-220: II. Thielicke,
Modern Faith and Thought, trans. G. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1990), pp.273-323.
80 C. Sutton, The German Tradition in Philosophy
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), p.22.
28
81themselves” or "noumena". Phenomena are objects present
in the sensible intuition, that is, time and space, of a 
8?human knower while noumena are objects lying beyond that. 
The realm of phenomena is governed by the natural law of
cause and effect so as to be called the kingdom of nature
which is a mechanical world. Conversely, the sphere of
noumena is a kingdom of freedom beyond causality law in
which humanity is autonomous. While humanity is in the
sensuous world, he is subjected to the law of causality and 
83does not appear to be free. He is an empirical self. But, 
as a noumenal self in the noumenal world, he gets ’’beyond 
the mechanism of blindly working causes” so as to be a 
free acting agent.
There are several aspects which are worth noting. 
Firstly, for Kant, God is a noumenon which is not present 
in the sensible intuition, that is, does not appear in time 
and space. Then, God is not an object of the phenomenal
world to be known by the theoretical reason. All the
traditional proofs of God ’ s existence are the misuse of
theoretical reason so as to be invalid. Therefore, Kant
81 Ibid.
82 For detail of Kant’s definition of noumena, see C.D. 
Broad, Kant: An Introduction, ed, C. Lewy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.202. Cf. H.J. Paton,
The Category Imperative: A Study of Kant’s Moral Philosophy 
(London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1946), p.269.
83 I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L.W. 
Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), A 174, 
p.202 ,
84 Ibid, A 191.
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sets a limit to the objectification function of the
theoretical reason so that the realm of knowledge
established by the theoretical reason is limited. In this
way, the non-provability of God is due to his non­
ob jectif lability by humanity’s theoretical reason, not like 
the objectifiability of the natural world. God is free from
any theoretical proof of humanity. However, it is
reasonable to believe in God in the context of practical
reason. In the second edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant says: "I have therefore found it necessary to 
deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.For 
him, "faith" belongs to the practical reason aspect 
concerning human action and morality. For the sake of 
making sense of moral practice, God, then, is a reasonable 
postulation.
The second point is about the atemporal character of the
realm of noumena. This realm is that of the non-objective 
and non-objectifiable, of which freedom is the central
nature. The noumenal self in this realm is free from the
categories of sensible intuition and understanding imposed 
by the theoretical reason. He is not to be subjected to the 
causality law that governs nature and history, but is 
wholly self-dependent and exclusively autonomous in his 
moral action. Human being is not bound to time any more, 
This realm is a kind of "primal history", so called by F.
85 I. Kant, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan/New York: St.
Martin’s, 1929), p.29.
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Overbeck when he takes up this notion from Kant in 
8(5understanding the true Christianity, Here origin and 
87eschatology are truly one. Time, in Kantian sense, is
absolutely not applicable in this realm. Therefore, this
noumenal world discloses itself only in the action of
practical reason which is operating beyond time. In 
Christian wording, it reveals itself in eternity or eternal 
present.
Thirdly, Kant in his treatise on Der Ende aller Dinge 
( The End of All Things) understands the eschaton in terms 
of his two levels of reality. On the one hand, Kant agures 
"against the end of all things as a [form of] temporal 
being and as an object of possible experience" since 
these "objects . . . lie entirely beyond the scope of our 
vision". 89 They "do not stand under conditions of time".88 
They are therefore not the objects of theoretical reason. 
On the other hand, "although these ideas transcend 
speculative cognition, they are not for that reason to be 
regarded as empty in every regard".What Kant thinks is
C. van Til, The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the 
Theology of Barth and Brunner (Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Co., 1972), pp,85-89.
87 Ibid.
I. Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. T. 
Humphrey (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), p.93.
Ibid., p.97.
Ibid., p.93.
Ibid.
89
90
91
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that the idea of an end of all things does not have its
origin in reasoning about the physical world, but is
occasioned only by reasoning about the moral course of 
things in the world. In this way, Kant says: "We have to
think of them with a view to moral principles concerned 
with the ultimate purpose of all things." In other words, 
the eschaton is supra-sensible so as to be beyond all 
possibility of knowledge but only to be acquired through 
practical reason. "The ideas of the last things have 
therefore to be ethically examined, and considered in the
sphere of the moral reason, of the practical ability to be 
a self."95
In this way, it is not strange for Moltmann to cite 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s remark: "transcendental philosophy 
becomes the method towards inward apocalypse". Moreover, 
because this inward apocalypse is placed in the realm of 
noumena, it does not get any futuristic sense but only 
immediate present without origin and end which happens in 
the world of Overbeck’s "primal history".
1.3.3.2 Barth and Bultmann
92
93
94
95
96
Ibid., p.94.
Ibid., p. 97.
Ibid., pp.93, 94,
TH, p.47.
Ibid., p.48.
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1.3.3.2.1 Introduction
Being' the pupils of W. Herrmann, both Barth * s and 
Bultmann’s concepts of God’s revelation develop from their 
own interpretation of their teacher’s statement in his book 
Gottes Offenbarung an uns; "We have no other means of
knowing God except that he reveals himself to us ourselves 
by acting on us. This statement consists of two parts 
concerning God’s revelation. Negatively, as pointed out by 
Moltmann, "revelation of God cannot be objectively
AOexplained". Positively, "it can certainly be experienced
in man’s own self, namely, in the non-objectivity of the
dark, defenceless depths in which we live the moment of 
nninvolvement". It is on the non-objectifiability of God’s 
revelation that they both agree without any dispute. 
However, they have different interpretations of the second 
part of the statement. "Does the statement mean that God 
himself must reveal himself to us, or that God must reveal
himself to us ourselves? Does the ‘self’ of the self­
revelation refer essentially to God or to man?"^
Despite their different interpretations of the meaning 
of "self-revelation", this "self" must not belong to the 
objective realm but to a transcendental one in which the
97 Cited from 777, p.52.
98 TH, p.52.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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self is free and autonomous, It is in this place that Barth 
and Bultmann are inheriting Kant’s idea of God’s non­
ob jectif iability. For both Barth and Bultmann God is
is not a matter ofsubject whose provability 
objectification through humanity’s theoretical reason. He 
is beyond humanity’s cognitive faculty. In Kantian wording, 
God is not to be known in the phenomenal world as an 
object. It follows that God’s revelation cannot be 
objectified either. His revelation is not an event
happening in the realm of phenomena or in an objectified 
world, but an event in that of noumena or in a subjective
world. However, what matters to Barth and Bultmann is: does
God reveal himself through his own transcendental self or 
humanity’s transcendental self? In other words, Barth 
understands Herrmann’s "self" as the transcendental
subjectivity of God whereas Bultmann considers it as the
transcendental subjectivity of humanity. No matter what the 
"self" refers to, it is a "transcendental" one in both of 
their theologies. In either case God’s subjectivity is
maintained since he does not reveal himself within the
realm of phenomena but in the realm of noumena.
For the discussion of the influence of Kantian 
philosophy on Barth and Bultmann, see the following. S. 
Fisher, Revelatory Positivism?: Barth’s earliest Theology 
and the Marburg School (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988), pp. 170-211; G.S. Hendry, ’’The Transcendental Method 
in the Theology of Karl Barth”, Scottish Journal of 
Theology 37/2(1984 ) , pp. 213-227; R.A. Johnson, The Origins 
of Demythologizing: Philosophy and Historiography in the 
Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (Leiden: E.J, Brill, 1974), 
pp.38-86.
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In the following, Barth’s and Bultmann’s doctrine of 
revelation will be analyzed to show that due to their 
placing God’s revelation within the transcendental realm, 
what God reveals is his eternal present.
1.3.3.2.2 Barth
Although there is a saying that Barth’s theology can be 
viewed as early and mature, where the former is represented
by his famous The Epistle to the Romans while the latter is
represented by his magnum opus Church Dogmatics, Barth 
himself comments on this saying about the ’’change” or even 
’’break” in his theological development that ”he has 
remained basically faithfully to the step he took after the 
First World War”. In other words, Barth thinks that his 
whole theology is consistent since his publication of The
Epistle to the Romans, However, in what sense are these two 
works consistent with one another? G.S. Hendry argues that 
in Barth’s theological development there does not exist any 
change in his basic theological structure. He even says 
that ’’the changed pattern was, however, deceptive; for the 
underlying structure remained, largely, unchanged". What 
Hendry means by the underlying structure which is 
prevailing in Barth’s whole theology is Kant’s
10? H. Zahrnt, The Question of God: Protestant Theology 
in the Twentieth Century, trans. R.A. Wilson (London: 
William Collins Sons, 1969), p.87.
103 Hendry, "The Transcendental Method in the Theology
of Karl Barth”, p.219.
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Despite Hendry’s argument oftranscendental philosophy.
Kant’s transcentental philosophy as the underlying 
philosophy which goes through Barth’s early and mature 
theologies, one thing is true to Barth’s whole theology: 
God is a non-objectifiable subject.
Owing to God’s non-objectifiability and non-provability
in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Barth further agrees
with Kierkegaard’s "infinite qualitative distinction"
between time and eternity, jn which "God is in heaven 
1 ft (5and man on earth". Kierkegaard’s infinite qualitative 
distinction is taken up to support God’s non- 
objectif iability in Barth’s theology. Due to the absolute 
ontological distinction between creator and creature, God’s 
subjectivity, then, cannot be dissolved by humanity’s 
subjectivity either cognitively or ethically. It is at this 
point Barth makes a distance from Kant’s placing God within 
humanity’s practical reason. "God is not subject to man’s 
passive scrutiny as Objekt> but stands over and against him 
as Gegen-stand, " Later, Barth in his Church Dogmatics 
expresses the same concern while discussing God’s
104 Ibid.
105
Hoskyns
K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. E.C. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p.10,
106 Ibid.
107 A.E. McGrath, The Making of Modern German
Christology: From the Enlightenment to Pannenberg (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986), p,105.
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108revelation: God as the Subject who is never Object. For 
Barth, God is not only "Subject" but "indissolubly 
Subject" .108 09 * * 112
Corresponding to this indissoluble Subject is its 
primal or primordial history ( Ur-geschichte), which is the 
transcendental condition of history (Geschichte).This
means that what happens in Urgeschichte determines what
happens in the realm of the historical In the early
Barth, revelation is posited in this sphere of
Urgeschichte. God’s revelation is a "mathematical point"
in which God touches this world only "as a tangent touches 
1 1 0a circle, that is, without touching it". This conception
108 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, trans. G.W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975 ), p.381. On this, see J. 
Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (London: SCM, 
1955), pp.140-167.
109 Ibid, , pp.381, 382.
Hendry, "The Transcendental Method in the Theology 
of Karl Barth", p.28. Barth’s concept " Urgeschichte'' is 
picked up from Overbeck, who is believed to develop this 
from the Kantian idea of the noumenal self in understanding 
that true Christianity appears in the realm of primal 
history, See van Til, The New Modernism, pp.85-90; J.D. 
Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology: Karl Barth and 
Rudolf Bultmann, 1908-1933 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1967), pp.101, 114.
m Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology, p.114.
112 C.E. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), p.21.
Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, p.30.113
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of two tracks of history and their "touch by not 
touching"^ relationship dominates Barth’s theology, 
especially his understanding of God’s revelation, since his 
dialectical period, for the sake of safeguarding God’s non- 
objectifiable and indissoluble subjectivity.
As observed by Moltmann, through the interpretation of
his teacher Herrmann’s "self-revelation" in his article
"The Principles of Dogmatics According to Wilhelm Herrmann"
in 1925, Barth begins to develop his doctrine of the "self- 
11firevelation" of God in detail. It is in this essay that
Barth articulates God’s self-revelation with the purpose of
grounding God in himself. For Barth, "there is no word more
significant for Herrmann’s theology than the word 
1 1 fi‘self’". God is like the lion breaking his cage; "a 
wholly different ‘self’ has stepped into the scene with his 
own validity". All human being’s religious experience 
can only be a pointer towards the ground that is really 
grounded in itself, that "is never in any sense ‘object’, 
but is always unchangeably subject". In other words, God 
cannot be objectively grounded through humanity’s
U* R.w, Jenson, "Karl Barth" in The Modern Theologians: 
An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. D.F. Ford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p.32.
H§ TH, pp.51-52.
11 fi K. Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 
1920-1928, trans. L.P. Smith (London: SCM, 1962), p.254.
117 Ibid., p.256.
!18 Ibid. , p.260.
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subjective action, but can only ground himself through his 
own grounding. Being "eternally subject and never object",
God "determines himself and is knowable exclusively through 
himself in 'pure act5 (actus purissimus) of his Triune 
Personality",^9 Then, God’s revelation is not through 
anything other than himself, such as human being’s 
religious experience, but through himself alone. God’s 
revelation is his self-revelation through which God proves
and grounds himself.
In the Church Dogmatics 1/1 Barth develops his idea of
self-revelation in the context of the doctrine of the
Trinity. For him, "revelation is the basis of the doctrine
of the Trinity; the doctrine of the Trinity has no other 
l?0basis apart from this". 4 Barth, then, starts his idea of 
revelation with the event of Deus dixit (God speaks) in 
which the subject, predicate and object of revelation are
all within God himself. Actually, God is himself the 
event of revelation because he is the subject (God 
reveals), the content (God reveals himself) , and the very 
happening (God reveals himself). In God’s self­
revelation, God is the agent, the content and the state of * 1
119 Ibid. , p. 256.
^29 Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, p.312.
121 Ibid. , p. 296.
122 W.J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as 
a Mystery of Salvation (Washington: Catholic University 
Press of America, 1982), pp.115-116.
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revelation. "God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself 
100
through Himself. He reveals Himself." God himself is
Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness. He takes the
initiative in the act of revelation and executes the
revelation not through any medium less than himself, but 
through his alter ego. In this way, Herrmann’s idea of 
subjectivity recedes in favour of a detailed doctrine of
i nrthe immanent Trinity in the Church Dogmatics 1/1. 3 Since
"revelation is the self-interpretation of this God", the
doctrine of the Trinity developed from the concept of
revelation, then, is the interpretation of God’s self­
. 127interpretation.
Because it really is God who reveals himself, because
190God reveals himself, Barth can proceed to say: "We may
sum all this up in the statement that God reveals Himself 
as the Lord. This statement is to be regarded as an
123 Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1 , p.296.
124 j. McIntyre, The Shape of Christology (London: SCM, 
1966), p.157.
125 TH, p.56.
12® Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, p.311.
..E. JUngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s being 
is in Becomong, trans. Scottish Academic Press (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), p.17. Cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics 
1/1, p.312.
128 C. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God 
in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978) p.129.
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129analytical judgement.” "Lordship is present in
revelation because its reality and truth are so fully self­
grounded, because it does not need any other actualization
or validation than that of its actual occurrence, because
it is revelation through itself and not in relation to
something else, because it is that self-contained
novum. While Barth connects the self-revelation of God
with the "lordship of God", he emphasizes God’s
transcendental exclusiveness once again. Revelation is 
131testimony to the lordship of God because God’s self­
revelation is his own proof by himself alone.
Accordingly, such a whole event of revelation is a
self-enclosed circle but one which at the same time reaches 
13?out and embraces humanity. On the one hand, God reveals 
himself in actual fact as "somebody" and "something" for 
humanity, not as pure, absolute Thou. In his revelation 
God does not identify himself with something other than 
what he himself is. J "Thus in revealing "something" (his 
lordship) and "somebody" (namely, himself in his son), God
129 Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, p.306.
130 Ibid.
131 J, Thompson, Christ in Perspective: Christological 
Perspectives in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1978), p.37.
132 Ibid. , p. 42 .
TH, p.56.133
134 Ibid.
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reveals himself." On the other hand, Barth starts God’s 
revelation with the pre-existent Christ, with the second
person of the Trinity in the immanent Trinity. Then, 
firstly, "the history of Jesus Christ is recognized not 
merely as a 30-year episode in time and space, but as an
event encompassing and embracing the entire history of God
and man, beginning from eternity and stretching into
eternity". And secondly, in the person and work of
Christ "God is merely declaring to man what he had
consummated in eternity, by a decree which anticipates
everything temporal." In this way, revelation is an
eternal recapitulation of what God already is. The history
of Jesus Christ can therefore only recapitulate in time 
138what has already happened antecedently in eternity.
Of this Zahrnt says that "the divine Trinity devised a
drama in eternity, and gave its first performance within
itself, played by the three persons. Now this drama is to
be re-enacted on earth, as it has been in heaven. To this
end the world is created as the stage, and man as the
135 Ibid.
McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology: 
From the Enlightenment to Pannenberg, p.108. Cf. Zahrnt, 
The Question of God: Protestant Theology in the Twentieth 
Century, pp.94-95.
ibid., p.109. Cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2, 
pp.53-54.
138 Ibid. , p.110
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139spectator”. Obviously, God’s self-revelation, in the 
first sense, means God’s eternal self-understanding within
the triune God. It follows that "self-revelation of God”
means the "pure presence of God”, an "eternal presence of 
God in time”, a "presence without any future”. In a 
word, it is an epiphany of the eternal presence.
1.3.3.2.2 Bultmann
It is helpful to understand Bultmann’s concept of God’s 
revelation starting with Moltmann’s sharp observation.^ 
Bultmann in his 1924 essay "Liberal Theology and the Latest 
Theological Movement" says: "The subject of theology is 
God, and the chief charge to be brought against liberal
theology is that it has dealt not with God but with man.
God represents the radical negation and sublimation of 
man."443 However, This essay ends with the programmatic 
statement: "The subject of theology is God. Theology speaks 
of God because it speaks of man as he stands before God. 
That is, theology speaks of faith." * 1 Two points are worth 
noting here. In the first place, Bultmann, like Barth, does
43^ Zahrnt, The Question of God: Protestant Theology in 
the Twentieth Century, p.113.
140 TH, pp.55, 57.
444 Ibid . , p . 59 .
1 4 9 R. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, trans. L.P. 
Smith (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), p.29.
143 Ibid. , p.52.
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not see God as a given entity^ that can be known directly 
through objectification either mythical or scientific. God,
1 i cfor him, is the "Wholly Other" as one who is known only 
14 fiwhen he reveals himself. "His revelation comes only 
contingently; it is act, act directed toward In
the second place, God as the Wholly Other does not mean
that "God is something wholly different from man, a 
14 Qmetaphysical being, a kind of an immaterial world", 
since such a sort of metaphysical object is something 
constructed by human mind. God would remain an object and
his transcendence, just as in myth, would be reduced to
immanence As pointed out by R.A. Johnson, "Wholly
Other" is strictly a relational category which says more 
IEOabout the human condition than it does about God, Foi'
Bultmann, there is an unobservable, hidden correlation of 
God and the "self" of humanity, "God and the ‘self’ of man 
stand in unsevered relation to each other."131
ibid., pp.33, 45.
145 r, Bultmann, "What does it Mean to Speak of God?" 
in Faith and Understanding, trans.L.P. Smith (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1987), pp.53-65.
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Bultmann, Faith and Understanding,
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Ibid., p.57.
p.45.
R. Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology", in
Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate vol. I, ed. H. ~W.
Bartsch, trans. R.II. Fuller (London: SPCK, 1972 ), p.44.
150 R.A. Johnson, Introduction to Rudolf Bultmann: 
Interpreting Faith for the Modern Era, ed. R.A. Johnson 
(London: Collins, 1987), p.19. 151
151 TH, p.60.
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Then, how does humanity’s existence correlate with God? 
For Bultmann, "in human existence an existentiell knowledge 
about God is alive in the form of the inquiry about 
‘happiness’, ‘salvation*, the meaning of the world and of 
history; and in the inquiry into the real nature of each 
person’s particular ‘being’". While human being is 
asking the questions raised by one’s existence, he is 
seeking God or an answer only God can provide. Being the 
structure of human existence, this questionableness points 
to the pre-understanding of humanity in which humanity
understands implicitly that his existence is not separated 
from God. Therefore, Bultmann links humanity’s existential 
inquiry to Augustine’s famous statement that our hearts are 
restless until they find their rest in God. 0 "And we
cannot talk about our existence since we cannot talk about
God, We could do the one only along with the other ... 
Therefore the truth holds that when the question is raised 
of how any speaking of God can be possible, the answer must
i r jbe, it is only possible as talk of ourselves."” Owing to 
humanity’s existential structure, the only way of speaking 
of God is speaking of humanity’s own existence.
In this way, Bultmann places God and the self of
humanity in the same realm in which the characteristic of
152 R. Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, 
trans, J.C.G, Greig (London: SCM, 1955), p.257.
153 Ibid.
154 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, pp.60-61.
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non-objectifiability belongs to both. In humanity’s 
authentic encounter with God, both his own self and God 
are subjects, and God’s revelation would not be objectified 
in such an inter-subjective realm. It follows that God’s
revelation can only be spoken of in this encounter event.
God, then, only discloses himself to humanity’s 
transcendental subjectivity. Consequently, Bultmann’s proof 
of God, according to Moltmann, is "an advanced, deepened 
and reshaped form of the only proof of God left over by 
Kant -- the moral proof of God supplied by the practical 
reason"J God "proves himself to the believing 
‘self’ " J56
It follows that, in the view of Bultmann, through this
encounter one does not know a historisch (historical) 
event, but geschichtlich (historic) event. God’s saving act
1 c tiin Christ does not happen as Historie but as Geschichte.
An event is historisch in so far as it lies wholly within 
the past which is known through the objective methods of
historical research. An event is geschichtlich in so far as
it both lies in the past and has existential significance
for the present which is known through a personal
155 TH, p.61.
156 Ibid.
157 .It is M. Kahler who first makes the distinction 
between Historie and Geschichte that Bultmann uses.
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158encounter. ' What one encounters, then, is not the
historical facts but the meaning or significance of those
facts for humanity’s existence. H.P. Owen further points
out these two views of history’s relationship to time. "An
‘historical’ is wholly temporal ... An ‘historic’ event ...
is not wholly temporal; it is both temporal and eternal; it
is the point at which eternity crosses time." In other
words, humanity is facing God’s eternal presence in this
encounter. "Each encounter is a moment at which eternity
crosses time; it is an eschatological event in so far as it 
1 fi ftbrings time to an end." Then, how does this encounter
between God and humanity happen?
For Bultmann, this encounter happens when the Christ
event is preached. Humanity encounters God in the kerygma.
And in the kerygma, Christ is present. "The content of the
Kerygma is the event of Christ, and it is this event of 
1 fi 1Christ which takes place here and now in preaching."
Bultmann considers that the whole event of revelation is
1 fi?concentrated upon the kerygma. In other words, God’s 
revelation is proceeding through the present of the event
158 H.P. Owen, Revelation and Existence: A Study in the 
Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 1957), p.25,
Ibid,, pp.25-26.
160 Ibid. , p.44.
1 fi 1 Zahrnt, The Question of God: Protestant Theology in 
the Twentieth Century, p.235.
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of Christ in the kerygma. In this kerygma, God’s act in 
Christ reveals to humanity the eschatological event and 
calls humanity to make a decision about his own existence.
What is this eschatological event? By "eschatology"
Bultmann does not mean the catastrophic destruction of the
world at the end of time, but the end of the world which in 
1 fnfaith is an event taking place even now, Eschatological 
event is not an event that denotes the end of this physical 
world in time. It is God’s act in Christ and in the kerygma 
by which God has set an end to the old world in the sense
of inauthentic existence. Humanity is challenged to make
his own decision to be authentic or inauthentic while God
in the Christ event discloses that he has made authentic
existence possible. He comes to understand his old self and 
the possibility of coming to be a new one only in God’s 
revelation, Parousia is not some future event but happens
in the existential kerygma and makes the latter the 
eschatological event. Humanity is addressed by the kerygma 
here and now, "This 'Now’ of being addressed at a specified 
moment, this moment, is the eschatological 'Now’, because
in it the decision is made between life and death . . .
Therefore it is not true that the parousia, expected by 
others as an event occurring in time, is now denied or 
transformed by John into a process within the soul, an 
experience. Rather, John opens the reader’s eyes: the
Ibid., p.230.
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parousia has already occurred." ’’Eschatology is wholly 
'realized' and wholly individualized."^
God, then, can be spoken of only when humanity’s
existence is spoken of, because God encounters humanity in
his existence. Only in this encounter, God reveals himself
while humanity’s authenticity is disclosed in the kerygma
of God’s act in the Christ event. However, such a
revelation of God is an eschatological event which happens
as Geschichte. It is an eternal "now" happening in which
God’s revelation completes and humanity attains his
authentic existence. In this way, "God’s ‘futurity’ would
be ‘constant’ and man’s openness in his ‘wayfaring’ would 
1 fifilikewise be ‘constant’ and 'never-ending’". That is, 
both God and humanity would not have any future that is
better than this eschatological moment, Bultmann’s doctrine 
of revelation, as mentioned above, is another form of the 
"epiphany of the eternal present".
1.3.4 Pannenberg’s Doctrine of Revelation
Pannenberg’s doctrine of revelation starts with
his understanding of revelation as self-revelation of God
1 f / Bultmann, Faith and Understanding^ p.175.
165 Owen, Revelation and Existence: A Study in the 
Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p.45.
166 Tif, p.68.
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but indirect. On the one hand, he agrees with Barth to take 
167the notion of revelation from Hegel that revelation is 
not the disclosure of truths about God but "in essence, the
self-revelation of God".168 If revelation is self­
revelation, there can only be a single and unique
revelation.168 If revelation is self-revelation, "the
revealer and the content of the revelation are
identical".178 If revelation is self-revelation , "it
constitutes genuine, though not necessarily exhaustive, 
knowledge of God". On the other hand, Pannenberg
differs from Barth that according to his analysis of the
biblical materials God does not reveal himself directly, 
172but indirectly through his act in history. "Every
activity and act of God can indirectly express something 
173about God." Although an event initially discloses simply 
itself, it subsequently demands perceiving it as an act of * 168 * * 171 172 173
I (57 W. Pannenberg, Introduction to Revelation as 
History, ed. W. Pannenberg, trans. D. Granskow (London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1969), pp.4-5.
168 ibid., p.4.
168 e.F, Tupper, The Theology of Wolf hart Pannenberg 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975), p.82.
17® Ibid.,p.83.
171 C, Schwobel, "Wolfhart Pannenberg", in The Modern 
Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the 
Twentieth Century vol.l, ed. D.F. Ford (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989), p.259. Cf. Tupper, The theology of Wolfhart
Pannenberg, p,85 .
172 Pannenberg, Introduction to Revelation as History, 
pp.8-13. On the discussion of direct and indirect 
communication, see pp.13-19.
173 Ibid. , p. 15.
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God from a different perspective, Pannenberg reasons: "As 
acts of God, these acts cast light back on God himself, 
communicating something indirectly about God himself".1^
However, every individual event can ’’illuminate the 
being of God only in a partial way". It breaks up the 
self-revelation of God into individual pieces none of which 
would provide a full disclosure of God. Hence, revelation 
must be understood as "the totality of God’s action". 
"The totality of his speech and activity, the history 
brought about by God, shows who he is in an indirect 
way." Then, "revelation in the sense of the full self­
revelation of God in his glory can be possible only where
17fithe whole of history is understood as revelation."
Pannenberg admits there are two possibilities of
understanding the totality of reality: either in the Greek
way of unalterable cosmos or in the German idealism of 
temporal development. Although Pannenberg’s position is 
the latter, Moltmann says that it intends to extend and 
supersede the Greek cosmic theology with the same *
174 Ibid., p.16
175 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
^77 Ibid. , p. 13 .
178 77/, p.77.
179 Pannenberg, Introduction to Revelation as History,
P. 16.
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. 180 epistemological method: retroflexive argument. "The
place of the cosmological proof of God, which argued from 
’reality as cosmos’ to the one divine arche and so provided 
proof of a cosmological monotheism, is taken by a theology 
of history which argues back in the same way from the unity 
of 'reality as history’ to the one God of history."^1 
"Just as in Greek cosmic theology the eternal being of God 
is indirectly manifest in that which is, and can be 
inferred from it, so here God’s being would be recognized 
in the has-beens of history." They both take the 
totality as their starting point of proof of God but with
different denotation, one refers to cosmos whereas the
other refer to history. Their arguments are the same.
To be sure, understanding God’s self-revelation by the
category "history" instead of "cosmos" would make the 
1 fi4}reality "open-ended towards the future" because totality 
as history can only be attained at the end of history. It 
follows that "all knowledge of God and the world has an 
eschatolog'ically qualified ’provisional’ character". 
However, this future orientated history does get its 
meaning only under the condition of seeing reality in its 
totality. The significance of the future is due to the not
180 TH, pp,, 77 -78.
181 Ibid., P. 77.
182 Ibid., P. 78 .
183 Ibid.
Ibid.
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yet coming of the reality as a whole. With this, God’s 
"epiphany will be represented by the totality of reality in 
its completed form".^ The totality of reality as history, 
then, like a mirror reflects God’s being completely.
With the understanding that the totality of history
constitutes God’s self-revelation, how can one interpret
the historical particularity of Jesus of Nazareth as God’s
final revelation? Pannenberg says that "in the fate of
Jesus, the end of history is experienced in advance as an 
187anticipation". "Jesus is the anticipated end and not the
middle of history." As the pre-actualization of the end
of history, Jesus of Nazareth discloses God’s power over
everything in his own resurrection. Since the prophetic-
apocalyptic tradition links God’s glory at the end with the
general resurrection of the dead, "the appearance and the
fate of Jesus is thus decisively defined by means of the 
180prophetic-apocalyptic expectation of the end". 
Therefore, the resurrection of Jesus is not only his own
185 Ibid. , p. 79.
186 Tupper, The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, p.92.
187 W. Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Concept of 
Revelation" in Revelation as History, ed. W. Pannenberg, 
ed. D. Granskow (London: sheed and Ward, 1969), p.134.
188 W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology: 
Collected Essays vol.I, trans. G.H. Kehm (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1983), p.24.
ion Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Concept of 
Revelation", in Revelation as History, p.146,
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but also the prolepsis of the end-time resurrection of the
dead,
At this point, Moltmann criticizes: "If it were solely 
the risen 'destiny’ of Jesus that constituted the 
forestalling of the end of all history and the anticipation 
of the 'destiny’ still awaiting all men, then the risen
Jesus himself would have no further future. Nor would it be
for Jesus himself that those who known him would wait, but 
only for the repetition of his destiny in themselves. The 
church would be waiting for that which has already happened 
to Jesus to be repeated for itself, but not for the future 
of the risen Lord" In other words, the end of all
history would only be the repetition and confirmation of
God’s final revelation in the resurrection of Jesus. It
follows that the revelation of God in the destiny of Jesus
is but the pre-actualization of his eternal present.
While taking totality as his primary category of the
self-revelation of God which requires that only at the end
of history there is a full revelation of God, Pannenberg at
the same time understands that God discloses the end of
history in the resurrection of Jesus. This leaves his
doctrine of revelation no better than the epiphany of the
eternal present. The crucial problem is that he sees
revelation as history but does not ask the question of how
190 TH, p.82. For the comment on Moltmann’s criticisms 
of Pannenberg as illegitimate, see Tupper, The Theology of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, pp.259-260.
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history is possible. History is only a mirror reflecting 
God’s being indirectly. Then, Jesus’ resurrection, as a 
historical occurrence and a prolepsis of the end of 
history, reflects God’s final act in history. If God’s act 
at the end of history is the epiphany of his eternal 
present, then the resurrection of Jesus would be the pre­
actualization of the epiphany of God’s eternal present. It 
reflects God’s whole glory in advance.
1.4 Conclusion: The Characteristic of Revealing in the Way 
of Epiphany of the Eternal Present
In this part the common characteristics of the concept
of revelation in the ideas mentioned above will be pointed 
out. They are all the conditions that lead God’s revelation
to be the epiphany of the eternal present. And it is to be 
acknowledged that Pannenberg’s doctrine of revelation, 
indeed, should not be counted in the same pattern of the 
epiphanic revelation. However, according to Moltmann, his
turn away from the epiphany of the eternal present is not 
radical enough. This will be analyzed in this section
also .
1,4.1 Two Levels of Reality and Dual Tracks of Time
In the first place, all of them, except Pannenberg, 
take a view of two levels or modes of reality or world and
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correspondingly dual tracks of time or history. In the
Canaanite religion, they are the original beginning with 
the sacred or mythical time and the changing world with the 
profane time. In Parmenides’ thought, Being is contrasted
witli becoming which is illusion. The former is eternal
while the latter is in time. Kant divides reality as the
realm of noumena and that of phenomena according to the 
twofold functions of humanity’s reason: theoretical and 
practical. The world of phenomena is under the control of
the law of causality in time, but that of noumena is not
conditioned by time so as to be free from any restriction.
In the Christian theology, Barth’s eternity and time, or 
Geschichte which is conditioned by Urgeschichte and
Historic, are the contrast between the history of God and 
history of the world respectively. Bultmann’s Geschichte
and Historie belong to two different modes of existence,
namely, authentic and inauthentic; or two different modes
of world: objective and inter-subjective. Barth takes
"refuge from Historie in the diffuse realms of pre- or
supra-history; Bultmann ... in the inwardness of 
191existential historicity".
These two worlds and histories do not enjoy the same
ontological status. The real reality is the eternal, 
changeless world rather than the transient, changeable. The 
real reality cannot be known or approached through the less
191 McGrath, The Making of Modern Christology: From the 
Enlightenment to Pannenberg, pp.164-165.
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real reality. Therefore, they do not merely posit God but
also locate his revelation in this realm so as to avoid
God’s revelation of himself being distorted by the 
changeable world. Hence, God’s revelation does not happen 
in the sphere of profane time but sacred or mythical time, 
not sense experience but abstract thinking, not phenomena
but noumena, not Historic but Geschichte, In a word, they 
ultimately retreat to a sphere that is free from any 
distortion of God’s eternal being. It follows that God’s 
revelation is a process or an event of disclosing something 
that is perfect and actualized but not something that is
not yet arrived. God in this sphere is perfect and 
complete, lacks nothing to be finished in the future. Then, 
what he reveals is his actualization in eternity and his
revelation is a kind of the epiphany of the eternal
present.
If God’s revelation happens in the sphere of eternity, 
then the problem for humanity in time would be; how can 
they approach this sphere so as to know God’s revelation? 
Then, what follows is the problem that how God’s revelation
can be received by humanity.
1.4.2 Revelation in Analogical Way
In the Canaanite religion the very beginning is present 
when a certain pattern of rite is practised. Because this 
rite shares the same structure with the cosmogony, every
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time this significant action is repeated, the archetypal 
action of God, which takes place in a mythical time, is
being repeated. In this kind of religion God reveals his 
eternal present in an analogical way through humanity’s 
practising a pattern of religious rite which corresponds to 
God’s action in the very beginning. Instead of revealing 
through religious rite, Parmenides’s Being can only be 
known through humanity’s reason or thinking. Being and 
thinking are the same thing. Being’s eternal character is 
reflected in the principles of thinking which determine the
former.
Barth’s doctrine of revelation, first of all, is God’s 
self-revelation through himself, and then a reflection of
this internal action in the history of Jesus Christ in the 
world. God’s revelation, from the very beginning, is in an
analogical way in a strict sense. This means that God is
revealed through God only. In the case of Bultmann, God 
reveals himself through humanity’s authenticity. He admits
that there is an analogy between the activity of God and
that of humanity and between the fellowship of God and 
192humanity and that of humanity with humanity. Then, the
difference between Barth and Bultmann is not something
about the epistemological principle according to which God
is known or revealed, but is something about through what,
God or humanity, God is known or revealed. They both follow
19? R. Bultmann, ’’Bultmann Replies to his Critics”, in
Kerygma, and Myth: A Theological Debate vol. I, ed.H.-W.
Bartsch, trans. R.H. Fuller (London: SPCK, 1972), p.197.
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the analogical way of revelation but with different
application.
To put it in a sum, this kind of religion, philosophy 
and theology all takes analogical way as the way of 
God’s revelation. However, the point most worth noting is 
the relationship with the two levels of reality, the dual 
tracks of history and revelation as the epiphany of the 
eternal present.
In the theory of two levels of reality or two kinds of 
world, God is posited in the eternity which is perfect and 
fully actualized ontologically. And every act of God, 
including the activity of God revealing himself, is bound 
to this eternal realm. The only way for God to reveal
himself, then, is through something that belongs to
eternity, or is in time but not of time so that his
revelation would not be distorted by the transient world 
but can be known by it. Obviously, the analogical way of
revelation is the best way to be used under these
conditions. Through it God is reflected as such without any 
distortion. However, it is precisely for this reason, God’s 
revelation is the revelation of his eternal present.
Therefore, it is understandable that such a kind of
revelation does not initiate any history of the world, and
also there is not any history of God.
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1.4.3 The Non-Radical Turn of Pannenberg’s Doctrine of
Revelation
Surely, Pannenberg gets rid of the dual tracks of 
history by seeing revelation as history. However, his 
emphasis on the primacy of the category "totality” makes 
him neglect the crucial problem that how history is 
possible, as Moltmann charges him with this: "it itself
fails to undertake critical reflection on the conditions of
the possibility of perceiving reality as history in the 
eschatological and theological sense.” This is because 
Pannenberg, epistemologically, adopts Greek’s retroflexive 
argument, according to Moltmann, which "presupposes an 
unbroken link between God and history, on the ground of 
which we can argue back from it to him” "Since this is 
also the basis of the cosmological proof of God, 'history’ 
is here understood as indirect theophany, just as the 
cosmos then was in Greek cosmology."^
In this way, if history is taken as revelation of God,
it should be understood primary by its whole rather than 
its process. It is only against the background of taking 
history as a whole that . history as process gets its
meaning. But this can happen only when history comes to the
end. History as totality, like a finished product, reflects
TH, p.79.
Ibid., pp.77-78, n. 7.
195 Ibid.
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indirectly God’s eternal being' at this moment. Pannenberg 
is right in limiting his application of analogy in the 
sphere of eternity. And by understanding of the
resurrection of Jesus as the prolepsis of the end of the 
universal history, Pannenberg takes it as the pre­
actualization of God’s power of unity over all. In other 
words, God’s being is disclosed in advance in the 
resurrection of Jesus as the one who unites all the things 
and God’s future, thus, is anticipated as the universal 
manifestation of his power. It seems that analogical 
principle is applied at this point once again. 
Nevertheless, he does not further explain how history is 
initiated so as to be the meaningful reality. That is, 
under what conditions history is possible to be perceived 
as reality.
On this, Moltmann comments: "But to think both of the 
God of the resurrection and the reality of the world is not 
possible in the direct way attempted in the cosmological 
proof of God, for this would presuppose an ordered world 
and a divine plan of history which is identical with the 
course of history. In the face of the reality of suffering 
and the God-forsaken state of this world and history, both 
are illusionary." ' Apparently, the underlying reason for 
Moltmann criticizing Pannenberg of lacking critical 
reflection on the conditions of the possibility of
196 HP, p.25.
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perceiving’ reality as history is that Pannenberg' does not 
take the God-forsaken state of this world and history into 
account in his doctrine of revelation. This comment gets
its response from J, Sobrino, a liberation theologian. He
writes:
. . , Pannenberg does not seem to realize that the 
negative side of history cannot be comprehended 
readily in the horizon of a universal history because 
it is in fact the negative aspect which seems to rule 
out any possibility of giving some total meaning to 
history. ... History cannot be comprehended as a whole 
so long as suffering, misery, and injustice exist,
Therefore, for Moltmann, Pannenberg’s doctrine of 
revelation belongs to the same kind of Barth’s and 
Bultmann’s, because they "all presuppose that the
validation of what is Christian must be found in the fact
that word and reality, word and existence, word and name
are congurent, and the truth is experienced in 
correspondence, confirmity and agreement". What Moltmann
rejects is the immediate correspondence of God’s self­
revelation which happens not only in the revelation as the 
epiphany of the eternal present, but also the revelation as 
history.197 198 9
197 J. Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads: A Latin 
American View, trans. J Drury (London: SCM, 1978), p,251.
198 HP, P.15.
199 •R.D. Johns considers that "the key difference 
between Pannenberg’s position and that of Moltmann ... 
centers on the concept of history". Man in the World: The 
Theology of Johannes Baptist Metz (Montana: Scholars, 
1976), p.104.
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2 Revealing in the Promise
2.1 Different Views on What and How
2.1.1 Ontological What Over Epistemological How
In the previous chapter two conditions which determine 
God’s revelation by way of epiphany of the eternal presence
are drawn out. These two conditions, namely, two kinds of
world and analogical principle, however, belong to two
different aspects, ontological and epistemological
respectively. Furthermore, it is the former that determines
the latter but not vice versa.
In this thought of two kinds of world, God and his
action are of eternity, in contrast to the transient world.
Whatever belongs to this divine world is perfect and
actualized so that any improvement and development does not
happen. This is very simple. Improvement or development
means the change of something from one state to another
state. "Improvement" implies that such a thing is not 
perfect enough at present so that it is going to change
itself from imperfect to perfect in the future. 
"Development" means that it does not reach its own 
actuality yet so that it is going to actualize its
potential fully. Owing to their implication of imperfect
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and non-actualized, improvement and development are
excluded from the eternal world.
In a word, being perfect and actualized are the two
characteristics of the eternal world, which can be further
classified as the states of ontological whatness. Two 
epistemological consequences follow. Firstly, it is due to 
these ontological characteristics that no process is 
allowed to appear in its epistemological how, that is, the 
way of revelation. God’s self-revelation is not to be given 
by way of process in any sense, but in a point of eternal 
present. In other words, God reveals his eternal presence 
by way of epiphany of the eternal present so that his 
revelation is not involved in any temporal transience. It 
is his eternal presence that confines his way of revelation 
to that of eternal present. Therefore, God’s self­
revelation is ahistorical.
Secondly, this revelation in the way of epiphany of the 
eternal present is possible only when it takes the
analogical principle as its epistemological condition. The 
essential function of the analogical principle is 
reflection. This means that by the analogical principle 
God’s sel f-revelation is like the image reflected in the 
mirror immediately. Surely, the thing which plays the role
of mirror must be something that can reach its eternal 
state, by nature such as Jesus Christ in Barth’s theology
certain conditions
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or under such as authentic, not
inauthentic, humanhood in Bultmann’s theology, so as to be 
able to reflect God himself without any distortion.
Obviously, while this analogical principle is taken as the 
condition of epistemological how, God’s self-revelation 
will not affect the ontological what in any sense. God’s 
self-revelation in this way just plays a role of reflecting
his own being rather than having a retroactive effect on
himself. This is because, ontologically, God is perfect and 
actualized already.
This kind of thought gives the ontological what
priority over the epistemological how. And what follows is
that the former determines the latter but not the reverse.
It does not take the epistemological how into account
seriously enough when studying God’s self-revelation.
Consequently, ahistoricality characterizes God’s self­
revelation. On the contrary, Moltmann starts his doctrine
of revelation with the concrete "how" rather than the
formal definition of revelation which allows the
ontological what to determine the epistemological how, such
as in the cases of Barth and Bultmann. For Bultmann: "In
general, we understand by revelation the disclosure of what 
is veiled, the opening up of what is hidden."1 For Barth: 
"Revelation in the Christian sense means the unveiling of 
certain facts that are fundamentally hidden from man, 
things no eye has seen, no ear has heard, no human heart
1 R. Bultmann, Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of 
Rudolf Bultmann, trans. S.M. Ogden (London: Collins, 1964), 
pp,67-68.
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2conceived." These general and formal definitions of 
revelation do not give any clear and concrete account of 
how God reveals himself. However, both Bultmann and Barth[ 
do not proceed further along the same line but shift to the
ontological level of whatness. The doctrine of revelation,
then, is subordinate to the doctrine of humanity and the
doctrine of God respectively in favour of the proofs of
God. The epistemological how is subject to the ontological 
what. Consequently, one may suspect: "Does not the view of 
revelation in actuality distort the particular, historical 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ?"* 4 5
2.1.2 Moltmann’s Starting Point: God’s Promise
From the very beginning, Moltmann considers that 
"revelation" cannot be understood apart from "the way of 
revelation". Rather, the specific way of revelation is 
essential to and constitutive of the concept of revelation.
Moltmann writes: "Revelation is understood from the
standpoint of the promise contained in the revelation. 
For him, "the expression for 'revelation1 in the biblical 
scriptures have completely broken out of their original
K. Barth, Against the Stream: Shorter Post-War 
Writings 1946-52, trans. M.E. Delacour and S. Godman 
(London: SCM, 1954), p,207.
d TH, p.43.
4 M.D. Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), p.60.
5 TH, p.100.
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religious context and are employed with a meaning of a
different kind."^ "This different kind of meaning is mainly 
ndetermined by the events of promise." That is, "the
concept of revelation has to be derived from the event of 
0promise," This means that God’s way of self-revelation 
gets primacy, not his eternal being, when speaking of God’s 
self-revelation. Then, humanity’s knowledge about God is 
determined, at least, not only ontologically by God’s 
eternal being, but also epistemologically by his way of 
revealing himself. This is because "revelation" is not 
formal without a concrete way. Conversely, the particular way 
of God’s self-revelation would help to determine and shape 
what is revealed and even God’s own being.
Therefore, Moltmann plainly advocates in the Theology 
of Hope the following famous statement: "God reveals
himself in the form of promise and in the history that is 
marked by promise."* 7 * 9 Through a comprehensive study of 
scripture, Moltmann discovers that "both Israel and the 
early church regarded the primary form of God’s presence 
and appearance among them as promise for the future".^
Ibid., p.45.
7 Ibid.
0 Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, p.72.
9 TH, p.42.
S.J. Grenz and R.E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: 
God and the World in a Transitional Age (Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 1992), p.177.
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2.2 Revelation as Promise
2.2.1 Moltmann’s Concept of God’s Promise
When a promise is given, its truth is proved only when
it is fulfilled afterward. In other words, a promise
requires its own fulfillment in order to prove itself.
Likewise, when God reveals himself in the way of promise,
the first question to be asked is about its fulfillment. 
However, for Moltmann, the fulfillment of God’s promise is 
not immediate . According to the content of God’s promise, 
it "requires a future in order to prove .itself",^ In this 
vein, it is necessary to know Moltmann’s understanding of 
God’s promise firstly.
Moltmann in his Theology of Hope gives a clear
explanation of what he understands by "promise" and more
specifically by the "promise of (the guide-)God" in seven 
12points. He derives these descriptions mainly from W.
13Zimmerli’s essay , "Promise and Fulfillment". They can be
summarized as follows,
H C. Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s 
Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), p.39.
12 TH, pp. 102-106.
13 W. Zimmerli, "Promise and Fulfillment" in Essays on 
Old Testament Interpretation, ed. C. Westermann, trans. 
J.L. Mays (London: SCM, 1963), pp.89-122.
14 R, Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott), pp.29-30.
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(a) A promise announces the coming of a reality that does 
not yet exist. In the case of the divine promise, this
future reality need not be a conceivable development from
the possibilities of the present, but is what is possible
for God.
(b) The promise initiates a history which leads to its 
fulfillment, and by arousing people’s hopes for this 
fulfillment it involves people in its history and thus
gives them a sense for history.
(c) The history initiated by the promise has a definite
direction towards the promised fulfillment. Thus the
promise creates a sense of past and future, dividing
reality "into one reality which is passing and can be left 
behind, and another which must be expected and sought".^
(d) Because it announces a future reality, the promise
stands in contrast to the reality which is open to present
experience and seeks a different reality which will
correspond to it.
(e) Between the giving of the promise and its fulfillment
is an interval in which people may live in hope and
obedience or in resignation and disobedience. This
distinguishes the promise from fatalistic predictions.
TH, p.103.
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(f) Since it is God who gives the promise, it is God in his
freedom and faithfulness who is trusted to fulfil them.
This means that fulfillment is not a matter of implementing 
a prediction to the letter, but can contain elements of
surprise and novelty.
(g) The promises to Israel were not left behind in Israel’s 
history through fulfillment or disappointment, but were 
constantly reinterpreted in a wider sense. In an "expanding 
history of promise" each fulfillment left an overplus of 
promise pointing to further fulfillment, since a reality 
wholly corresponding to the God who gave the promise was
never reached.
2,2.2 The Character of God’s Promise (I): Future-Oriented 
and Contradictorily Structured
It should be noted that all the points with which 
Moltmann explicates the concept of promise are inseparable 
from the "future of this world". Indeed, the content of 
God’s promise is nothing other than "the future of this 
world”. The first character of God’s promise, then, is 
f uture-oriented.
The promise points always from the appearances in which
it is uttered, into the as yet unrealized future which it 
I fiannounces. For Moltmann God’s appearance is not to be
Ibid., p.100.16
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considered in terras of the hallowing of places and times, 
but is immediately linked up with the uttering of a word of 
divine promise. What should be paid attention to in God’s 
self-revelation, then, is not his "sensually perceptible 
appearance", but his "announcement of his action" in the 
first place.
God’s announcement is about the not yet arrived 
reality. What the promise is primarily concerned with, 
then, is not God’s eternal present, not like the doctrines 
of revelation in Barth and Bultmann. The promise does not 
announce anything about God simply in himself, but the 
future of this world. In other words, what is disclosed in 
God’s revelation as promise is firstly the future reality 
of this world, rather than the eternal being of God
himself.
It is this future that makes Moltmann’s concept of 
promise different from others’ ahistorical promise. There 
are two cases in which a promise does not involve any
historical process in its realization. The first one is
that it can be fulfilled immediately when it is given. The
second one is that it does not realize itself in this
transient world but in an eternal realm. However, if God’s 
promise is about the future of this world, then its
fulfillment cannot be abstracted from the historical
Ibid., p.99.
18 Ibid. , n.2 .
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process by either immediate realization or eternal
actualization.
The second character of God’s promise is its 
contradictory structure. In Moltmann’s view, this promised 
future reality and the present reality do not merely differ
from one another, but even contrast to each other. Moltmann
expresses this very clearly in point (d): The promise
"stands in contradiction to the reality open to experience
now and heretofore". The statement of promise "must stand
in contradiction to the reality which can at present be 
20experienced". In this way, a contradictory relationship 
is set up between the future and the present of this world.
The promise is dialectic structured.
As pointed out by Bauckham, although Moltmann’s concept 
of promise is indebted much to Zimmerli’s essay it is 
notable that point (d) is not explicit in Zimmerli . It is 
this explicit understanding of the contradiction that makes 
him as "a thoroughly dialectical thinker", not in the
™ Ibid., p.18.
21 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p,30.
H.W. Frei, "Book Review of The Theology of Hope", 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 23/3 (1968), p.268.
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Kierkegaardian or the early Barthian sense but in the 
23Hegelian and Marxian sense,
Moltmann writes: ’’Hope’s statements of promise ... must 
stand in contradiction to the reality which can at present
be experienced . . . They do not seek to illuminate the
reality which exists, but the reality which is coming. They
do not seek to make a mental picture of existing reality,
but to lead existing reality towards the promised and hope-
for transformation . , . In so doing they give reality a
historic character.”23 4 25Moltmann draws a difference between
the statements of promise and those statements ’’which
describe existing reality and whose truth is therefore 
9 Ktested by their correspondence to existing reality”.
The latter does not require a transformation of the 
present, but conversely confirms and even justifies the 
status quo. This kind of revelation does not initiate any 
historical movement. However, the "promise, in
contradicting this present reality, discloses not an 
eternal present, but a different future for this reality,
23 Ibid. For a brilliant comparison of Hegel’s 
dialectic with Kierkegaard’s, see M.C. Taylor, Journeys to 
Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980), pp,141-180. For a general sketch 
of modern dialectic, see J. Ellul, What I Believe, trans. 
G.W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans/London: Marshall and 
Scott, 1989), pp.30-35.
24 TH, p.18
25 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.30.
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whose changeableness thereby becomes not meaningless 
transience, but movement in a meaningful direction".
2.2.3 The Initiation of the History of this World
God’s promise creates the history of this world through 
its two characters: future-oriented and contradictorily 
structured. How is this possible? Firstly, God’s promise 
for the world divides one reality into the future and the 
present. The promise "has not yet found a reality congruous 
with it". This not yet existed reality implies that the 
present reality of this world is not the same as the
announced future. This promised future, then, has a 
function of uncovering the present reality in a contrasting 
way. Owing to this, a difference is set up between the 
future reality and the present reality. It is this
difference that makes the movement from the present towards 
the future possible.
Secondly, God’s promise provides a goal and direction
for the world to attain. The announced future serves as a
definite direction for the movement from the present
towards the future, Such a movement, owing to its "definite 
28trend towards the promised and outstanding fulfillment",
26
27
Of!
Ibid.
Ttf, p.103.
Ibid.
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The future isnq"does not consist in cyclic recurrence", 
not a repetition of the origin. It does not return to its
starting point, but moves towards a reality which is
different from the present and the past.
However, is the difference between the future and the
present a sufficient reason for the initiation of history?
This means that if the future is only different from the
present, why must one leave the present for the future and
not stick to the present? Obviously, the difference itself
cannot serve as the criterion of judging which is better.
The fact that the future reality is different from the 
present does not justify that the former should be pursued
or attained. The difference between the future and the
present alone does not have the cogency making the present
reality left behind.
At this point one will understand why point (d) is so 
crucial in Moltmann’s understanding of the concept of 
promise. If the history of this world moving from the 
present to the future cannot be justified, then God’s
revelation as promise will lose its historic character.
Moltmann will fail to reject the doctrine of revelation in 
the way of the epiphany of the eternal present.
The concept of contradiction implies difference but not 
vice versa. A contradictory relationship is a mutually
29 Ibid.
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exclusive one, whereas a relationship of difference is not
necessarily such. Either-or is the structure of
contradiction but this is not the case with difference. In
this way, a negation happens within this contradictory
relationship.
Therefore, thirdly, it is only when the future and the
present are posited, according to their natures, on the
opposite poles, that the former can negate the latter
through a historical movement. In this way, the future
gains its primacy over the present because the latter is 
going to be negated and abolished. And in turn, a 
historical moving from the present towards the future is 
justified. It is this negation inherent in the 
contradiction that originates and drives the history moving 
towards the future and leaving behind the present. In other 
words, the promised future which contradicts the present is 
the crucial force that initiates the history of this world 
moving in a dialectical way.
In sum, history is initiated when "the word of promise 
cuts into events and divides one reality into reality which 
is passing and can be left behind, and another which must 
be expected and sought". In this way, the historicity of 
this world is justified. The changeableness of the world is 
not absurd but with particular and meaningful direction.
Ibid., p.103.
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2.2,4 The Significances for God’s Self-Revelation
When God reveals himself in the way of promise, there 
are several significant points which differs this kind of 
God’s self-revelation from that in the way of the epiphany 
of the eternal presence,
2.2.4.1 The Revelation of God’s Faithfulness
God’s self-revelation as promise leads to a different 
understanding of God’s being. As noted by C. Morse, when 
the question of how God is revealed is followed by that of 
what of God is revealed, God’s self in the general answer
of that God reveals God’s self would have different
sense. He considers that ’’the who and the what of
revelation cannot be understood apart from how revelation 
onoccurs’’.
When a promise is fulfilled, what is revealed is the 
faithfulness of the promisor. Therefore, "'God himself’,” 
Moltmann writes, "cannot be understood as reflection on his 
transcendent I-ness, but must be understood as his self­
sameness in historical fidelity to his promise.’"3 Morse 
makes a remark on this: ’’The contrast he draws is between
31 C. Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s 
Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), p.41.
32 Ibid. , p.77.
33 TH, p.116.
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Ichheit and Selbig'keit, between God’s transcendental 
selfhood and his historical faithfulness."^4 Meeks puts 
this contrast further: "The revelation of God is not the
unveiling of the essence of God in terms of the essence of
history, of existence, or the divine name. Rather
revelation is the demonstration of God’s faithfulness to
a rhis promise". "God is known not as a transcendental self 
beyond history, but as one who pledges himself to do things 
in history - to implement his righteousness, to accomplish 
his lordship in the world". In a word, what is revealed 
is God’s faithfulness, not his eternal presence.
2.2.4.2 History of this World as the Predicate of God’s
Self-Revelation
In this way of God’s self-revelation, the history of
this world is to be justified as meaningful by God’s
promise and its fulfillment. On the one hand, God’s promise 
3 7"originates, drives and directs the process of history".
On the other hand, as the promise is to be fulfilled by God 
himself, "history has to be understood as a predicate of 
the eschatological revelation". God’s faithfulness to his
A t
Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s Theology,
P. 41.
3,) Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, p.72.
3(5 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p, 31 .
37 TH, p.75.
38 Ibid. , p.76.
78
promise "makes the history of this world a constituent of 
God’s self-revelation".^
The history of this world, then, is not something that 
stands in contrast to God’s being. God’s self-revelation 
does not negate the history of this world.
If "history" is a predicate of God’s self-revelation, 
then "this world" is a predicate of God’s self-disclosure 
as.well. This is because the former is the history of "this 
world", not the history itself. This world is not merely a 
recipient of God’s word when God reveals himself in his 
promise. Rather, it is made to be a constituent of God’s
self-revelation when the history of this world is created 
by God’s promise. Therefore, as something other than God,
this world does not stand in contradiction to God but is
involved in his self disclosure.
It follows that God does not stand in contrast to the
world, not like the case in the revelation in the epiphany 
of the eternal presence?®
39 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Makingj p.31.
R.S. Chopp misunderstands that an antithesis exists 
between God and the world. "Theology, in Moltmann’s work, 
substantively interprets the narratives of God while it 
formally reveals the contradiction between God and world." 
[ The Parxis of Suffering: An Interpretation of Liberation 
and Political Theologies (New York: Orbis, 1986), p,102,
cf. p.106.]
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2,2.4.3 Revelation in Dialectical Way
The saying that God reveals himself in a dialectical
way does not mean that God’s self-revelation is a kind of 
divineself-negation. It does mean that the present reality 
reveals God in a dialectical way. That is, God is revealed 
through the negation of the present reality. This is 
because "the revealing of the divinity of God ,.. depends 
entirely on the real fulfillment of the promise"44 which is 
totally opposite to the present reality.
Epistemologically, when God reveals himself in the way 
of promise, he does not disclose himself analogically 
through the present reality of this world. "The absolute is 
not . . . extrapolated from the presently available 
reality."41 2 The relationship of God’s being to the present 
reality is not an analogical one. The former cannot be
reflected by the latter. Consequently, God’s self­
revelation is not a kind of immediate disclosure of his
eternal presence. The analogical principle is not
applicable to this way of revelation.
Indeed, God reveals himself through the negation of the
present reality of this world. Nothing in the present 
reality can reflect God’s being. Conversely, it is the 
opposite side of the present reality that can disclose God.
41 TH, p.86.
42 FH, p.ll.
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That is, he reveals himself in the reality which stands in
contradiction to the present one.
In sum, epistemologically, God reveals himself in the
dialectical way, not analogical. Accordingly, what is
revealed in this way is God’s faithfulness, rather than his 
eternal presence. And the changeableness of this world is
justified as well. It follows that God’s relationship to 
this world is not a kind of relationship between eternity
and transience. In other words, ontologically, there is not
any two levels of reality and dual tracks of time.
2.3 The Dialectical Movement
2,3,1 The Character of God’s
Schema
When a specific
that the history
not the case that
Moltmann in his
clearly states: ”
liquidated by
disappointment
contrary Israel’s
of the Promissory History
Promise (II): Non-Mechanical
it seems
this is
history.
promise
not
neither by
that on the
gave them a
historic future is fulfilled,
is running to its end. However, 
happens in Israel’s promissory 
explanation of the concept of
the Old testament promises . . .
the history of Israel
nor by fulfillment - but
experience of history
were
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constantly new and wider interpretation". This means that 
no matter what happens to God’s promise, either fulfillment 
or disappointment, Israel’s history is still moving on. But 
how could this be possible? That is, why is God’s promise
not to be liquidated by fulfillments but can be re­
interpreted with a new and wider content?
To this, Moltmann’s answer is that: "the God who is
recognized in his promises remains superior to any
fulfillment that can be experienced, because in every
fulfillment the promise, and what is still contained in it,
does not yet become wholly congruent with reality and thus
there always remains an overspill".^ What Moltmann tries
to point out here is the non-mechanical structure of God’s
promise. There "can be no burning interest in contructing
a hard and fast juridical system of historic necessities
according to a schema of promise and fulfillment".^ For
him, God’s promise and fulfillment cannot be treated as an 
4 fiabstract schema with historic necessity. Instead of this, 
Moltmann proposes what is disclosed by God’s promise is to 
be seen as a movable horizon rather than a fixed boundary
until it reaches its ultimate.
4 TH, p.104. Bauckham considers that Moltmann’s 
exposition of this point ( TH, pp.105-106) owes a good deal 
to E, Bloch, Principle of Hope, trans. N. Plaice, S. Plaice 
and P. Knight (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp.178-195. See 
Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making, p.151, n.8.
Ibid,, p.105.
45 Ibid. , p.104.
Ibid., pp.106, 112.
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2.3.2 Expanding the Horizon of History
As pointed out by Meeks, the notion of the "history of 
promise" is von Rad’s greatest legacy to the theology of 
hope. For von Rad, Israel’s history happens in the 
tension between "promise’ and "fulfillment" which expresses 
a "periodizing of history". "The gradual progression ... 
from a promise to its fulfillment and from there to the
next promise introduces an inner movement into history 
which keeps it open for the future."^ Von Rad writes: 
"Here everything is in motion, the accounts never balance, 
and fulfillment unexpectedly gives rise in turn to another
promise of something greater still. Here nothing has its
ultimate meaning in itself, but is always an earnest of 
something still greater"?® Von Rad notes that fulfillment 
gives rise to another greater promise. However, he does not
ask further: in what way does this happen? It follows that
he does not propose any theological concept in
understanding the transformation of the fulfillment.
Although Moltmann owes a great deal to von Rad in
Meeks, Origins of Theology of Hope, pp.70-71. On 
Moltmann’s reception of von Rad, see pp.70-73. For a 
detailed introduction to von Rad’s interpretation of Old 
Testament, see J.L. Crenshaw, Grehard von Rad (Texas: Word 
Books, 1978).
1 H.G. Reventlow, Problems of Old Testament Theology 
in the Twentieth Century, trans. J. Bowden (London: SCM, 
1985), p.75.
49 Ibid.
G. von Rad, "Typolog'ische Ausleg’ung’ des Alten 
Tesamentes", Evang'elische Theologie 12 ( 1952 ), p.29. Citied 
from TH, p.107.
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understanding Israelite history, he does not yet get the
proper concept from von Rad in understanding the operation
of its dialectical movement.
Moltmann employs H.-G. Gadamer’s hermeneutical concept 
of "horizon" to help explain the dialectical movement of 
the promissory history. Gadamer understands that "a horizon
is not a rigid frontier, but something that moves with one 
and invites one to advance further".^ C.E. Braaten’s 
explanation of the meaning of horizon in phenomenological 
and hermeneutical philosophy is worth noting:
In phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophy 
horizon is a field of vision which includes two sides, 
one subjective and the other objective. The horizon of 
the viewer is his subjective standpoint, how he looks 
out upon the world. The objective pole is the wide 
range of what comes into view, the outer limits within 
which anything that appears has its place and meaning. 
A horizon, accordingly, is not to be thought of as 
merely subjective or objective, but involves a dynamic 
situation in which the horizon of the subject attempts 
to expand continually to overtake the horizon of all 
that is not yet known. Thus, a horizon is not a closed 
and fixed situation, neither on the subjective nor on 
the objective side.
51 -H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. W. Glen- 
Doepel, ed. G. Barden and J. Cumming (London: Sheed and •.
Ward, 1975), p.217. For a detailed and comprehensive
exposition of Truth and Method, see J.C. Weinsheimer,
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). And a good
introduction to Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be found in:
R.E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in \
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp.162-217; J.
Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as 
Method, Philosophy and Critique (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1980), pp.108-116.
C.E, Braaten, The Future of God: The Revolutionary ?
Dynamics of Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p.168,
n . 12 , ;
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Braaten clearly explains that horizon is both objective and
subjective. Also it is not fixed and closed but attempts to
expand itself continually so as to be the horizon of all.
Moltmann applies this concept of horizon to understand
the boundary of history which is disclosed by God’s 
promise. If the horizon of history is moving along with
people, then the event which fulfills the promise does not
put an end to God’s promise because it is within the time- 
span. There is another boundary ahead for people to pursue.
Everything which happens within this new horizon, then, has
an unfinished and provisional character that points
forwards because there is still something that is 
53outstanding, not yet finalized, not yet realized. All
fulfillments are denied as the completions of God’s promise
so that they are to be treated as the realities that can be
left behind.
However, ’’the * f uf illments ’ are taken as expositions, 
confirmations and expansion of the promise"?* They are 
being integrated into the promise so as to expand it. In 
this way, God’s promise is being transformed into a greater
one and in turn the horizon of history it discloses will be 
wider as well. "The greater the fulfillments become, the 
greater the promise obviously also becomes in the memory of
TH, p.107.
Ibid., p.105.
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the expositor at the various levels of the tradition in 
which it is handed down,"^J
Then, humanity is set on the move and experiences 
reality as history once again, but with a greater promised 
future and a broader horizon of history.
In this sense, "the tension of promise and fulfillment 
was not left behind by the simple progress of Israel’s
history, but was much more strongly creative of Israel’s 
historic progress". On the one hand, the moving horizon 
historicizes all fulfillments so as to prevent their 
completion of God’s promise. On the other hand, these 
fulfillments are preserved in the memory of Israelite 
history as the confirmations of the promise so as to point 
forward. In this way, humanity is led to "a break-away from 
the present towards the future . History is moving on.
R.S. Chopp gives a summarized account of Israelite
history; "The call to Abraham can be best understood as a
promise to be filled, transformed, and filled again; this
call appropriately becomes paradigmatic for Israel. The
history of Israel is now a journey, a journey of faith and
Ibid.
Ibid., p.112.
Ibid., p.100.
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hope toward a future". She considers that "the continual 
filling, overfilling, and reinterpreting of God’s promises 
to Israel is what Moltmann calls the 'overspill’ of God’s 
promise" ,
However, when will this filling, overfilling and 
reinterpreting of God’s promise stop? To what extent does 
the horizon of history expand? What is the final frontier 
of such a horizon? For Braaten, this horizon "attempt to 
expand continually to overtake the horizon of all that is
PA
not yet known". According to Moltmann, the horizon will 
stop its moving only when it reaches the eschaton. At this 
time, God’s promise becomes eschatological and the promised 
future will be the ultimate.01
2.3.3 The Ultimate Horizon of God’s Promise
For Moltmann, God’s promise becomes eschatological in 
the hands of the classical prophets and the postexilic 
apocalypticists. What is meant by the concept of 
eschatological promise? Moltmann says: "Those promises and
expectations are eschatological which are directed towards
58 Chopp, The Praxis of Suffering: An Interpretation of 
Liberation and Political Theologies, p.104.
Ibid.
150 Braaten, The Future of God: The Revolutionary 
Dynamic of Hope, p.168, n.12.
61 TH, pp. 124-138.
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a historical
horizon" . ^2
future in the sense of the ultimate
However, what is meant by the concept of ultimate
horizon? How can it be the f inal boundary? What does this
horizon attain so that it is ultimate? In sura, under what
conditions does the horizon become ultimate? The horizon
reaches a no more beyond boundary when it satisfies two 
conditions. The first one is its universality: embracing' 
all peoples (in prophetic) and the cosmos (in apocalyptic). 
The second one is its intensification: reaching the 
ultimate human and cosmos reality as such.
Moltmann explains further why these two conditions make 
the horizon of God’s promise ultimate so that his promise 
is eschatological. The horizon can be ultimate only at the 
point where it "embraces in the eschaton the proton of the 
whole creation ... extends to all peoples, for there is
nothing that can be conceived as wider in extent than 
that". This is the quantitative aspect of the eschaton. 
"Along with this universalizing, there goes also an 
intensification of the promise up to the limits of
p J
existence as such." This means that the horizon must
reach beyond the final boundary of existence: death. This
is the qualitative aspect. If death is experienced as
62 Ibid. ,
Ibid. ,
p.125,
p.130.
Ibid.64
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exclusion from the promise of fullness and consummation of
life, then the hope of overcoming this boundary of life 
must be exemplified in God’s eschatological promise.^ 
"Only when the horizon of expectation extends beyond what 
is felt to be the final boundary of existence, i.e. beyond 
the bounds of death, does it reach an eschaton, a non plus 
ultra, a novum ultimum,0
With this understanding of the ultimate horizon of 
God’s eschatological promise, one then comes to realize 
that God’s promise ultimately is a promise for the ultimate
future of the whole creation which stands in contrast to
the present suffering reality.
2,4 Conclusion
Moltmann starts his doctrine of revelation with the way 
of promise. He objects any metaphysical or ontological 
presupposition that conditions God’s way of revealing
himself. Rather it is the latter determines what is
revealed because it is the way God chooses to reveal
himself. It is in this sense that the epistemological how 
gets the priority over the ontological what. The principle 
which is underlying God’s self-revelation in the way of 
promise, then, is dialectical rather than analogical.
65 Ibid. , pp.131-132.
66 Ibid. , p.132.
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1-Ie asserts that God reveals himself in the way of
promise. Then, God reveals himself in the future which is
contradictory to the present reality when he fulfills his
promise. And in the ultimate future God does not merely
reveal his faithfulness but is also present analogically. 
Meanwhile, a history of transforming the present reality of 
this world is created until this world is totally congruous 
with God’s promise.
However, two problems are left. Firstly, does God reveal
himself only when the promise to the world is fulfilled? 
Does this mean that God is present in the future only but 
not in the present? In order to avoid the revelation in the
way of the epiphany of the eternal present, will Moltmann’s 
alternative of revelation in the promise pay the price of 
sacrificing God’s presence at present?
Secondly, when God’s promise reaches its ultimate 
horizon in breadth and in depth, he is going to be revealed
as a God of all who overcomes the bounds of death. But the
analysis of the way which God reveals himself does not
display that God of the promise is a God who can overcome 
the final boundary of existence. How can this promise be
fulfilled? Is there any guarantee for the fulfillment of
this great promise?
It is in the Christ event that these two questions can
90
be clearly answered.
3 Analogy and Its Ahistorical Character
3.1 God’s Presence in the Present
3.1.1 The Problem of God’s Presence in the Present
In Theology of Hope, Moltmann "rejected the kind of 
natural theology which finds God evident in or deducible
from the world, on the grounds that the world does not yet 
correspond to the coming God"J Epistemologically, God is 
not to be known or revealed through the present world. The 
analogical principle of knowledge is not appropriate. This 
is because, ontologically, there is not any analogical
relationship between God and the present reality of this
world. However, it will be possible when the world 
corresponds to the promised future.
Actually, Moltmann’s proposal of revealing in the way 
of promise precisely stands in contrast to the assertion 
that there is a correspondence between God’s being and the 
present world. Rather, God’s faithfulness is revealed in 
the future when the present reality is transformed to
correspond to the promise. Therefore, God is present in the
future reality of this world analogically. However, does
1 R. Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 
p. 57.
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this mean that God is not present in the present reality in
any sense?
’’Moltmann is severely critical of any understanding of
revelation which thinks of it as a kind of epiphany, by
which he means a present, static, unchanging' manifestation 
9of God." "We have noted that ‘epiphany’ is a bad word with 
Moltmann. An entire tradition of Christian theology and
spirituality, centring on what John Bailie called ‘the 
sense of the presence of God’, is thus summarily 
dismissed." For J. MacQuarrie, Moltmann’s doctrine of 
revelation denies God’s presence. Therefore he says: "We
need presence as well as promise. It seems to him that in 
Moltmann’s thought God’s presence and God’s promise are 
mutually exclusive. However, as C. Morse points out, 
"Moltmann’s theory does not deny the presence of God in 
revelation but rather an ‘eternal presence’"? "Promise is 
itself a mode of presence, but promissory presence must not 
be confused with eternal presence."
2 • •J. MacQuarrie, "Today’s Word for Today: I. JUrg'en 
Moltmann", Expository Times 92/1 (1980), p.5.
’ J. MacQuarrie, Thinking about God (London: SCM, 
1975), p.230. [ = "Theologies of Hope: A Critical
Examination", Expository Times 82/4 (1971), p,104,]
J. MacQuarrie, "Eschatology and Time" in The Future 
of Hope: Theology as Eschatology, ed. F. Herzog (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1970), p.123.
5 »C. Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann s Theology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), p.31.
® Ibid.
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For Moltmann, God is present in the future as well as 
in the present. He further distinguishes God’s presence in 
the future from God’s presence in the present by taking the 
latter as the "presence of God on the way" and the former
as the "presence of God at the goal of the way of
7 8promise . God is present in his promise. God’s presence 
in the present happens when God announces a future reality
for the world.
Indeed, God’s presence in promise differs itself from 
eternal presence in that it is not a kind of presence in 
the present reality analogically. However, the way in which
God announces the promise will affect the meaning of God’s 
presence in the present. To put it simply, there are two 
kinds of promissory presence in Moltmann’s doctrine of
revelation, namely, in words and in Word.
3.1.2. God’s Presence In Words and in Word
It is obvious that for Moltmann in the Old Testament
God gives his promise in terms of words while in New
Testament God offers his promise in terms of Word, that is, 
Jesus Christ. Although Moltmann does not explicitly use 
these two terms to describe God’s way of giving promise, 
these two ways do exist in Moltmann’s doctrine of
p. 29.
RRF, p. 211 .
Bauckham, Moltmann : Messianic Theology in the Making,8
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revelation and affect one’s understanding of God and his 
relationship to the world.
Moltmann calls God’s promise a word promise when he talks 
of God revealing himself in the promise to Israel. God
gives his promise to Israel in the form of words. If this
promise is a word promise and God is present in his
promise, then God is present as an announcer of the
promise. God is present in his word but does not
participate in the present reality analogically. This 
implies that God is not present in the present reality 
analogically, but in the future reality analogically.^
When God gives his promise in Christ’s resurrection,
God himself enters the dialectic of life and death. That
y TH, p.102.
IO Later Moltmann in his The Crucified God expresses 
the point that in the Old Testament God is suffered from 
Israel’s disobedience and is injured by man: "I-Ie enters not 
only into the situation of the limited creature, but even 
into the situation of the guilty and suffering creature." 
(p.273 ) He goes on: "These accommodations of God to the 
limitations of human history at the same time contain 
anticipations of his future indwelling in his whole 
creation, when in the end all lands will be full of his 
glory." (p.273) It seems that God is present in the present 
world dialectically. However, God’s suffering alone cannot 
constitutes God’s promise to the world unless it is 
accompanied by the negation of God’s suffering. In this 
view, the fact that God participates in the present 
suffering reality does not necessarily mean that in his 
self-revelation God is present in the present reality 
dialectically as well. On the other hand, the fact that God 
is present in his word but not the present reality 
analogically in his self-revelation does not exclude the 
possibility that God can share the suffering of this 
abandoned world in his other interaction with it. 
Nevertheless, either view of God’s presence does deny the 
idea of analogical presence in the present reality.
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is, God displays his promise by constituting it with his 
own negations. This is because Christ’s resurrection is the 
negation of his death and Christ’s death is God’s self­
negation. According to Moltmann, on the cross God 
identifies himself with the forsaken reality of this world. 
Therefore, God is present in the present reality 
dialectically. And when the present reality is negated, God 
is present in the future reality analogically as well.
3,2 Dialectic, Analogy, and History
The two ways mentioned above have two common points. 
Firstly, there is not any analogical relationship between 
God and the present reality. Secondly, analogical
relationship can only be possible in the future which
contradicts the present. But this does not mean that God
cannot enter the present reality. If God cannot be present
in the present reality analogically, then it is possible 
for him to be present in it dialectically. This is
precisely the significant point that should be noted in the
promise event. Dialectic precedes analogy.
In words God only negates the present reality of this 
world so as to initiate its history.^ In Word God negates 
his self-negation through which God identifies himself with
Moltmann calls this history "word-history”, a 
history of tradition or the history of the working of the 
traditional hope. (TH, p,153.)
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the world. Therefore, the history God creates is both of 
God and this world. In other words, two consequences follow 
God’s giving his promise in Christ’s resurrection. Firstly, 
God enters the history of this world. Secondly, he 
initiates his own history as well as the history of this 
world. Indeed, through God’s self-negation, God enters the 
history of this world and the history of this world is 
taken up into God’s history. Their histories are interwoven 
into one another from the very beginning of God’s history.
In Moltmann’s view, one cannot understand God’s 
relationship to the present reality in terms of analogy. If
a metaphysical distinction between God and the world is
presupposed; eternal and temporal; non-evanescent and 
evanescent, then the analogical principle is the way to 
make God’s revelation in the form of the epiphany of the 
eternal presence possible. It follows that such a God of
the epiphany will be the one who is not involved in the
suffering of this world. In this way, God is revealed as an
ahistorical God who does not share the destiny of this
world,
On the other hand, atheism employs the analogical
principle to argue that there is no God because suffering 
exists in the present reality and God does not overcome it.
Therefore, a kind of antinomy will be produced; God is and
Cf. TKG, p.158.
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13God is not. Both of theism and atheism proceed their
argument with the same reasoning principle but get
contradictory results. However, they both agree to the
point that God cannot suffer. Therefore, if there is God,
he is a God who does not participate in the suffering
history of this world.
These are precisely the problems aroused by the
analogical principle of which Moltmann explicitly 
criticizes in his The Crucified God. This chapter will take
a close look at the structure of the analogical principle 
and its significance for the doctrine of God, especially 
its ahistorical character. After that, the dialectical 
character of the Christ event will be analysed.
3.3 The Use of Analogy
Moltmann points out that "Christian theology very early 
adopted the epistemological principle of the Platonic 
school and introduced the principle of analogy into its 
doctrine of the knowledge of God", "Either the invisible
God is known in the analogies to him in the order of
creation or in the acts of history which point to him, or 
else he is known in his self--revelation, or only in the
13 CG, p.210.
14 Ibid. , pp.210-220.
15 Ibid. , p. 26 .
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i rHoly Spirit of God." Indeed, it is Plato who first 
introduces the concept of analogy into the philosophical 
fields of epistemology and ontology. Therefore, a brief 
analysis of Plato’s use of analogy in his philosophy is 
necessary before one is going to understand its use in
Christian theology.
3.3.1 Platonic Philosophy
According to B. Mondin, Plato uses the word "analogy"
in both its meanings of proportion (i.e. direct similarity)
18and proportionality (i.e. the similarity of relations). 
He calls "analogy" the proportion of two things or of two 
concepts, the proportion between things and ideas, or 
between knowledge and things known. He uses it to signify 
the proportionality between four elements (fire/air = 
air/water - water/earth), between the four forms of 
knowledge (knowledge/opinion = thinking'/imagining), and 
between two kinds of being and two kind of knowledge
16 Ibid .
17 B. Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant 
and Catholic Theology (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 
pp.1-2. Cf. W. Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. M.J. 
O’Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1989), p.95.
18 Ibid.
1 Q Plato, Republic, 508b; Timaeus, 29c.
88 Plato, Timaeus, 32c.
Plato, Republic, 5 34a.
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22(being'/becoming = knowledge/opinion), However, it is 
important to note the philosophical context in which Plato
uses analogy.
Plato’s ontology and epistemology is established around 
his theory of Forms or Ideas. As said by P.M. Huby, "this 
‘theory’ is not set out in full anywhere in the dialogues, 
and on many points the dialogues are uninformative or 
inconsistent". However, it may be reconstructed in its 
essentials without much difficulty, "The forms were 
universals, but not merely universals; they were unchanging
objects existing apart from this world and more real than
it, knowable by the mind as opposed to the senses, and the 
source of the existence of particular things in this 
world." Therefore, "fundamental to Plato’s ontology and 
epistemology is the division between what is sensible and
what can be grasped by the intellect only, between the
world of senses and the world of Forms". J
22 Ibid.
P.M. Huby, "Socrates and Plato", in A Critical 
History of Western Philosophy, ed. D.J. O’Connor (Toronto; 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p.18. For a detailed
outline of Plato’s discussion of Forms see D.J. Welling, 
Understanding Plato (Oxford/New York; Oxford University 
Press, 1987), pp.96-124; C.J. Rowe, Plato (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1984), pp.52-86.
24 Ibid.
25 D. Allen, Philosophy for Understanding' Theology 
(London: SCM, 1985), p.47.
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Plato’s ontology is a theory of two worlds: the
intelligible realm of Forms and the physical, visible world
of particular things. The world of Forms is constituted by 
onideals objects which are invisible and intangible. "They 
exist eternally, with a transcendent nature that set them
apart from our world, but by a process of 'creation’, the
visible world has been modelled after them, and their
essential qualities are diffused down into the particular 
0 0things that we touch and see."
These two worlds share different degrees of reality. 
"Reality is concentrated in the invisible world of Forms, 
which are more real than the fleeting and insubstantial
particulars in the world. But particulars are not viewed as
totally unreal. They share to some extent in reality in so 
00far as Forms are present in them." Correspondingly,
different degrees or levels of knowledge are distinguished 
pqaccording to objects of different degrees of reality: 
opinion and knowledge. The former is formed by apprehending 
the changing phenomena of the visible world on the basis of
sense perception and thereby is flawed by contradictions
and illusions. The latter is the true knowledge which is
9 f J.V. Luce, /in Introduction to Greek Philosophy 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1992), p.100.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol I; Greece 
and Rome (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1956), p.151.
30 Luce, An Introduction to Greek Philosophy, p.100.
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31infallible and of the real. It "does not rest in any way 
on sense perception, but is a function of the mind making
direct contact with the Form". "In terms of what it is
(ontologically considered) and in terms of the truth that 
can be known from it (epistemologically considered) the
sensible world is like a shadow or reflection of the
intelligible world.
Because the visible world imitates or participates in 
the realm of Forms, the word "analogy" is used to express 
that there is a certain proportion between these two.
Likewise, the relationship between knowledge of the
invisible and intangible form and opinion of the world of 
sense is proportional. For Plato, "both our minds and the
A 1
outer world have the same shared order". Therefore, there 
is an analogy between these two kind of knowledge.
Plato does not explicitly use the word analogy to
express the way of apprehending the real knowledge of the
Forms. However, he does open the door for the Neoplatonists
to develop the doctrine of analogy in the field of
theology. Firstly, Plato uses it to signify the proportion
between two worlds. It should be noted that such a use of
31 Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol I: Greece and 
Home, p.14 9.
32 Luce, An Introduction to Greek Philosophy, p.100.
33 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, p.50.
A J
R.S. Brumbaugh, The Philosophers of Greece (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1981), p.148.
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analogy presupposes that the visible world gets its reality
by sharing, imitating or participating in the really real
invisible world. Secondly, Plato explains the mind making
direct contact with the Forms in terms of anamnesis, the
a rrecall of the knowledge acquired before birth. 3 However, 
the recall is possible only when the "latent memories of 
the relevant Forms are being elicited through experience of 
the particular things in which they are imperfectly
A pexemplified".'50 In other words, the invisible world of
Forms is known through the present visible world of
particular things.
3.3.2 Neoplatonism
According to Mondin, "it is only with Proclus and
Pseudo-Dionysius that the term ‘analogy’ enters into
37theological discourse". In the theology of the
Neoplatonists, analogy has two main functions. First, it 
accounts for the possibility of speaking of God. Second, 
analogy provides a principle of unity between the various
levels of reality. * * * 37 38
Huby, "Socrates and Plato", pp,20, 23.
A p
Luce, An Introduction to Greek Philosophy, p.105.
37 Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and 
Catholic Theology, p.3,
38 Ibid.
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39The philosophy of the Neoplatonists is 
of Plato’s. "The world-picture presented is based on
certain features of orthodox Platonism, but there is also 
much that is different."^ It can be summarized as follows: 
"Reality is a continuum with a centre from which, as it 
were, circles expand outward. There is reality throughout
living, and it is based on a power that works from the
centre. Secondary things are timelessly dependent upon what
is prior in power; hence there is no temporal creation but 
a constant outgoing (proodos) from the centre, whereby mind
enters into matter. Higher things determine lower things 
without being affected themselves."^
It is important to note that Neoplatonism is not a kind
of pantheism.^ The Neoplatonists propose a doctrine of
emanation which is based on a peculiar theory of 
41causality to explain that "multiplicity is the result of 
the overflow of the One ‘downward’".^ Firstly, true
39 A comprehensive introduction to the Neoplatonism can 
be seen in R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 
1972).
D.W. Hamlyn, "Greek Philosophy after Aristotle", in 
A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. D.J. O’Connor 
(Toronto: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p,76.
a modification
4?' Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol I: Greece and 
Rome, p.4 6 7.
43 E.R. Dodds, Introduction to Select Passages 
Illustrating Neoplatonism (London: Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, 1923), p.16.
Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, p.75.
103
causality is a "timeless relation of dependence between 
Being's; 'creation’ is only a metaphor to express this 
dependence".^ Secondly, it is a "one-sided relation: that 
is, the higher determines the lower without being
determined by its own causative activity; it gives itself
to the lower, yet itself remains undiminished and
4 fiaffected". Thirdly, "there is nothing in the effect which 
does not exist eminenter in the cause; but the cause is 
never perfectly mirrored in the effect".
In this way, a hierarchy of different degrees of
reality is formed. "Reality is proportionately distributed
in different degree," This proportionate distribution is
called analogy, Ontologically, analogy can be used to
describe the relationship of the Many to the One, the world
to God, It can be seen as a cosmological principle in 
50Neoplatonism.
45 •.Dodds, Introduction to Select Passages Illustrating 
Neoplatonism, p.16.
47 Ibid.
48 Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in the Protestant 
and Catholic Theology, pp.3-4
49 Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete 
Works, trans. C. Luibheid (London: SPCK, 1987), 588A, p.49; 
372D, p.196.
50 Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in the Protestant 
and Catholic Theology, p.4, n.l.
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On the base that nothing' in the effect does not exist
eminenter in the cause, it is possible to speak of God,
"Everything which by its existence bestows a character on
others itself primitively possesses that character which it 
communicates to the recipients. "Now, God is the cause
of everything. Hence all created perfections may be 
ascribed to Him."^ However, the "effect, or being that 
proceeds, is partly similar to the cause or source of 
emanation and partly dissimilar".^ Therefore, two ways of 
approaching God are proposed: the positive way (cataphatic) 
and the negative way (apophatic).
In brief, "the affirmative method means ascribing to 
God the perfections found in creatures, that is, the 
perfections which are compatible with the spiritual Nature
of God, though not existing in Him in the same manner as
r rthey exist in creatures".30 In the negative way "the mind 51 52 53 54 55
51 Proclus, The Elements of Theology: A Revised Text 
with Translation and Commentary, trans. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1933), prop.18, p.21.
52 Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and 
Catholic Theology, p.3.
53 Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol I; Greece and 
Rome, p.4 7 9.
54 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, p,90. 
The doctrine of two ways of approaching God is firstly 
articulated by Pseudo-Dionysius in his The Divine Name and 
The Mystical Theology. Later, it is accepted by Thomas 
Aquinas, Cf. F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol II: 
Mediaeval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus (London: Burns 
Oates and Washbourne, 1950), pp.94-95.
55 Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol II: Mediaeval 
Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus, p.94.
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begins by denying of God those things which are farthest 
removed from Him, e.g. 'drunkenness or fury’, and proceeds
upwards progressively denying of God the attributes and 
qualities of creatures, until it reaches 'the supper-
c p
essential Darkness’". Apparently, these two ways of 
knowing God are adopted and modified by Thomas Aquinas as
his theological doctrine of analogy containing three 
interconnected steps: via affirmationis (way of 
affirmation), via negationis (way of negation) and via 
eminentiae (way of eminence).
Analogy, then, gets its epistemological meaning in the 
hand of the Neoplatonists, That is, one can approach God 
through the present reality of the world in the ways of 
positive and negative on the ground that the world, 
ontologically, is the effect of God the cause.
3,3.3 Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Theology
W. Pannenberg points out that "the Scholastics . . .
thought that not only their language about God but also God 
cohimself was analogous to the world of human experience."
50 Ibid. , p.95. 
w Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, pp.96-97,
58 W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in the Theology: 
Collected Essays vol I, trans. G.H. Kehm (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1983), p.223; cf. p.213.
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He goes on: "This was a consequence of the fact that they 
59understood God primarily as the cause of the world.
Here two points should be noted. Firstly, an analogical
knowledge of God is possible because "the reality of God 
r nstands in an analogical relationship to the world". 
Secondly, such an analogical relationship is possible
because the world is the effect of God the cause. In sum,
"according to the doctrine of analogy, the effects produced
by God are the basis of what is said about God himself,
following the maxim about knowing the unknown by analogy
with the known" . Such a point of view is expressed
fi?explicitly in Thomas Aquinas’ natural theology.
Aquinas says: "Now any effect of a cause demonstrates 
that that cause exists, in case where the effect is better
known to us, since effects are dependent upon causes, and
can only occurs if the causes already exist. From effects
evident to us, therefore, we can demonstrate what in itself 
fiis not evident to us, namely, that God exists." It is 
based on this ground that his five ways of proof of God’s
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. , p.213.
61 Ibid. , p. 215 . 
fi? Cf. Mondin, The principle of Analogy in Protestant 
and Catholic Theology, p.85.
fi 1 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Latin Text and English 
Translation vol 2, ed. T. Gilby and T.C. O’Brien (London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964), la.2,2; p.ll.
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fi /Iexistence outlined in the Summa Theolog'iae^ "begin by 
stating some observation - or, rather, by calling attention
to some particular feature in the structure of the
universe" 65 Kasper gives ct summary of this cosmological
argument. I! Thomas takes as his starting point various
aspects of the world of our experience (movement,
causality, contingency, degrees of being, purposefulness). 
He then inquires into the cause of these phenomena. In this
search for a cause it is not possible to engage in an 
infinite regress in its entirety as a series, no less than
in its individual members since the series of causes is
itself contingent and therefore requires an explanatory
ground. There must therefore be a first cause that is not
to be understood simply as the first member in a series of 
causes, but that grounds this series in its entirety and 
cannot itself have its ground in a higher cause. It must 
therefore be understood as self-subsistent, complete being, 
as that fullness of being which we call God.”01
Aquinas’ cosmological argument presupposes that there 
is similarity between cause and effect. The "effects will
Ibid., la.2,3; pp.13-19. 
fi fi K, Tranoy, "Thomas Aquinas", in A Critical History 
of Western Philosophy, ed. D.J. O’Connor (Toronto: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1964), p.109.
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, p.101. A detailed 
analysis of Aquinas’ five ways proof can be found in A. 
Kenny, The Five Ways: St Thomas Aquinas1 Proofs of God’s 
Existence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
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fi7bear an even remoter resemblance to the agent” because "a
cause or agent can act or produce an effect, only by 
producing something that bears some similarity to itself, 
since causality (ability to act) belongs to a being insofar 
as it is in act"/9 A "cause cannot produce effect of any 
sort, but necessarily produces effect according to its 
nature (its actuality, its form)”.0 Based on this, an 
analogy of intrinsic attribution is established so as to
provide an adequate interpretation for the God-creature
relationship and a justification for theological
language. Accordingly, "finite reality (creatures) points 
71to God, since it is caused by God”. For Kasper, 
establishing the causal relationship between God and the 
world is the first step of the theological doctrine of 
analogy: "The via af f irmationis (way of affirmation) takes 
as its starting point the positive connection between the 
finite and the infinite, as this emerges from creation; it
knows God from his effects in the world”.
Aquinas, Summa Theolog'iae: Latin Text and English 
Translation vol 2, la.4,3; p.57.
Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and 
Catholic Theology, pp,86-87.
69 Ibid. , p.87.
Ibid. , p.85.
Ibid.
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, p.96.7?
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According to Aquinas, as the primary and per se cause, 
God brings out effects like himself. "God, however, is 
not univocal but an equivocal cause, since every creature
must fall short of the perfection of divine goodness.It
is important to note here that although the world as the 
effect of God resembles God’s perfection, it is not as 
perfect as God. It follows that "effects can give 
comprehensive knowledge of their cause only when
commensurate with it . That is, effects which are not
proportionate to their cause do not give us perfect 
knowledge of their cause. In this way, "man may always take 
either a negative or a positive attitude with regard to the 
attribution to God of the name of any perfection".'0
"Now, in considering the divine substance, we should 
especially make use of the method of remotion . . . For we
know each thing more perfectly the more fully we see its
difference from other things, for each thing has within 
itself its own being, distinct from all other things."?7 
The second step of the theological doctrine of analogy,
73 Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and 
Catholic Theology, p.93.
n Ibid.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Latin Text and English 
Translation vol 2, la.2,2; p.ll.
76 Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and 
Catholic Theology, p.98.
T. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. A.C. Pegis 
(Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 
1.14,2; pp.96-97.
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then, is the via neg'ationis (way of negation) that "denies
the finite mode inherent in our statements and in the
embodiment of all perfections in the finite realm". This 
negative way or way of remotion (via remotionis) is, in
fact, a method of elimination. Firstly, through this way 
God is said to be immutable (without change), eternal (not 
in time), pure act (without potentiality), incorporeal, and 
simple (without composition). "There cannot be in God 
corporeality, composition, limitation, imperfection, 
temporality, etc." All the finitude of creatures must be 
negated so as to distinguish the infinite God from the
finite world. Secondly, the finite mode of all perfections
in the finite realm is denied so as to make a difference
between God’s perfection and that of this world.
It follows that the third step is the via eminentiae
(way of eminence): "these finite perfections belong to God
in a higher degree, in a more sublime manner, and, in fact, 
8?in a simply all surpassing way {eminenter)”.
Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy is, in essence, grounded 
on the causal relationship of God to the world. Based on
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, p.96.
79 Tranoy, "Thomas Aquinas", p.112.
80 Ibid. , p. 112 .
81 Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol II: Mediaeval 
Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus, p.350.
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, pp.96-97.00
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the analogical connection between God and the world, a way
of knowing God is developed which starts with the 
experience of the world: knowing the unknown by analogy
with the known.
3.4 The Ontological and Epistemological Character of
Analogy
The analogy used in this kind of thought has two 
dimensions. It is not confined to the epistemological 
field, but is applied to the relationship between two 
analogates as well, To put it further, its ontological 
significance provides a ground for the speaking of God 
analogically. In other words, the possibility of using 
analogy in the field of epistemology is based on its 
ontological dimension.
3.4.1 One-Sided Relationship of God to the World
First of all, there is an unbroken link between God and
the world. The cosmos is understood as indirect
theophany. However, the ontological relationship between 
the analogates, God and the world, is one-sided. As the 
cause of the world, God determines its being and existence.
Conversely, as the effect of God, the world does not have
any influence on God. This means that the world is not
83 TH, pp.77-78, n.7.
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necessary for God. The world depends on God but not vice
versa. The ontological dependence between the world and God
is one-sided.
Because the world is the effect of God, it resembles
God’s nature. There is a likeness between God and the
world, just like that between cause and effect. It is this
likeness which connects the analogates, God and the world. 
But what is this likeness? "In the first place it is only 
a one-way likeness, that is the creature is like God, but 
we cannot properly say that God is like the creature."^ 
This is because the world is out of God and it merely
shares a certain extent of reality of God, not the whole.
The effect is not equal to the cause. "In the second place
creatures are only imperfectly like God; they cannot bear
a perfect resemblance to him." The world only shares a
certain degree of reality of God, not the same. The 
ft fi"creature is at the same time both like and unlike God".00
"It is like God in so far as it is an imitation of Him; it
is unlike God in so far as its resemblance to Him is 
87imperfect and deficient."
Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol II: Mediaveal 
Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus, p.355.
8& Ibid. Cf. Aquinas: " ... creatures resemble God, but 
not that God resembles creatures." (Summa Theologiae: Latin 
Text and English Translation vol 2, la.4,3; p.59.)
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. , pp. 355-356 .
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In this way, knowing' God through the world is neither
univocal nor equivocal but analogical.
3.4.2 The Negation of Finitude
The way of knowing God is through the world by analogy.
It is a kind of knowing the unknown by analogy with the
known. Knowing through analogy, in Moltmann’s words, is a 
0 0process in which "like is known only by like". Therefore, 
it is always a process of recognition. The sole starting
point is the experience of this world. Because this world
is the effect of God, such a way of knowing, then, is an
argument arguing from the effect back to the cause.
90Moltmann calls this retroflexive argument.
Although the world is like God, it is not equal to God.
Therefore, in order to approach God without getting any
distortion from the world, the way of negation and way of
eminence are two crucial steps being' introduced into the 
doctrine of analogy. The former negates the finitude and
the finite mode of all the perfections of the world while
the latter qualifies the perfections transcendentally. Then 
God is known as eternal, simple, immutable, incorporeal
which are the negation of the temporality, composition,
CG., p.26.
Ibid.
TH, pp.77-78, n.7.
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changeableness, corporeality of this world, and with all 
the perfections as such.
The point worth noting here is that the function of the
way of negation is an exclusion of the finitude of this
world. It presupposes that there is a mutually exclusive 
relationship between infinite and finite. By negating the 
finitude of this world, God is known as the infinite which 
excludes the finite. In this way, the principle underlying 
the operation of the way of negation in analogy is that of 
excluded middle. And this is supported by the one-sided 
relationship of God to the world. God’s perfection is 
shared by the world, but God is not affected by the world’s 
imperfection. Imperfection totally belongs to the world but
not God himself. The way of negation manifests this merit
in the field of epistemology.
3.5 Theological Consequences
Two consequences follow this way of God’s self­
revelation, The first one is its ahistorical nature. The
second one is the antinomy of theism and atheism.
3.5.1 Ahistorical Revelation and Ahistorical God
CG, p.214.
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Moltmann clearly points out that the reality of God is 
assumed as "already present and immediately perceptible to 
every man" in such analogical thought. He goes on: "There 
must be a reality accessible in experience and perception, 
which is at the same time related to God and corresponds to 
him, otherwise there would be no knowledge of God 
immediately accessible to every man In sum, there is a
certain kind of correspondence between this world and God. 
In this way, this world does not need any change so that 
God can be reflected through his creatures correspondingly, 
The only problem is that such a correspondence is not a
perfect one. That is, the reality of this world cannot 
reflect God’s reality perfectly. In order to avoid 
distortion, the way of negation is introduced so as to know 
God properly. From the very beginning, the ontological 
grounding of the analogical principle of knowledge provides 
an ahistorical relationship of God to the world which
further directs the process of knowing God.
It is the crucial step of analogical principle of 
knowledge, the way of negation, that renders God’s self­
revelation ahistorical. As mentioned above, the function of 
the way of negation in analogy is a kind of exclusion which
can be represented by the principle of excluded middle. 
Indeed, the principle of excluded middle is one of the 
principles of thought of formal logic. It presupposes the
92 TH, p. 282.
93 CG, p.210.
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other two principles: principle of identity and principle
of non-contradiction.
According to G.W.F. Hegel, "the maxim of Identity,
reads: Everything is identical with itself, A = A; and, 
94negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and not A". 
The latter is known as the principle of non-contradiction 
which further makes a limitation to the principle of 
identity. -(A A -A) rejects the possibility of the 
emergence of both A = A and A = -A at the same time.
Accordingly, the "Maxim of Excluded Middle is the maxim ...
which would fain avoid contradiction . . . "A must be
either +A or -A ..." If the principles of identity and 
non-contradiction are definitive, then that of excluded 
middle is operative that by denying the opposite it is 
either A or -A. By doing so, A = A is prevented from
becoming both A = A and A = -A at the same time.
Here two points should be noted. Firstly, the way of
negation in the doctrine of analogy is not a kind of self­
negation in reality but in thought. The reality of this 
world will not be changed since the negation is operated in 
thought only. Secondly, what it is concerned with is the 
negation of the finitude of this world so as to grasp the
94‘ G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic; Being Part One of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science (1830), trans. 
W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), §115, p.167.
Ibid., §119, p.172.
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infinite invisible perfection of God in thought. The
process of knowing God is completed in abstract thinking,
not in history.
Furthermore, in this process of approaching God, an
absolute ontological gulf is established between the
infinite and the finite. Although the world is like an 
image reflecting a certain degree of perfection of God, it 
is finite in nature while God is infinite. Eventually, God
cannot enter his opposite by negating himself because
infinite and finite are contradictory. It follows that God
cannot reveal himself in his opposition or contradiction.
Otherwise, God will be a God of contradiction and he will
lose his simple identity, according to the principles of 
identity and non-contradiction. And this precisely 
satisfies the one-way relationship of God to the world, 
Such a God cannot be affected and shaken by any suffering 
and injustice of this finite world. In this way, God is
an ahistorical God who will not share the destiny of the
finite world because ’’death, suffering and mortality must 
98... be excluded from the divine being".
However, according to Hegel, "if the infinite is 
distinct from the finite, it is limited by the finite and
CG, p.222,
Ibid., p.214.
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00is thus finite rather than infinite". If, e.g., God is 
distinct from the world, he is finite. Then, God will
not be the God in all because he is not present in his 
opposite. Moltmann expresses the similar point: "a God who 
is only omnipotent is in himself an incomplete being, for
he cannot experience helplessness and powerlessness"
Therefore, he contends that the "absolute is not, via
eminentiae or via neg'ationis, extrapolated from the 
102presently available reality".
3.5.2 The Antinomy of Theism and Atheism
For Moltmann, theism and atheism are twins. They both
share the same presupposition which is inherent in the
theological doctrine of analogy. It should be noticed here
that what Moltmann is concerned with is the analogy of
being in Aquinas’ natural theology or theism, rather than 
his discussion on the use of analogy in speaking of God.
Theism has different terms, but for the same thing:
traditional theism, classical theism, metaphysical theism,
M. Wood, "Infinity" in A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992), p.140. Cf. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Being
Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science 
(1830), §36, pp.58-59.
100 Ibid.
101 CG, p.223.
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103cosmological theism. Aquinas’ natural theology ’’stands
as the fountainhead of traditional theism" ,104 And the
atheism discussed here arises in the context of and in
response to traditional theism. It is the antithesis of 
105traditional theism and is bettei' called protest atheism
for its nature.
W.W. Willis, Jr. gives a good account of protest 
atheism. "It is based upon the perception of the extent and 
persistence of human pain and suffering. In the face of
such misery, protest atheism says no to any God who would 
continue to allow such condition. How, this atheism asks, 
can one believe in God, who, though supposedly perfectly 
just and omnipotent, remains unmoved by and fails to 
response to injustice and human agony, who is impassible
while his creatures suffer? That creation includes these
conditions is incomprehensible already, but that there is
a just God who would allow them to persist is a
contradiction. For the sake of humanity and the human
feeling for justice , God must be rejected. ,.106
103 W.W. Willis, Jr. , Theism, Atheism, and the Doctrine
of Trinity: The 
JUrgen Moltmann 
Scholars, 1987),
104 Ibid. , p.
105 Ibid.
Trinitarian Theologies of Karl Barth and 
in Response to Protest Atheism (Altanta:
p. 9 .
11 .
106 Ibid. , pp. 79-80.
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In Moltmann’s view, "theism and protest atheism are
related methodologically in that both draw conclusions 
107about God by a process of abstracting from the world."
In The Crucified God, Moltmann writes:
The cosmological arguments for the existence of God 
presuppose a God who is indirectly evident and 
manifest through his works. Therefore they draw 
conclusions from ea quae facta sunt to the invisible 
being of God, This process of argument is not 
questionable in itself, but stringent; however, its 
presupposition, that everything that is corresponds to 
God and is connected with his being through an 
analog’ia entis, probably is.
Moltmann rejects the classical cosmological proofs for 
God’s existence not for the process of argument but for its 
presupposition that "everything that is corresponds to God 
and is connected with his being through an analog’ia 
entis”, However, protest atheism takes the same 
presupposition in its argument. Moltmann writes:
Metaphysical atheism, too, takes the world as a mirror 
of the deity. But in the broken mirror of an unjust 
and absurd world of triumphant evil and suffering 
without reason and without end it does not see the 
countenance of a God, but only the grimace of 
absurdity and nothingness. Atheism, too, draws a 
conclusion from the existence of the finite world as 
it is to its cause and its destiny. But there it finds 
no good and righteous God, but a capricious demon, a 
blind destiny, a damning law or an annihilating 
nothingness.
107 Ibid. , p. 83 .
108 CG, p.210.
109 Ibid. , p. 210.
110 Ibid. , pp.219-220.
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Such a presupposition, "the reality of the world that can 
be experienced and known is like a mirror in which God’s 
divinity, God’s power, God’s wisdom and God’s righteousness 
can indirectly be known",m indeed, implies a certain kind 
of concept of God. If protest atheism does not challenge
such a presupposition of theism from the very beginning, it
will accept the concept of God which is inherent in theism 
112at the same time.
As Willis, Jr. points out, protest atheism focuses on
certain attributes of God that have been maintained by
traditional theism, such as omnipotence, goodness, and
justice. "However, in its own investigation of the world 
it does not find the evidence to support belief in this God
. . . The order of the world is the actual disorder of
suffering and injustice."H4 This world is not a cosmos but 
115in larger measure a chaos. Therefore, the existence of
an omnipotent, good and just God must be denied.
The God both theism and atheism assume is an infinite
God who cannot suffer. Although protest atheism notices the
111 Ibid. , p.210.
112 Willis, Jr., Theism, Atheism, and the Doctrine of 
the Trinity, p.83.
H3 ibid.
114 Ibid.
H3 J.J, O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The 
Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology 
and the Theology of Hope (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 
1983), p.113.
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broken order of this world, its acceptance of the method
and doctrine of God of traditional theism means it cannot
understand God as a suffering' God. For protest atheism, the
basis of God’s inaction in relation to suffering' is that 
11 fiGod cannot participate in suffering'. "God, in his own 
117being’, does not experience pain and suffering'."
Thereby, Moltmann says: "atheism demonstrates itself to 
118be the brother of theism".
3.6 Conclusion
Moltmann, in his The Crucified God, on the one hand, 
opposes the idea that God is known or revealed in the present 
reality analogically, on the other hand, affirms that God
is known or revealed in his opposite in the present
reality. The crucial point is that these two different
views of God’s self-revelation present two different
conceptions of God correspondingly.
By analogical reasoning of the present reality of this
world, for either theism or protest atheism, God is a God
who cannot enter into and participate in the suffering' of
1 1 fi Willis, Jr., Theism, Atheism, and the Doctrine of 
Trinity, p.83.
117 Ibid.
118 CG, p.221.
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this world. This is because analogical reasoning is a
process of knowing God by negating the finitude and the 
finite mode of all perfections of the world and qualifying 
the perfections transcendentally. Its ontological grounding 
is the metaphysical distinction between God and the world:
eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, non-evanescent 
and evanescent, and the one-sided relationship of God to 
the world which allows God influencing the world but not
. vice versa. Consequently, God’s presence is the 
epiphany of the eternal presence which can be grasped 
merely in pure contemplation but not in the suffering 
history of the world.
However, in Moltmann’s view, God is not revealed 
analogically but dialectically. God in Christ is present in 
his opposite but not his likeness. For the sake of this
suffering world, God in Christ identifies himself with the 
world by entering, participating in and suffering with it 
so that his resurrection becomes the promise for the future 
of this world. This will be discussed in the next chapter
in detail.
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4 Dialectic in the Christ Event
4.1 The Inseparability of the Resurrection and the Cross
4.1.1 The Problem
What is the Christ event? As the event of promise, the
Christ event is constituted by the resurrection and cross 
of Christ J Apparently, Moltmann’s books of Theology of 
Hope and The Crucified God focus on the resurrection and
the cross of Christ respectively. To some of Moltmann’s
critics, it might seem that Moltmann shifts from one focal
point to another without any necessary and internal
connection within his own theology or theological
development. This view-point is no accident.
On the one hand, in Theology of Hope Moltmann makes the 
well known claim that: "From first to last, and not merely 
in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology ... The 
eschatological is not one element of Christianity, but it 
is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which 
everything in it is set". However, "Moltmann is not 
concerned primarily with eschatology as such", but with
1 TH, p.225.
Ibid., p.16.
W.R, Herman, "Moltmann’s Christology", Stadia. Biblia 
et Theologica 17/1 (1989), p.3.
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the eschatology which "speaks of Jesus Christ and his
future". And "Christ has a future because of his 
resurrection"? Christian eschatology "recognizes the 
reality of the raising of Jesus and proclaims the future of 
the risen Lord". Hence the eschatological significance of 
Jesus Christ’s resurrection is the focal point of 
Moltmann’s first major book, Theology of Hope.
On the other hand, in his second major book, The 
Crucified God, Moltmann claims; " Theolog'ia. crucis is not a 
single chapter in theology, but the key signature for all 
Christian theology. It is the point from which all
theological statements which seek to be Christian are
viewed." Therefore, the book is subtitled "The Cross of
Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian 
0Theology" . The "cross is the test of everything which
* TH, p.17. 
S Ibid,
9
CG, p.301. Moltmann cites these words from W. von 
Loewenich’s book on Luther’s theology; "For Luther the 
cross is not only the subject of theology; it is the 
distinctive mark of all theology . . . The theology of the 
cross is not a chapter in theology but a specific kind of 
theology ... it is the centre that provides perspective for 
all theological statements." [Luther’s Theology of the 
Cross, trans. II.J.A. Bouman (Belfast: Christian Journals, 
1976), pp.17-18.]
0 A.E. McGrath suggests that Kritik should be 
translated as Criterion, rather than Criticism. [The Making 
of Modern German Christology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 
pp. 20 3-204, n.5.'|
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gdeserves to be called Christian". Once again, Moltmann 
understands the whole theology in another focal point, the 
cross of Christ. Therefore, according to Moltmann, "a
widespread accusation made against The Crucified God is the
same as that made against Theology of Hope". It is
charged with one-sidedness. According to B. Mondin, the
book stresses "arbitrarily only a singly mystery of Christ,
the mystery of the cross''.^ According to J.M. Lochman, the 
1 ?"God of Christian faith is not just the crucified God."
4,1.2 Two Sides of One Coin
It seems to these critics that these two books are
separated from each other and lacking any logical and 
doctrinal connection for their one-sidedness. In this way, 
Moltmann is supposed to neglect the unity of the
crucifixion and the resurrection in the Christ event.
However, R. Bauckham points out that the view-point which
by The Crucified God Moltmann makes a fresh start in his 
13theology is superficial. It is certain that Moltmann does
3 CG, p.7.
10 HTG, p.173.
B. Mondin, "Der gekreuzigte Gott" in DGG, p.106, 
Translation is cited from HTG, p.173.
12 J. M. Lochman, "Gottes Sein ist im Leiden: Zur 
trinitarischen Hreuzestheologie Jurgen Moltmanns" in DGG, 
p.33. Translation is cited from HTG, p.173.
13 R. Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 
p. 53 .
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explore theology with different unifying themes in his
trilogy. But this does not imply that there is not any
inner doctrinal connection between these two books.
To put it simply, the two themes of the resurrection
and the crucifixion can be seen as the two sides of one
coin. Ontically, the "event of the crucifixion and
resurrection of Jesus" is "one event and one person".^
Jesus Christ’s identity is said to be understood as an
identity in cross and resurrection. The risen Christ is 
1 rthe historical and crucified Jesus, and vice versa,
Noetically, the "resurrection 'does not evacuate the cross’
(I Cor. 1.17), but fills it with eschatology and saving
significance." "Only in the light of his resurrection
from the dead does his death gain that special, unique
saving significance which it cannot achieve otherwise, even 
18in the light of the life he lived." The resurrection 
19shows the meaning of the cross. In this vein, as Moltmann
claims, Christian theology must be an eschatologia
. 20 crucis.
14 CG, p.204
15 TH p. 200
16 CG p.160 .
Ibid., p . 18 2
Ibid,
TH, p.200.
Ibid., p.83, 160. Cf. CG, p.5
17
18
19
20
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For Moltmann, "the resurrection can neither be reduced
to the cross . . . nor can the cross be reduced to the
resurrection", Likewise, Theology of Hope can neither be 
replaced by The Crucified God, nor can The Crucified God be
replaced by Theology of Hope. However, he considers that 
"theology of hope is at its hard core theology of cross"
colying "in the resurrection of the crucified Christ", 
while "the theology of cross is none other than the reverse 
side of the Christian theology of hope",21 22 23 4 25 * 27giving it "a 
more profound dimension" Therefore, "these two different 
approaches to the whole of Christian theology are not in 
competition, but complementary aspects of Moltmann’s 
theological enterprise". Nevertheless, in the Christ 
event, for Moltmann, the resurrection and the crucifixion
are not two isolated happenings, but the resurrection of
the crucified Christ and the cross of the risen Christ
respectively.
Obviously, the cross and the resurrection are mutually
presupposed and implied in Moltmann’s theology, In the
21 Ibid. , p. 200 .
22 EH, p.57,
23 CG, p.5
24 Ibid,
25 Ibid,
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.54.
27 CG, p,204.
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following the Christ event will be analyzed in terms of 
God’s self-negation, identification with the godless and 
sublation of God’s self-negation.
4.2 Revelation in the Opposite and God’s Self-Negation
The Christ event is an event of double negations. The
cross is the first negation whereas the resurrection is the
second negation. In other words, the Christ event is 
dialectically structured. This does not merely denote that 
the cross is negated by the resurrection but also expresses 
that God is negated by himself initially.
4.2.1 The Way of Understanding Revelation in the Opposite
According to Moltmann, "the deity of God is revealed in 
28the paradox of the cross". For him, the cross embodies
the dialectical principle of knowledge, like is known by
unlike, which contrasts with the analogical principle of 
29knowledge, like is known by like. He takes Hippocrates’ 
and Schelling’s words as illustrations of this 
epistemological principle and concludes that "God is only 
revealed as 'God’ in his opposite". It is true that the 
crucial concept of "revelation in the opposite" in
28 Ibid. , p. 27 .
29 Ibid. , p.26.
30 Ibid. , p. 27 .
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Moltmann’s theology of cross is not explicated clearly. And 
this causes some confusion and puzzlement. R. Bauckham 
questions that "if it means literally that God is revealed
by what is opposite to him then it is hard to see either
how a revelation of God could be recognised or how anything
of God would be revealed". However, this does not mean 
that Moltmann does not provide any clue to understand this
concept properly.
In the first place, it is very easy to be misdirected
by Moltmann’s quotations from Hippocrates and Schelling in
understanding this concept. One will try to grasp it in
terms of Hippocrates’ "contraria contrariis curantur" or
Schelling’s words: "Every being can be revealed only in its 
33opposite. Love only in hatred, unity only in conflict."
These quotations have their proper meaning only in the
context of their different thoughts. Although they are the
same in the formal sense of revelation in the opposite,
they are applied in different contexts so as to have 
different concrete meanings. Likewise, Moltmann’s concept
of dialectical principle of knowledge shares the form but
with different application.
31 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.68. Cf. DGG, pp.47-48, 143-144, 152, 158, 188-
189.
32 Ibid.
33 CG, 27.
4 JJ Bauckham considers that "it was probably a mistake 
for Moltmann to try to put the cross under* some general 
dialectical principle of knowledge". {Moltmann: Messianic
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The concept of "revelation in the opposite" has to be 
understood as a formal concept firstly. It can be expressed 
in this way: A is revealed in its opposite, -A. However,
this formal concept does not tell what the ontical
relationship of A to -A is. In Moltmann’s case, A and -A 
are identical. This is because -A is A’s self-negation.
One should not neglect that Moltmann applies this
concept to understand the cross. Indeed, it is his 
interpretation of the cross that can help to clarify how he 
uses this concept in turn.
4.2.2 Luther’s Theology of the Cross
Moltmann admits that his interpretation of the death of 
Christ on the cross follows Luther’s theologia crucis.^ 
His two principles of knowledge, analogical and 
dialectical, "correspond to Luther’s distinction between 
the theology of glory which knows God from his works and 
the theology of the cross which knows him in his suffering"
A A
respectively. Then a prior understanding of Luther’s 
theology of cross will be helpful to clarify Moltmann’s
concept of revelation.
Theology in the Making, p.69.)
35 HTG, p.172.
A p R. Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Eschatology of the Cross", 
Scottish Journal of Theology 30/4(1977), p.305. Cf. CG,
pp.27-28, 68-71, 196, 208-214.
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’’The most comprehensive description of Luther’s
theolog'ia crucis is given in his theses in The Heidelberg
Disputation (1518), where he contrasts the theolog'y of the
cross with the theology of glory". And the decisive 
38statements are in theses 19 and 20. These two types of
knowledge of God are fundamentally opposed to each other, 
indeed, what Luther calls the theology of glory is the view
of mediaeval Scholasticism which maintains that the
knowledge of God can be grasped through knowing God’s 
creation analogically. According to Moltmann, its
underlying epistemological principle is analogical rathei' 
than dialectical. Moltmann’s criticism of Aquinas’ natural 
theology precisely inherits Luther’s merit of opposing the 
theology of glory. However, he further uncovers the 
epistemological principles inherent in these opposite 
theologies. That is, he distinguishes these two by 
contrasting their different epistemological character.
For Luther, a theologian of glory, who does not deserve 
to be called a theologian, "looks upon the invisible things 
of God as they are preceived in created things". By 
tracing the footprints of God in creation, this way of
37 W.D. Persaud, "Luther’s Theolog'ia Crucis: A Theology 
of 'Radical Reversal’ in Response to the Challenge of 
Marx’s Wel tanschauung” , Dialog 29/4 (1990), p. 264,
38 Von Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, p.18.
39 M. Luther, "Heidelberg Disputation" in Martin 
Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, ed. T.F, Lull 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), thesis 19, p.43. Here the
translation is cited from A.E. McGrath, Luther’s Theology 
of the Cross (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), p.148.
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4 ftknowing' God is the nearest path. ’’The invisible things of
God are virtue, godliness, wisdom, justice, goodness, and
so forth."41 The implication of this type of knowledge of
God is drawn out by W. von Loewenich by substituting modern
concepts of nature, history, and personality for "the 
4 ?things that are made". "Whether one becomes aware of 
God’s glory by contemplating the eternal laws of nature or 
by quiet prayer and adoration in view of the inexhaustible
riches of creaturely life; whether one sees history as the
Eternal’s unconcealed revelation, or whether because of the
mystery of personality one is convinced of the certainty of
the Uncaused, in every case the attempt is made to reach 
4 Qthe knowledge of God by way of creation." However, Luther 
claims that "the recognition of all these things does not 
make one worthy or wise".^
What Luther means here is that "the knowledge of God 
which the theologian of glory offers through his study of 
‘the invisible things of God’ is not salvific."^ Such a 
"‘divine one’ stand so far above humankind that God is de
Von Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, p.18.
Luther, "Heidelberg Disputation", explanation of 
thesis 19, p.43.
42 ,Von Loewenich, Luther s Theology of the Cross, p.18,
Ibid.
Luther, "Heidelberg Disputation", explanation of 
thesis 19, p.43.
Persaud, "Luther’s Theologia Crucis: A Theology of 
‘Radical Reversal’ in Response to the Challenge of Marx’s 
fVel tans chaining” , p.267.
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W.D.4 fifacto absent from the world of human suffering".
Persaud is right that "the emphasis in Luther’s theology is 
4 7knowledge of God that is saving knowledge". For Luther, 
such knowledge is to be found in God’s self-revelation
through Christ and his cross.
In thesis 20 of the 1-le.i del berg Disputation Luther says; 
"The man who preceives the visible rearward parts of God as 
seen in suffering and the cross does, however, deserve to 
be called a theologian."^ J. Pelikan says to the point 
"At the basis of the theology of Cross was the proposition 
that 'God can be found only in suffering and the cross", 
so that ‘he who does not know Christ does not know God
r 1hidden in suffering’". But what are the visible things 
that are seen through the cross? The visible things of God 
which are in opposition to the invisible, to Luther, are 
"his human nature, weakness, foolishness",^ There is 
"nothing else to be seen than disgrace, poverty, death, and
46 Ibid.
4S Luther, "Heidelberg Disputation", thesis 20, p.43. 
Here the translation is cited from McGrath, Luther’s 
Theology of the Cross, p.148.
49 J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of 
the Development of Doctrine vol 4; Reformation of Church 
and Dogma (1300-1700) (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984), pp.155-156.
50
51
thesis
52
Ibid.
Luther, "Heidelberg Disputation", explanation 
21, p.44.
Ibid., explanation of thesis 20, p.43.
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53everything' that is shown us in the suffering Christ”.' 
Precisely in the things humanity regards as the counterpart
of the divine, God has become visible. God wants to reveal
himself in the humility and shame of the cross,
Moltmann summarizes Luther’s Heidelberg' Disputation as 
follows: ”God reveals himself to the godless not through
power and glory, but on the contrary in suffering and the 
cross, and in this way justifies the sinners."^ Suffering 
and cross is the contradiction of power and glory. For
Luther, the God who is suffering on the cross is the God of
power and glory. However, God conceals his glory and power 
so as to be a hidden God who can only be recognized "in the
r rhumility and shame of the cross”, * 1 "under the opposite
form”/ Christ on the cross, for Luther, "was forsaken by
all, even by God".J? In the godforsaken Christ, God reveals
himself in his opposite. Therefore, G. Ebeling* says that
"the principle of the knowledge of God in the cross is that 
58of contradiction".
53 Weimar Edition of Luther’s Works, vol.5, p.108.
Cited form von Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of Cross, p.28.
54 HTG, p.172.
55 Von Loewenich, Luthers Theology of the Cross, p.29.
56 American Edition of Luther’s Works, vol.25, p.366. 
Cited from von Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 
p. 29 .
r o1 M. Luther, "A Mediation on Christ's Passion”, in 
Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writing, ed. T.F. Lull 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), p.169.
58 G. Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought, 
trans. R.A. Wilson (London: Collins, 1972), p.228.
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4.2.3 The Cross as God’s Self-Negation
Moltmann writes something similar to Luther’s 
revelation under the opposite form when he talks about the
application of the dialectical principle of knowledge:
Applied to Christian theology, this means that God is 
only revealed as 'God’ in his opposite: godlessness 
and abandonment by God. in concrete terms, God is 
revealed in the cross of Christ who was abandoned by 
God.
Speaking formally, God’s opposite is godlessness. Then, God 
is revealed in godlessness. And for Moltmann, as God’s 
opposite, the godlessness and godforsakenness primarily 
denotes the godforsaken Christ. This godlessness is equal
to the crucified Christ. The Christ who is on the cross is
the godforsaken Christ. Therefore, the cross signifies the 
opposite of God. However, Christ is not something other 
than God but God the Son. He is abandoned by God the
Father. The act of abandoning unto godlessness which 
contradicts God’s being is an act of negation. In the 
cross, God abandons God. God becomes his opposite by his
self-negation because he is abandoned by God himself. And
this is precisely the paradox of the cross: God against
60 f |God. It is an event happening within God himself. In 
this way, God’s self-revelation in his opposite is to be 
understood as an act of God’s self-negation.
59 CG, p.27. Cf. FC, pp,78-79.
80 Ibid. , p. 152 .
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This view is further supported by Moltmann’s view of 
Christ’s resurrection. In the context of discussing the
significance of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
he says that "his resurrection must then be understood ... 
as a conquest of the deadliness of death - as a conquest of
god-forsakenness ... as a negation of the negative (Hegel), 
as a negation of the negation of God". It is clear that 
the death of Christ which is negated by his resurrection is
the negation of God. In another context of talking of the
risen Christ as the God of promise, as the coming God, 
Moltmann puts these phrases in parallel: the "death of God" 
on the cross, the pain of the negation of himself; the
resurrection of the crucified one, the negation of
negation, Obviously, for him, while the resurrection of
Christ is the negation of his death, the cross of Christ is 
the negation of God’s own being, an absolute nihil 
embracing God.
In this vein, God’s self-revelation in his opposite is
his own act of self-negation. But one cannot comprehend the
cross event by using the simple concept of God ( esse 
85simplex). Moltmann points out the problem:
06 TH, p.211.
63 Ibid. , p, 171 .
64 Ibid. , p.198.
65 CG, p.244.
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In that case one would have to say: what happened on 
the cross was an event between God and God. It was a 
deep division in God himself, in so far as God 
abandoned God and contradicted himself, and at the 
same time a unity in God, in so far as God was at one 
with God and corresponded to himself. In that case one 
would have to put the formula in a paradoxical way: 
God died the death of the godless on the cross and yet 
did not die. God is dead and yet is not dead.
However, Moltmann does not avoid this contradiction by
understanding God’s self-negation in terms of the
dialectical movement of the absolute, identical subject but
by taking it as an event in the Trinity, that is, a 
fi 7trinitarian event between the Son and the Father.
In German Idealism, especially G.W.F. I-Iegel, the divine 
co
monas is interpreted as the absolute, identical subject.
For Hegel , God as the Trinity does not means that there are 
three "persons" in God as represented by traditional Church 
dogma. "The name ‘Father’, ‘Son’, and ‘Spirit’ are 
figurative, childlike ways of expressing the three moments
constitutive of the interior dialectic of the divine life -
unity, differentiation, return; or universality, 
particularity, and individuality." In other words, there 
is only one person in God whose divine .life is dialectic.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.245.
TKG, p.139.
P.C. Hodgson, "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel" in
Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West vol.l, ed. 
N. Smart, J. Clayton, S. Katz and P. Sherry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.101.
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The death of Christ is but the climax of the
differentiation of God’s life.
Moltmann assures that there are three persons in God
and views "what happened on the cross ... as an event 
71between God and the Son of God", From this perspective 
two negations happen when Jesus Christ is crucified.
J. J O’Donnell noted that "the central concept which 
Moltmann employs to interpret the event of the cross is the
biblical idea paradidonai, in German Dahing'abe, in English
‘deliver up’". Moltmann identifies a double paradidonai
in the event of the cross: the Father "delivers up" his
Son to the fate of death; the Son "delivers himself up" for 
74sinful humanity. The Father abandons his Son and the Son
abandons himself. Moltmann explains the full import of the 
Father’s action by citing the study of W. Popkes on the
meaning of paradidonai in the New Testament:
That God delivers up his Son is one of the most 
unheard-of statements in the New Testament. We must 
understand "deliver up" in its full sense and not 
water it down to mean "send" or "give". What happened 
here is what Abraham did not need to do to Isaac (cf. 
Rom. 8:32): Christ was quite deliberately abandoned by
11 CG, p.192,
79 J.J. O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The
Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology 
and the Theology of Hope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983), p.117. Cf. McGrath, The Making of Modern 
Christology: From the Enlightenment to Pannenberg, p.189,
73 Ibid.
74 C'G, pp.242-244. Cf. TKG, pp,80-83; WJC, pp.172-177.
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the Father to the fate of death: God subjected him to 
the power of corruption, whether this be called man or 
death. To express the idea in its most acute form, one 
might say in the words of the dogma of the early 
church: the first person of the Trinity casts out and 
annihilates the second ... A theology of the cross 
cannot be expressed more radically than it is here.
On the other hand, Moltmann gives an analysis of the
corresponding paradidonai of the Son:
In Gal. 2:20 the "delivering up" formula also occurs 
with Christ as its subject: " ... the Son of God, who 
loved me and gave himself to me". According to this it 
is not just the Father who delivers Jesus up to die 
godforsaken on the cross, but the Son who gives 
himself up. This corresponds to the synoptic account 
of the passion story according to which Jesus 
consciously and willingly walked the way of the cross 
and was not overtaken by death as by an evil, 
unfortunate fate. It is theological important to note 
that the formula in Paul occurs with both the Father 
and the Son as subject, since it expresses a deep 
conformity between the will of the Father and the will 
of the Son in the event of the cross, as the 
Gethsemane narrative also record.
Therefore in the trinitarian context this double
"delivering up" in the cross can be understood as: the
Father negates the Son and the Son negates himself. They
both share the same will to annihilate and cast out the
second person in the Trinity, This is precisely the meaning
of the statement that the crucifixion is an event "which
75 W. Popkes, Christus Traditus: Eine Unterssuchung zum 
Begriff der Dahing'abe im Neuen Testament, 1967, p.286f.
Cited from CG, p.241.
76 CG, p.243.
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77 78takes place within God himself’, "between God and God".
It is in this twofold negation that God reveals himself.
The dialectical principle of knowledge, like is known
by unlike, then, can be understood as: God is revealed in
his self-negation. Like becomes unlike so that God can be
recognized by the sinners and the unrighteous. In his self­
negation God identifies himself with the godforsaken so 
that he can be recognized by them. "If like is known only 
by like, then the Son of God would have had to remain in 
heaven, because he would be unrecognizable by anything 
earthly." Therefore, "it is the dialectical knowledge of
God in his opposite which first brings heaven down to the 
80earth of those who are abandoned by God".
At the same time, on the cross God’s humiliation is
completely revealed. God’s incarnation "even unto death" is
his utter humiliation. For Moltmann, the confession "Ecce
deus!" means "Behold God on the cross!" When the
crucified Jesus on the cross is called the "image of the 
invisible God", the meaning is that "this is God, and God
77 Ibid., p. 152
78 Ibid., p. 1 51
79 Ibid., p. 27 .
80 Ibid., p, 28 .
81 Ibid., P. 205
82 Ibid.
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00is like this". On the cross God is revealed as the one
who empties himself and identifies himself with the godless
and the godforsaken, becoming "the brother of the despised, 
abandoned and oppressed", By this way, the love of God
(IKreaches them. In other words, God s love is revealed when
the son of God abandons his divine identity and enters the
situation of the godless, the context of the godforsaken.
It is at this point that one can says: "The cross therefore
reveals God in his loving identification with godforsaken 
flfimen and women.”
Here one point should be noticed. God’s act of self­
negation in Christ’s death is for the sake of the godless. 
Through this God identifies himself with this suffering
world. It is not an act purely for God himself. That is, 
for Moltmann, God’s self-negation is not a self­
differentiation in the divine life in Hegelian sense that
the Father as the unity negates himself to be the Son and
returns to himself in the Spirit.
4.3 God’s Identification with this World in the Cross
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid. , p.24.
85 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making', p.69.
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4.3.1 From Historical Good Friday to Speculative Good
Friday
Illuminated by Hegel’s philosophical interpretation of 
Good Friday, Moltmann, in his Theolog'y of Hope, connects
the godforsakenness of Jesus on the cross and the
godforsakenness of the world. From the very beginning he 
notes the universal significance of the "death of God" in
the context of discussing the reality of the resurrection
of Christ. He considers the question of the reality of the
resurrection of Christ can only be one "which embraces the
whole modern experience of the world, of self and of the
future - a question which we ourselves constitute with our 
oowhole reality". And the statement of Hegel and Nietzsche: 
"God is dead", in Moltmann’s view, "is not merely a 
statement of philosophical metaphysics or of theology, but
is one which also seems to lie at the foundations of modern
experience of self and the world ... ". "God is dead" 
implies that this world is experienced as godless, 
humanity’s self is godless, the future is godless. 
Godlessness is the modern experience of the whole reality.
777, pp. 168-172.
Ibid., 167.88
89 Ibid.
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In 1802, Hegel ended his essay Faith and Knowledge with 
90his own interpretation of Good Friday. Moltmann quotes
this passage with his own commentary to establish the point
that there is a connection between the godforsakenness of
the crucified Jesus and the godforsakenness of the world.
As shown in the title of the essay: Faith and Knowledge
or the Philosophy of Subjectivity in the Complete Range of 
91its Forms as Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy,
the main concern of Hegel is the problem raised from the
reflective philosophy. In general, reality, in such 
philosophy, is split up into two opposite realms: the 
infinite and the finite. God and the world are separated 
from each other. The gap posited between them is infinite. 
In this way, the whole finite reality is suffering from 
being forsaken by the infinite. They can never be
reconciled with one another. G. Rosen paraphrases that
passage:
The abstract, pure concept or infinity in Kant and 
Fichte is "the abyss of nothingness in which all being 
is engulfed". The infinite is opposed to being, that 
is, to the finite, to all determination, and hence is 
nothing itself ("nothingness"). This nothingness is 
imposed on all being ("the abyss ... in which all 
being is engulfed"). This "signifies" the "infinite 
grief" of the finite: the individual feels abandoned
G.F, Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. W. Cerf and 
II. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1977), p.190.
93 The German Title: Glauben und Wissen oder die 
Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivitat in der 
VolIstandigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, 
und Fichtesche Philosophic.
145
by a characterlessj omnipotent and hence impotent God?Z
However, Hegel does not agree with this philosophical view­
point. He considers that the bifurcation is not fixed but
a moment of the dialectical movement of the Absolute Spirit 
or God. "Spirit, as infinite creative life ... posits a 
world which in its determinateness ... is the negation of
its own infinite indeterminateness. Then, in a negation of 
that negation, Spirit overcomes the estrangement in a 
higher synthetic unification." With this understanding, 
"Hegel draws a parallel between Jesus’ godforsakenness on 
Golgotha ... and the modern, worldwide godforsakenness and 
godlessness, which is, in fact, a universal Good Friday, an 
'abyss of nothingness which engulfs all being’, an 
'infinite pain*".^ According to Hegel, Good Friday has to 
be interpreted "as the negative moment which is necessarily 
produced by the Absolute Spirit (God) in order to allow its 
externalization and to make itself finite so that it might 
return to itself in an enriched and concretized way".
G. Rosen, Hegel Contra. Sociology (London: Athlone, 
1981), pp.103-104.
91 W.J, Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a 
Mystery of Salvation (Washington: Catholic University Press 
of America, 1982), pp,150-151.
94 ••M. Steen, "Jurgen Moltmann’s Critical Reception of 
K. Barth’s Theopaschitism", Ephemerides Theologicae 
Lovaniensis 67/4 (1991), pp.294-295.
95 Ibid. , p. 295 .
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Therefore, Moltmann comments that "Hegel meant by this
that modern atheism and nihilism ... can be understood as
a universalizing of the historic Good Friday of the
forsakenness of Jesus, so that it becomes a speculative 
Good Friday of the forsakenness of all that is". That 
is, Good Friday denotes not merely the death of God but
also the death of this world, not merely the
godforsakenness of the crucified Jesus but also the
godforsakenness of the world. The crucified Jesus and this
world suffer from the same alienation which splits them 
from God. Moltmann agrees with Hegel that the "infinite 
pain of the cross" has to be understood in terms of 
universality, However, he rejects Hegel’s method of 
universalization by projecting the cross as an "element
belonging to the divine process and thus immanent in
God". Otherwise, the historicity of the event of the
cross and the resurrection will be done away with in the 
98logos of reflection and consciousness. And such a
speculative christology "makes the particular features of 
the real historical human being Jesus of Nazareth and the
arbitrary occurrences of his life unessential"/
4,3.2 The Cross as God’s Identification with the World
TH, p.l69.
Ibid,, p.17I.
Ibid., p.17 2.
CG, p.91.
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In Theology of Hope Moltmann does not explicate how the
crucified Jesus is connected to the godforsaken world.
Rather, he is concerned with the abolition of the universal
Good Friday, of the godforsakenness of the world, in the
resurrection. As M. Steen says: "Moltmann seeks to
understand the g'odf orsakenness of the world, the 
destructive, the prevailing nothingness, as taken up in 
God’s dialectic, eschatological process, in accordance with
the dialectic event of the crucified and resurrected 
Christ” .10° In this vein, Moltmann writes that "the 
resurrection and the future of God must manifest themselves
not only in the case of the godforsakenness of the 
crucified Jesus, but also in that of the g’odf orsakenness of 
the world".101
Even so, Moltmann implicitly expresses the point that 
the connection between the historic Good Friday and the
universal Good Friday is not external but internal. This is
because only such connection will make the abolition of the
negative possible in the resurrection of Christ. This point 
is very clear when Moltmann says: "If ‘atheism’ finds its 
radical form in the recognition of the universal
significance of Good Friday, then it is a fact that the God
100
Barth’s 
101
Steen, "Jiirgen Moltmann’s 
Theopaschitism", p.295.
TH, p . 1 6 9 .
Critical Reception of K.
148
of the resurrection is in some sort an ‘a-theistic’ 
God".102
1't is in The Crucified God that Moltmann explicitly
interprets the cross as the place God identifies himself
with the godforsaken world. In his view, the cross is the
place on which the incarnation of the Logos is
completed. ' He writes: "When God becomes man in Jesus of
Nazareth, he not only enters into the finitude of man, but
in his death on the cross also enters into the situation of
man’s godforsakenness1'”Not only does he enter into it,
descend into it, but he also accepts it and embraces the
whole of human existence with his being, "making it
1 Of!part of his own eternal life”. It seems that God’s act
of identifying with the world on the cross consists of two
moments: God enters into the situation of the
godforsakenness of the world and the negative element of
the world enters into the being of God. In this way the
destiny of Jesus Christ and that of this world are
interwoven with one another.
In other words, God the Son, like all living things,
takes up death in his own being so that he is completely in
102 Ibid. , p.171.
103 CG, p .204. Cf. TKG, pp.118-119
104 Ibid. , p.276. Cf. TKG, p.119.
105 Ibid. Cf. TKG, p.119.
106 TKG, p. 119.
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solidarity with the godforsakenness. Therefore, Moltmann
writes: "God becomes the God who identifies himself with
men and women to the point of death, and beyond". And 
this is the significance of the completion of God’s
incarnation on the cross.
God expresses his solidarity with this world on the
cross. Here one thing' has to be clarified. Is Jesus Christ
totally dead on the cross? Or just his human nature is 
crucified but not his divine nature? Indeed these questions 
arise only in the framework of traditional christolog'ical 
doctrine of two natures. The significance of these 
questions is how radically God identifies himself with the
godforsaken world.
4.3.3 The Death of the Son and Death in God
The christolog'ical doctrine of two natures proposes 
that "it was only the human nature in Christ which 
died". In this way, "the hypostatic union of the divine 
and human natures in Christ provided a basis for explaining 
Christ’s death without directly involving God" Moltmann
TKG, p.119. In WJC Moltmann writes that "Jesus died 
the death of all living things ... He died in solidarity 
with the whole sighing creation, human and non-human - the 
creation that ‘sighs’ because it is subject of 
transience".(p.169)
108
( 1977 ) , 
109
R.D. Zimany, 
p.52.
Ibid.
"Moltmann’s Crucified God", Dialog 16/1
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discloses the concept of God and the longing' for salvation 
underlying this doctrine?^ ’’The theistic concept of God 
according to which God cannot die, and the hope for
salvation, according to which man is to be immortal, made
it impossible to regard Jesus as really being God and at
the same time as being forsaken by God".m "Therefore the
God-man Christ can only have suffered 'according to the 
112flesh’ and 'in the flesh’, that is in his human nature",
not his divine nature.
Although Scholastic theology can attribute the human
characteristics of suffering and death to the whole person
of Christ with the help of the doctrine of communicatio
idiomatum, one still cannot say: Therefore the divine 
nature can suffer and die; it is only possible to say:
Therefore the person of Christ is mortal. This is
because the predicates of the human nature are only
transferred to the divine nature The divine nature does
not suffer and die in its own. God’s being is not really
CG, pp.227-228.
111 Ibid. , p. 228.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid. , p. 232 .
H4 According to Moltmann, Luther tries to interpret the 
death of Christ as the death of God within the framework of 
the doctrine of two natures after Scholastic theology. 
However, owing to the lacking of trinitarian terms, he 
arrives at paradoxical distinctions between God and God: 
"between the God who crucified and the crucified God; the 
God who is dead and yet is not dead".(CG, pp.232-235)
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forsaken and his identification of himself with the
forsaken world will be not radical enough.
According to Moltmann, the death of Jesus Christ on the
cross is not a divine-human event, but a trinitarian event
between the Son and the Father "The title ‘Son5 does
not . . . concern a Godhead separated from the manhood of
Christ, but the whole person of the Christ who is delivered 
1 1 fiup ... in his relationship to the Father." Therefore it
is God the Son who dies on the cross but not his human
nature. God identifies himself with this suffering world in
God the Son rather than in the human nature of Jesus
Christ, it is only in this way that the negative element of 
this world is taken up in God’s own being.
It is God the Son whose whole being dies on the cross.
Then, to God, what is it meant by death? In trinitarian
terms, the Son is forsaken by the Father, His death is "the
death of complete abandonment by God" "Jesus died 
'without God’ - godlessly.He "suffers dying in 
forsakenness". God the Son is delivered up in the 
absolute, total nihil,"the absolute death, the
115 CG, p. 245 •
116 Ibid., P • 265 .
117 Ibid., P- 276.
118 TKG, p .82 . Cf
119 CG, p. 243 •
120 TH, p. 198
WJC, p.174.
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Death, then, is the121destroying nothingness itself”,
condition of being nothing. The Son on the cross become
nothing so that his resurrection is "a new totality which
annihilates the total nihil"
With this understanding of the death of Jesus, Moltmann
distinguishes the suffering of the Son from that of the 
Father: ’’The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the 
death of the Son”, for one ’’can no longer ‘suffer’ 
death, because suffering presupposes life”.1 The Father 
and the Son do not suffer in the same way. By this Moltmann
avoids the ancient heresy patripassianism which holds that
God the Father suffers as the Son. On the other hand he
claims that "nor can the death of Jesus be understood in
IOCtheopaschite terms as the ‘death of God’"168 "but only as 
death in God”.* 122 123 124 125 126
FC, p,75. In GC Moltmann says: ” ... by yielding up 
the Son to death in God-forsakenness on the cross, and by 
surrendering him to hell, the eternal God enters the 
Nothingness out of which he created the world ... It is the 
presence of his self-humiliating, suffering love for his 
creation, in which he experiences death itself.”(p.91)
122 TH, p.198.
123 CG, p.243.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid. Cf. CG, p.207; FC, p.73.
126 Ibid. , p.207. P.S. Fiddes notes that in TKG Moltmann 
speaks simply of "the death of God”.[The Creative Suffering 
of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p.l95.J
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Moltmann insists that "it is important to distinguish
the divine nature in g'enere and the second person of the
Trinity in concrete when one is talking of the Christ
event. The reason is simple. The one who dies on the cross
is the Son but not the Father and the Spirit. Since God in
genere refers to the triune God, it is inappropriate to
says that God is dead.
4.4 God’s Sublation of His Self-Negation in the
Resurrection
In The Crucified God Moltmann writes:
,.. a trinitarian theology of the cross perceives God 
in the negative element and therefore the negative 
element in God, and in this dialectical way is 
panentheistic. For in the hidden mode of humiliation 
to the point of the cross, all being and all that 
annihilates has already been taken up in God and God 
begins to become "all in all".
The strong Hegelian overtones of this passage are not 
unusual in Moltmann’s The Crucified God, particularly the 
statement that the contradictory elements have been "taken 
up in God". "Being taken up" is the English translation 
of the German passive verb a,ufgehoben. Its noun Aufhebung
161 Ibid. , p.235.
128 Ibid. , p. 277 .
For example: "He humbles himself and takes upon 
himself the eternal death of the godless and the 
godforsaken ... "(CG, p.276)
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is often translated as ’’sublation" or "sublimation" in
Hegelian sense, "in the sense of resolving a dialectical 
tension" . A.E, McGrath suggests that "it is possible 
that Moltmann may wish to convey the idea of the resolution
of the seeming irresolvable dialectic between 'being’ and 
'non-being’ in the resurrection of the one who was 
crucified".130 31
4.4.1 The Resurrection as the Negation of Negation
In Theology of Hope Moltmann explicitly interprets the 
resurrection of Christ as "the negation of the negative" 
{Negation des Negativen), as "a negation of the negation of 
God" {als Negation der Negation Gottes), as "the beginning
of and the source of the abolition of the universal Good
Friday" (der Anfang und der Ursprung der Aufhebung des 
universalen Karfreitags), of the godforsakenness of the 
world.132
Here two points should be noted. The first one is that 
Moltmann uses Hegelian term "negation of negation" to 
interpret the resurrection. Basically this is consistent 
with the analysis of the cross above as God’s self-negation 
in Jesus Christ. In Hegelian sense, if the cross is
130 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology: 
From the Enlightenment to Pannenberg, p.191,
131 Ibid. , pp. 191-192 .
132 TH, p.211.
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understood as God’s self-negation, then it is very natural
to interpret the
negation; and vice
resurrection as
versa.
the negation of the
The second one is that Moltmann employs the Hegelian
term Aufhebung to express Christ’s resurrection as the
beginning and the source of the abolition of the
godforsakenness of this world. Since on the cross Christ
identifies himself with this world, his destiny is 
interwoven with the destiny of this world. Therefore, the 
negation of the death of Jesus Christ is to be interpreted 
as the beginning of the negation of this godforsaken world.
In sum, the resurrection is understood as "negation of 
negation" and Aufhebung (sublation) in relation to the 
death of Jesus and the death of this world respectively. 
Jesus Christ’s resurrection is not merely an act of God’s 
negating the negative element which he accepted and adopted 
as part of his being on the cross, but also an act of
negating the godforsakenness of this world.
According to Hegel, negation of negation is the 
1 'bsublating of the contradiction of the first negation. 
This means that the second negation is a kind of sublation
and its function is to sublate the contradiction in the
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A.V. 
Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p.835.
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first negation. Then, what is it meant by the statement
that the contradiction is sublated in the second negation?
4.4.2 The Negation of Negation as the Sublation of the
Crucified Jesus Christ
Aufheben has three main senses: (1) to raise, to hold,
to lift up; (2) to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel,
1 QXsuspend; (3) to keep, save, preserve. The noun Aufhebung 
similarly means (1) raising up; (2) abolition; and (3)
1 Q Rpreserving. ' "When something is sublated [aufgehoben(eJ],
it is ... a moment of a whole that also contains its
ICCopposite." "What results from the sublation of
something, e.g. the whole in which both it and its opposite 
survive as moments, is invariably higher than ... the 
item(s) sublated." ’ Through this moment the identity of 
the thing being sublated arrives, for Hegel, at the 
identity of identity and non-identity, The opposite is 
contained in a higher level of synthesis.
In Moltmann’
Obviously, it is
uses the terms
s case, what is going to be sublated?
the crucified Jesus. However, Moltmann 
negation of negation and sublation (or
M. Inwood, "Sublate" in A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992), p.283.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid. , p. 284 .
1 5 7
taking up) usually in the sense of abolition of death, 
negative element. It is only when he talks of the identity 
of Jesus that the meaning of preserving in God’s act of 
resurrecting emerges.
The identity of the risen Christ is not a simple one. 
He is not a God in heaven but the one whose identity is an
identity in contradiction. Moltmann considers that the
contradictions between the cross and the resurrection are
an inherent part of Jesus’ identity. Jesus’ identity is 
a dialectical identity which exists only through the
contradiction.Jesus, then, cannot be recognized by 
either his death or his resurrection but by both. Jesus as
the crucified cannot be reduced to the risen one and vice
versa.
Iiow can the identity in contradiction be possible? How
can the contradiction or opposite be contained in Jesus’
identity? The crucial point is that resurrecting is an act
of God sublating the death of Jesus Christ.
In The Crucified God, Moltmann argues that Jesus’
resurrection cannot be viewed as a revivification or as
138
139
140
141
TH, p.200.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cf. TH, 200.
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life after death. This is because "such interpretations142
14 1do not take seriously enough the deadliness of death".
For Moltmann, resurrection means "life from the dead", the
annihilation of the power of death in the victory of the
new, eternal lifeJ44 "Resurrection from the dead" does not
deny the fatality of death. This point echoes Moltmann’s
interpretation of Jesus’ death and resurrection in Theology 
1 4 fiof Hope: He is wholly dead and wholly raised. 0
In this vein, death means discontinuity of life,
absolute nihil. However, by raising Jesus to life, God 
created continuity in this radical discontinuity.1 By 
raising Jesus from the dead, God creates life and new being
out of nothing. At this point Moltmann makes clear that 
the risen Jesus is not "a new heaven Being of some kind, 
but Jesus himself" ,44^ This means that the risen Jesus is 
the crucified Jesus himself. Then, the act of resurrecting 
functions in two ways. Firstly, it abolishes the power of
death in the crucified Jesus. God the Son is not overcome 142 143
142 CG, pp.169-170. Cf. TH, p.211.
143 Herman, "Moltmann’s Christology", p.14. Cf. TKG. 
pp.85-86.
144
145
148
147
p . 2 0 3 .
148
149
CG, p.170.
Ibid.
TH, p.200.
Bauckham, "Moltmann’s
TI1, p.2 00.
Ibid,, p.199,
Theology of Hope Revisited",
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by death so as to become nothing' forever. Secondly, it 
preserves the identity of the crucified Jesus in the risen
Jesus. This is to say that resurrection does not annihilate
the crucified Jesus but the death of Jesus. Jesus’
identity, then, is an identity of continuity in radical 
discontinuity, or an identity of identity in total 
contradiction. The crucified Jesus is preserved in a 
higher identity of Jesus Christ. Jesus is simultaneously
the crucified and the risen one. It "is the same Jesus who
was crucified and is now raised" .151 it is the same Jesus
who is now raised was crucif ied.
4,4.3 The Open Dialectic
Because the destiny of Jesus Christ is interwoven with
that of this world in the cross, the resurrection of Jesus 
is not seen as a private Easter for his private Good
Friday, but as the beginning of the sublating of the
universal Good Friday, of this godforsaken world,^2 "as
the beginning of the eschatological transformation of the 
1 Qworld by its creator". Jesus’ "identity in cross and 
resurrection points the direction for coming events and
150 Ibid.
1 1 Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope Revisited",
p . 2 0 3 .
152 TH, p.211.
153 CG, p.162.
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makes a path for them".^ Against the background of the 
Old Testament, ’’this event which is revealed in the cross
and the Easter experiences points back to the promises of
God and forwards to an eschaton in which his divinity is
revealed in all i. .155 The resurrection is a promise
event. It is an event that has to be understood "as the
dawn and assured promise of the coming glory of God over
all".15’ That is , God begins to abolish all negative
element starting with the Christ event.
Moltmann even reads back from Jesus’ resurrection that
the godforsaken history of this world begins to be sublated
in the concrete history of God in the death of Jesus on the 
cross on Golgotha.He writes: "All human history, 
however much it may be determined by guilt and death, is
taken up into this 'history of God’, i.e. into the Trinity, 
and integrated into the future of the 'history of God’."^ 
As he quotes W, Kramer that "the resurrection of Jesus ... 
qualifies (the cross) so that it becomes an eschatological 
saving event", v the cross can be viewed as the beginning
154 TH, p.201 •
155 Ibid,, pp . 200
158 CG, p.173 •
157 Ibid., p. 201 .
158 Ibid., p. 246 .
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid., p. 182 .
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of the sublating of this godforsaken world. In this
context, Moltmann claims that "the trinitarian God-event 
on the cross . . . opens up the future"
Nevertheless, the dialectic of the cross and the
resurrection "is an open dialectic, which find its 
I fi ?resolving synthesis only in the eschaton of all things". 
This is because on the cross God opens himself in Christ to 
accept and adopt this forsaken world. The "Trinity is no
self-contained group in heaven, but an eschatological
process open for men on earth, which stems from the cross 
1 r qof Christ", ’ Therefore, the dialectic is not closed when
God raises Jesus from the dead, Jesus’ resurrection is but
a beginning and a promise of the sublation of this forsaken
world. It is only when all negative element is totally
abolished in the eschaton, that the ultimate synthesis
arrives. In this vein, the future of Jesus Christ is very
significant for the future of this world. This world waits 
1 f zfor its future by waiting for Jesus Christ’s future.
4,5 Conclusion
4.5.1 The Revelatory and Soteriolog'ical Significance
161 Ibid. , p. 255 .
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid. , p. 249.
164 TH, p,83.
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God reveals himself in the Christ event. First of all
this event has to be understood against the background of
the Old Testament history of promise. The God of Israel
reveals himself in the promise which is ultimately about
the eschaton of this world, that is, an eschatological
future in which even death will be overcome. And this
promise culminates in Christ’s resurrection in the New
Testament. ’’Once and for all ... Christ validated God’s
promise.” In the resurrection "God guaranteed his 
I fifipromise by ... enacting it in Jesus Christ”.1
However, the death which God overcomes so as to
validate his promise is that of the risen Christ. If the
resurrection reveals God’s power overcoming death, then the
cross reveals God’s suffering unto death. Therefore, in
the Christ event God discloses himself not merely "as the 
1 fi 7one who raises and will raise the dead”, but also as the 
1 fifione who can suffer and die on the cross. "If in the
resurrection of Jesus one sees 'God in action’, in the 
crucifixion of Jesus one sees 'God in passion’,"103
G.G. O’Collins, "Spes Quaerens Intellectum", 
Interpretation 22/1 (1968), p.45.
ICC Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope Revisited”,
p.203 .
O’Collins, "Spes Quaerens Intellectum”, p.45.
168 CG, p.216.
IRQ M. D. Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), p.123.
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In other words, God gives his promise in the Christ 
event to this world in a. dialectical way. God the Son
himself constitutes the promise in the resurrection which 
presupposes the cross. In this context, O’Collins rightly 
says that "the resurrection does not merely confirm the 
promise, but opens the future in a new hope". This means 
that Christ’s resurrection does not merely repeat God’s 
word-promise of overcoming death but in reality opens a way
to the fulfillment of this promise. .
ThixS is because God’s self-revelation in the Christ
event is a kind of double negation. In the Old Testament
the fact that God gives his promise to Israel in his words 
implies that God does not participate in the present 
reality analogically when he reveals himself. In the New
Testament the fact that God gives his promise to the world
in Jesus Christ means that God is involved in the present
reality dialectically, God
death in Christ firstly so
crucified Christ from death,
becomes the promise of God
Through the first negation
himself with this suffering
this godforsaken world can
Jesus. In this context,
resurrection, as the negatic 
future in a new hope" for t
has to negates himself unto
that his act of raising the
as a negation of the negation,
for the future of this world.
on the cross, God identifies
world so that the sublation of
start with the resurrection of
it can be said that the
n of Christ’s death, "opens the
he world.
O’Collins, "Spes Quaerens Intellectum", p.45.
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God’s promise given in Christ, then, is simultaneously 
his self-revelation and his soteriological action for the
world. However, such an act of self-revelation and
salvation does not finish yet. They both point to the
ultimate future in which all negative will be transformed
and overcome.
4.5.2 The Initiation of God’s History and its
Characteristic
When God reveals himself in the dialectical Christ
event, he initiates his history. From the contradiction 
between Jesus’ death and his resurrection derives a history 
forward to the eschaton. The crucial point of such an
initiation is that the dialectic of the Christ event is not
a closed dialectic but an open one. On the one hand, it is 
open to accept this godforsaken world on the cross, On the
other hand, it is open to the future in the resurrection.
Because on the cross Jesus identifies himself with this
world, his resurrection does not stand for the final
overcoming of the negative but only the beginning of
negating the death of this world. Then, before the risen
Christ there is still an eschatological future for God to
pursue that this godforsaken world has to be totally
sublated in God’s history so that "God will be all in 
171all". The future of Jesus Christ is a future in which
171 As Bauckham observes, this is a text which has 
always been a favourite of Moltmann’s. ["Moltmann’s 
Eschatology of the Cross", Scottish Journal of Theology
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God will be in everything and everything will be in God, In
this way, a history of God is initiated in the Christ event
for the sake of this world.
Such a kind of history has several characteristics.
Firstly, God’s history is inseparable from the history of 
172this world. On the one hand, God’s history is possible 
only when he participates in this world dialectically. On 
the other hand, God’s history comes to its end only when it 
brings the history of the world to an end.
Secondly, God’s history is a history of overcoming the 
g'odf orsakenness of this world. He opens himself in Jesus 
Christ to the nothingness so as to share the destiny of
this world in the cross. He raises Jesus from the dead so
as to begin to overcome the eschatological death of this
world.
Thirdly, God’s history is a history of the Trinity. God 
the Father, God the Son and God the Spirit are involved in
the Christ event. Their interactions are dialectical. While
the Father surrenders the Son and the Son surrenders
30/4 (1977), p.310,] Cf. HP, p.87; TH, p.88; HP, pp.40, 66, 
83, 120.
172 Cf. CG, p.270.
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himself unto death, it is the Spirit who re-unites them by 
173raising the Son from the dead.
173 Bauckham rightly points out that Moltmann’s doctrine 
of Holy Spirit is not adequate in The Crucified God. 
(Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making, p.110) But
this does not deny the trinitarian character of the Christ 
event.
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5 The Retroactive Effect of God’s Economic Activity
5.1 Introduction
In the Christ event, God gives his promise to the world
in a dialectical way. Epistemologically, God reveals the 
eschatological future to the world in Christ’s resurrection 
which contradicts Jesus’ cross. Soteriologically, God 
begins to fulfill this promise by starting with God’s 
identifying with this world in the cross and his sublating 
of Jesus* death in the resurrection. Then, God’s history is
initiated for the sake of this world. It is interwoven with
the history of this wor1d.
However, according to the traditional Christian 
theology, God’s trinitarian history with this world belongs 
to the category of the economic Trinity. It is only a 
reflection of the immanent Trinity. Moltmann does not agree 
to this view. God’s history on the cross is no mere 
revelatory and soteriological event, but also a theological
event at the same time. Moltmann rejects the traditional
distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinities
in order to get rid of the notion that God’s history is 
merely a reflection of God’s inner being.
Is this Hegelianism? Does Moltmann have a tendency to 
see God’s history as his self-realisation?
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Actually, Moltmann’s doctrine of God is not a 
theological version of Hegel’s philosophy. Nor does he want 
to propose that God needs to participate in the history of
the world so as to realise himself. In this way, Moltmann
has to establish a different concept of God that can
fulfill two functions. On the one hand, it can justify that 
God’s history on the cross or God’s acts on the world is
not the moving image of eternity. On the other hand, it can
avoid being charged with the view that God’s trinitarian
history is his self-realisation in the world,
This chapter falls into two parts. The first part 
tackles how Moltmann denies the traditional concept of God
by establishing a different concept of God around the cross
event. The second part deals with the problem of Hegelianism
and the self-realisation of God by further clarifying the 
dialectic in the cross event and the correct relationship
between the immanent and the economic Trinities.
5.2 Two Different Doctrines of the Trinity
This part consists of two sections, The first one is
to see what kind of God is implied in the distinction which
is rejected. The second one is to analyse the doctrine of
God which is going to replace the rejected one. The first 
way can help clarifying what kind of concept of God is
169
going to be established from a negative way. Furthermore,
by singling out the character of the rejected concept of 
God, one can understand the significance of Moltmann’s
revolution in the concept of God.
5.2.1 The Traditional. Distinction Between the Immanent
Trinity and the Economic Trinity
Moltmann considers the way which the Christian theology 
distinguishes the Trinity’s immanence from its economy is 
out of the experience of this world, not out of God.
Consequently, God is a God in heaven but not of this world.
In the following the origin, the underlying doctrine and 
the character of this traditional concept of God, that is, 
the distinction between the immanent Trinity and the 
economic Trinity is viewed as original and copy, are to be 
examined. After that Moltmann’s revolution in the concept 
of God will be analysed against this theological 
background.
5.2.1.1 The Origin of the Distinction
As J.J. O’Donnell writes, "in the classical Christian 
tradition theologians distinguished between the economic
and the immanent Trinity, between the being of God for us
TKG, pp.158-159.
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and the being of God in himself However, he goes on to 
point out that the motives behind such thinking are 
soteriolog'ical rather than theological: "Only God has the 
power to save us."^ The salvific power of the economic 
Trinity is grounded in the immanent Trinity. They do not
ask the other way what the Trinity in the economy of
salvation means for the immanent Trinity.
C.M. LaCugna points out that the crucial moment of such
doctrinal development happens in the christological and
trinitarian controversies of the fourth century. In the
pre-Arian period, "the economy was at the center of 
fiChristian speculation". "The representative expression of 
this phase was subordination!sm, which was an 
interpretation of Scripture based on salvation history. At
this point there was no need to appeal to the distinction
between oikonomia and theologia., nor any intention to teach
that the Son is ontologically inferior to God."
J,J. O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The
Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology 
and the Theology of Hope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983), p.124
Ibid.
Ibid.
C.M. LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian 
Life (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p.8.
l’ Ibid., p . 3 0 .
? Ibid.
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In Arius’ view, "the subordination of Christ to God 
according' to the economy ( kat ’ oikonomian) implied 
subordination at the level of the God’s being' (kata
n
theologian)”. In other words, "Jesus Christ is a lesser 
aGod; the one who is sent is less than the one who sends", 
The consequence of this theological statement is considered
to be dangerous "because it .jeopardized salvation through
Christ: If Christ is not God, we are not saved through 
him".8 * 10 11 12
In response to Arius, "the Council of Nicaea (325) 
taught that the Christ is homoousios with God".^ "This 
immediately shifted attention away from the patent
subordination of the economy to an intradivine realm,
theologia, in which God and Christ, Father and Son, could 
be equal in substance". In this way, the conception of 
the immanent Trinity is introduced into Christian theology
to be the ontological ground for the salvation of this
world.
However, owing to the unquestioned axiom of divine
impassibility, the suffering of Christ in the economy of 
salvation contradicts the inner being of God’s immanent
8 Ibid., p.35.
8 Ibid., p.8.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
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. 13Trinity. In order to get around this contradiction,
Athanasius and others affirm that Christ suffers in his
humanity (kat ’ oikonomian) but not in his divinity (kata 
theologian) , not as the Logos.The Logos himself takes
human being’s flesh and assumes its weakness for human 
beings’ salvation, but "the changeless Logos could not in 
fact suffer these weaknesses" God only suffers in his 
human nature but his divine nature is impassible. Although 
the Logos is aware of the sufferings of his human nature,
accepts them as his own, because the human nature is his,
he does not experience them as suffering. This results in
the opening of a gap between the economic Trinity and the
immanent Trinity.
The Cappadocians then "made a distinction between the
'immanent Trinity’ and the ‘ Trinity in the economy of
salvation’ ... as between original and copy, idea and
17manifestation". God’s inner life and his external act are
posited in different realms of eternal and transient
respectively. They do not share the same ontological status
so that the relationship of the immanent Trinity to the
13 Ibid.
Ibid., pp.8, 42 .
15 F.M. Young, "A Reconsideration of Alexandrian 
Christology", Journal of Ecclesiastical History 22/2 
(1971), p.107.
R. Bauckham, "In defence of The Crucified God" in 
The Power and Weakness of God, ed. N.M. de S. Cameron 
(Edinburgh: Rutherford House Books, 1990), p.110.
17 CG, p.23 9.
173
economic trinity is not the same as the latter to the
former.
Within this dual framework, the suffering of Christ
then can be considered as happening in the economic Trinity
but not in the immanent Trinity. In this way, God’s inner
life is kept pure from being affected by his external act
to the world. And the axiom of divine impassibility is
maintained.
Obviously, the axiom of divine impassibility is the
crucial key that makes the Trinity be differentiated as the 
immanent Trinity and the economy Trinity. It plays a
decisive role in the relationship between these two. But 
what is the reason of taking such divine impassability as 
God’s being? The answer to this question is apparent that 
only an impassible God can save the transitory world. It
follows that the reason for the distinction between God’s
immanence and his economy is soteriological as well. And
this is derived from the experience of this world.
Before the relationship between the immanent and the 
economic Trinity is examined, a close look at the emergence 
of this axiom is necessary.
5.2.1.2 The Emergence of the Axiom of Divine Impassibility
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The emergence of the axiom of divine impassabiiity is
no accident. According to Moltamnn, it is introduced into
Christian theology in the context of human being’s asking' 
18for salvation as he realizes himself as finitude. Since
the days of the early church the question of divine being
or God is constantly connected with man’s self 
understanding. How does human being’s experience of his own 
finitude determine God’s being?
The key point lies in man’s longing for salvation. 
Man’s experience of his finitude is not the sufficient
reason for him to posit an eternal God. It is only when man 
finds that he cannot bear with being passing into nothing,
he will, seek for an eternal realm which is ontologically
different from this transient one. And the salvation of
this world is possible only when it participles in this
eternal realm. The salvation of this world can be found
only in the divine being in its unity, indivisibility and
unchangeableness. Clearly, then, this is very Platonic. 
Therefore, Moltmann is right when he writes; ’’Everything
that exists and yet does not endure raises the question of
a being which exists and endures eternally, and which can 
give it endurance in the midst of impermanence.”
When the Christian theology adopts such a pattern of
thinking, it unavoidably takes up the concept of God which
18 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
Ibid,, p . 8 7 .
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is assumed in the view-point of salvation: "The divine
being is intransitory, immortal, unchangeable and
impassible." This is because "God cannot suffer, God
cannot die ... in order to bring suffering, mortal being 
21under his protection."
Therefore, the axiom of divine passibility has "its 
origin in the experience of finitude and its context in the 
hope of immortality". ' When this axiom is taken along with 
the concept of the finitude of this world by the Christian
theology, a metaphysical doctrine of the two natures is
formulated. According to Moltmann, this metaphysical 
doctrine is the underlying principle of the distinction 
between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity.
5.2.1.3 The Metaphysical Doctrine of the Two Natures
This doctrine is very simple but its consequence is
very significant. It is about the world and God: "the world
is evanescent, God is non-evanescent; the world is 
temporal, God is eternal; the world is passible, God is 
impassible; the world is dependent, God is independent."
20 Ibid., p . 8 8 .
21 Ibid., p . 21 6 .
22 Ibid., p . 8 8 .
23 Ibid., p.158.
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This doctrine has two characteristics. In the first
place, methodologically, it is derived from the experience 
of the world that infinite and finite are mutually 
exclusive, not from the experience of God. In the second
place, theologically, the infinite and the finite are 
mutually exclusive.
As mentioned above, this doctrine starts with man’s
experience of his finitude. The problem does not lie in the 
starting point but the method of deriving God’s being from 
the nature of man. If finitude is to be denied, then its 
opposite, infinitude, has to be assumed. The underlying 
thought form is the abstract logic of either-or. The thing
that is going to be known is not allowed to manifest itself
in its own way but is limited to be known as either A or -
A. However, is it appropriate for man to determine God’s 
being by the way of negating his nature?
It follows that the theological consequence is very 
significant. By this way, God is posited as totally
different from the world. He is the infinite one who cannot
be finite. He cannot suffer. However, Christ is suffering 
on the cross. Then, how is the doctrine of two natures,
that is, the distinction between God and the world, to be
preserved when God is involved in the world in Christ? 
"Traditionally this has been done by differentiating
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between the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the 'economic* 
Trinity. ”24
5.2.1,4 The Structure of the Distinction
5.2.1,4.1 The Meaning: Immanent Trinity and Economic
Trinity
First of all, what is it meant by the theological terms 
"economic Trinity" and "immanent Trinity"? "'Economic 
Trinity’ designates the presence of the Trinity or of the 
Persons of the Trinity within the history of salvation" 
while "the Trinity is understood in itself, the internal 
relationship between the three Persons, the mystery of
trinitarian procession - all this is known as the immanent 
Trinity" ,25
Their difference can be further seen from a relational
perspective: economic Trinity is the "Trinity in relation 
to creation and the revealing of God through history" 
whereas immanent Trinity is the "Trinity understood in 
itself through the interrelationship of its three
24 hR. Olson, Trinity and Eschatology: The Historical 
Being of God in JUrgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg", 
Scottish Journal of Theology 36 (1983), p.215.
25 L, Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. P. Burns 
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988), pp.95-96.
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f 26members". Clearly, the former is about God’s relationship 
to the world and the latter is about God’s relationship to
himself.
5,2.1,4.2 The Distinction: Original and Copy
Moltmann finds that the patristic tradition "liked to 
distinguish and relate the Trinity’s immanence and economy 
as the Platonists distinguished and related the Idea and 
its appearance". That is, it "distinguished in its own 
way between inner being of God and salvation history, as 
between original and copy, idea and manifestation. The
modern differentiation between "God in himself" and "God
for us" is inheriting such a distinction.
Indeed, such a distinction has its epistemological and
ontological senses. Ontologically, the copy or the
appearance is not as real as the original or the Idea. The
former is just the imperfect manifestation of the latter.
It cannot be viewed as the perfect original without any
distortion. In this way, there is an ontological
distinction between these two. In the case of the
distinction between the economic Trinity and the immanent
Trinity, it is the same. The Trinity in the economy of
9 f Ed. D.F. Ford, The Modern Theologians: An
Introduction to the Christian Theology in the Twentieth 
Century vol.l (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p,328.
27 TKG, p.158.
28 CG, pp. 239-240.
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salvation history cannot be seen as the essence of God. 
Rather it is a reflection of God’s inner being but not 
God’s real essence. Only the immanent Trinity is the 
prefect original. It is in this sense that the immanent
Trinity is called the essential Trinity. In this way, the
economic Trinity is accidental to the constituents of God’s
being.
Correspondingly, knowing God means knowing God’s inner
life rather than his external works. Proper knowledge of 
God cannot be got through knowing God’s relationship to the 
world in his salvation history but through speculating on 
the inner divine life. This is because knowledge of the 
copy, appearance is not the same as that of the original, 
Idea, The former is merely the knowledge of the reflection
of the really real whereas the latter is the knowledge of
the really real itself. Apparently, the former cannot
replace the latter. Therefore, the immanent Trinity alone 
is the unique true object of the knowledge of God,
5.2.1.4.3 The Relationship: One Way
Like the relationship between the copy and the 
original, the economic Trinity is not independent from the 
immanent Trinity ontologically, God’s external action 
towards the world is based on his inner being. What is 
reflected in the copy is beforehand in the original itself. 
This unilinear view of correspondence is seen in Barth’s
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distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity.
He "first of all adhered to the Platonic notion of
correspondence: what God revealed himself as being' in Jesus 
goChrist, he is in eternity, 'beforehand in himself’". "For
this is the truth of God in time and eternity: 'God 
30corresponds to himself’,"
At this point one thing is worthy noting. Obviously, 
the relationship between the immanent Trinity and the
economic Trinity is one way, not two way, God’s
relationship to the world simply corresponds with his
relationship to himself. The economic Trinity merely 
reflects or reveals the immanent Trinity. It does not have 
any retroactive effect on his inner being. On the contrary, 
the divine inner relationship determines God’s relationship
to the world.
In a word, ontologically, the immanent Trinity is
constituted by itself alone and the economic Trinity is not 
essential to God’s being. The one way relationship is
precisely the manifestation of such nature of the
traditional distinction.
5.2.1.5 Summary
TKG, p.15 9. Cf, CG, p.240
Ibid.30
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It is clear that in the traditional Christian theology
the axiom of divine impassibility is the governing 
principle of the distinction of the immanent Trinity and
the economic Trinity. It does not allow that God can suffer
in his divine nature for the sake of man’s salvation from
this suffering world, though his human nature does suffer.
In this way, the immanent Trinity is kept pure from being' 
affected by the suffering of Christ. Then, the immanent 
Trinity is taken as the essence of God’s being and history 
is taken as the moving image of eternity.
However, for Moltmann, the underlying reason of the
axiom of God’s impassibility has its logical limitation in 
understanding suffering, on the one hand; the reason of the
emergence of such logical limitation is that this axiom is
derived from experience of the world rather from experience
of God in the cross, on the other hand.
5.2.2 Moltmann: The Emergence of the Trinity in the Christ
Event
In Moltmann’s mind, the doctrine of the Trinity is not
the appendix to the Christian dogma,but the innermost 
. 32core of Christianity. Obviously, such a view-point cannot 
be separable from his theological analysis of the Christ
31 ,F. Schieiermacher, under the directing of the 
experience-oriented theology, deals with the doctrine of 
the Trinity in an appendix to his great dogmatic synthesis 
The Christian Faith. Cf. CG, p.238.
32 CG, p.23 5.
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event, especially the cross. For him, the cross is not
merely an event for this world, but also an event within
God. That is, it is no mere a soteriolog'ical event but also
a theological event,
5,2.2.1 The Demand for a Revolution in the Concept of God
Moltmann asks: "What does the cross of Jesus mean for 
God himself?"^ He quotes P, Althaus affirmatively: "Jesus 
died for God before he died for us."33 4 35 * 37"The death of Jesus 
is a statement about God himself," As W.W. Willis, Jr. 
observes, Moltmann moves "the meaning of the cross beyond 
a soteriolog'ical context only, to its implications for 
theological concepts". Does such a move have any logical 
necessity within Moltmann’s theology? To put it 
particularly, under what condition does the cross not only
have meaning for this world but also for God himself?
R. Bauckham rightly points out that Moltmann’s basis
concept of the total contradiction of cross and
a nresurrection demands a revolution in the concept of God/
33 Ibid. , p. 201 .
34 Ibid., p.201; FC, p.62.
35 Ibid., p.202.
' W.W. Willis, Jr, Theism, Atheism, and the Doctrine 
of Trinity: The Trinitarian Theologies of Karl Barth and 
Jurgen Moltmann in Response to Protest Atheism (Atlanta: 
Scholars , 1987), p.98. Cf. CG, p.201.
37 R. Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), p.97.
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According to Moltmann Jesus resurrection totally
0 0contradicts his cross, "If, abandoned by his God and
Father, he was raised through the 'glory of the Father’,
then eschatological faith in the cross of Jesus Christ must 
39acknowledge the theological trial between God and God.'"
Moltmann’s concept of total contradiction implies that 
God suffers in the cross. God the Son is wholly dead and
wholly raised. But how can God be dead? This is against the
apathetic axiom of the traditional Christian theology.
5.2.2.2 The Affirmation of God’s Suffering
Moltmann claims the axiom of divine impassibility or 
apathy has the logical limitation that "it only perceives 
a single alternative: either essential incapacity for 
suffering, or a fateful subjection to suffering". This is 
derived from man’s experience of his own transience and his 
longing for salvation through the abstract logic of either- 
or. Moltmann considers that the saying of God’s 
impassibility in Christian theology means that "God is not 
subjected to suffering in the same way as transient, 
created being".44 It is right to say that "God is not * 39 40 41
00 TH, pp. 197-202.
39 CG, p . 1 52 .
40 TKG, p.23. Cf. CG, p.2 30.
41 Ibid.
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changeable" only when it is understood as a simile that "God 
is not changeable as creatures are changeable".^
If this is so, then how should God’s suffering be
understood properly? For Moltmann, "there is a third form
of suffering: active suffering - the voluntary laying'
oneself open to another and allowing oneself to be
intimately affected by him; that is to say, the suffering 
41of passionate love". ' In this way, Moltmann avoids saying 
that "God is capable of suffering because of a deficiency 
in his being". Rather, God "suffers from the love which 
is the superabundance and overflowing of his being".In
this sense, God is passionate.
5.2.2.3 The Cross as the Material Principle and the Trinity
as the Formal Principle
If God can die and does die on the cross, then, how
should it be grasped properly? Moltmann writes:
The cross of the Son divides God from God to the 
utmost degree of enmity and distinction. The 
resurrection of the Son abandoned by God unites God in 
the most intimate fellowship. How is this Easter day 
fellowship of God with God to be conceived in the Good 
Friday cross? To comprehend God in the crucified
<2 CG, p.229.
13 TKG, P. 23 . Cf. CG, p.230
44 CG, p . 2 3 0 . Cf. TKG, p.23
45 TKG, P. 2 3 . Cf. CG, p.230
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Jesus, abandoned by God, requires a ‘revolution in the 
concept of God’,
Hence, it is within Moltmann’s theological development that 
a different kind of doctrine of God is required,
However, the revolution in the concept of God which is
required by the cross has two inter-related senses. First
of all, a trinitarian concept of God is needed to 
comprehend the cross event because the traditional simple 
concept of God fails to do so. Secondly, such a concept is
to be determined concretely by the cross in turn so that
the traditional distinction between God in himself and God
for us has to be abolished.
Why cannot the cross be grasped in terms of the
traditional simple concept of God? This is because ''what
happened on the cross was a happening between God and God:
there God disputes with God; there God cries out to God; 
J 7there God dies in God". The problem is: How should one
understand such a paradoxical phenomenon happening on the 
48cross: God is dead and yet is not dead?
4QClearly, a simple concept of God is not sufficient. “
It requires another kind of concept of God to comprehend
46
47
48
48
CG, p. 152
FC, p» 65 ,
CG, p.203
Ibid
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the contradiction between God and God, In this case,
Moltmann finds that the only way to think of God is in 
"dialectically trinitarian terms"?® Then, the revolution 
in the concept of God, firstly, means that the simple 
concept of God is to be replaced by the dialectically
trinitarian concept of God, Accordingly, the cross has to
be understood as a trinitarian event and the Christ event
as a dialectically trinitarian event.
In this sense, Moltmann writes: "The form of the 
crucified Christ is the Trinity."^
"The death of Jesus is then to be understood not simply 
as the 'death of God’ ... but as 'death in God’, an event 
within the relationship of the three persons, from which
the meaning of Godhead emerges. That is, in turn, the
concept of the Trinity is determined by the cross event.
The relationship between the theology of the cross and the
doctrine of the Trinity is not one way, but reciprocal,
The cross, when it is understood in terms of
trinitar;ian context, is no mere external work of God. It
requires a different understanding of God’s trinitarian 
being. As T.D. Parker says of Moltmann’s reading of the
FC, p.66.
51 CG, p.24 6,
52 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.98. Cf, CG, p.207.
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Christian God, ’’the cross, as the centerpiece of the 
relation of Father and Son {along with its dialectical
antithesis in resurrection), is not simply an event ad 
extra but the living God".J Moltmann explicitly expresses: 
"The God event takes place on the cross of the risen
Christ. Here God has not just acted externally, in his
unattainable glory and eternity, Here he has acted in
C Jhimself and has gone on to suffer in himself,"
"How much is God affected by Jesus’ death?"^ "The 
cross cannot leave the divine being unaffected."'0 This is 
because in the trinitarian context, Jesus as the second
person of the Trinity brings the suffering and death which 
is represented by the cross into God’s very being,For
Moltmann, this death is supposed to touch him at the very
heart, and not merely his outward relationships. It is in 
this vein that Moltmann asks the question: "What does the 
cross of Jesus mean for God?" Obviously, it is the
trinitarian framework that provides the condition for one
p Q T.D, Parker, "The Political Meaning of the Doctrine 
of Trinity: Some Theses", Journal of Religion 60/2
(1980), p.174.
54 CG, p,205.
55 FC, p.64.
Willis, Jr,, Theism, Atheism, and the Doctrine of 
the Trini. ty, p, 98 .
I b i d .
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to arrive at such an understanding of God. "The cross 
58stands at the heart of the trinitarian being of God".
In this sense, Moltmann says; "The content of the
doctrine of the Trinity is the real cross of Christ 
himself."*^ .
Accordingly, the theology of the cross and the doctrine 
of the Trinity require one another with definite necessity.
Moltmann draws a famous formula for the relation between
these two; "The material principle of the doctrine of the 
Trinity is the cross of Christ. The formal principle of 
knowledge of the cross is the doctrine of the Trinity." u
Such a speaking of the relationship is illuminated by 
I. Kant’s famous epistemological statements, which are 
quoted by Moltmann; "Concepts without perception are empty"
f 1and "perceptions without concepts are blind". Parallel to 
these are Moltmann’s assertions: "The perception of the
trinitarian concept of God is the cross of Jesus . . . The
theological concept for the perception of the crucified 
Christ is the doctrine of the Trinity."^ Obviously, 
Moltmann intends to make the point that without the cross
58 CG, p. 207
59 Ibid,, P • 246.
60 Ibid., P. 241; Cf.
61 Ibid., p. 240 .
62 Ibid., PP .240-241
p. 74 .
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the trinitarian concept of God is empty and without the
doctrine of the Trinity the cross is blind,
5,2.2,4 The Inappropriateness of the Distinction between
the Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity
If God’s very inner being' cannot be separated from the
way God appears in his acts of salvation, then the
traditional distinction between the immanent Trinity and
the economic Trinity is inappropriate, Such a distinction 
implies that God’s external work, like his salvific acts, 
is merely a copy of his inner being and does not have any
reciprocal influence on it, In Moltmann’s view, the cross
is the external work of God but is not external to God’s
being. Rather, "the nature of God would have to be the
human history of Christ and not a divine ‘nature’ separate
from man"?3 In the trinitarian event of the cross God is 
64in himself what he is for us. The immanent Trinity is
inseparable from the economic Trinity ontologically.
Then, as Moltmann puts it: "We cannot say of God who he
is of himself and in himself; we can only say who he is for
us in the history of Christ which reaches us in our
nrhistory."0 Moltmann even proposes to "give up the
63 Ibid. , p.239. 
fi4 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.98.
65 CG, p.238.
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distinction between the 'God in himself’ and the ‘God for
us’, or between ‘God in his mystery’ and 'God veiled in the 
flesh of Christ’".90
It follows that the immanent Trinity cannot be
comprehended apart from the Trinity in the economy of 
salvation epistemologically. "Anyone who really talks of 
the Trinity talks of the cross of Jesus, and does not 
speculate in heavenly riddles." No one can articulate any 
appropriate statement about the Trinity without talking of
the cross of Christ, "If it is the event of the cross which
requires trinitarian language, then the doctrine of the
Trinity is no mere theological speculation remote from
salvation-history," "a kind of theological higher 
69mathematics for the initiated".
Consequently, the revolution in the concept of God
which is required by the cross, for Moltmann, can be
expressed in K. Rahner’s famous thesis: "The economic
Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the immanent Trinity 
70is the economic Trinity." Moltmann requires no mere 66 * * 69 70 * * *
66 Ibid. , p. 239,
97 Ibid,, p,207,
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.98,
69 FC, p.80,
70 CG, p.240. Cf. FC, p.76; TKG, p.160. This axiom is
seen in K. Rahner’s The Trinity, trans, J, Donceel
(Tunbridge: Burns and Oates, 1970), p,22. Bibliography of
commentaries on Rahner’s trinitarian theology can be found
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trinitarian framework to comprehend God in the cross, but
also a totally different doctrine of the Trinity,
5,2,2.5 Summary
In Moltmann’s view, God’s passibility in the cross, in
contrast to the traditional Christian theology, is the
underlying principle of his revolution in the concept of
God, In contrast to traditional Christian theology’s view 
of God’s impassibility, this understanding of God is not
out of the experience of the world but out of the
experience of God in the cross, However, in The Crucified
God Moltmann tends to think that all kind of distinction
between God’s immanence and economy is out of the
experience of the world. .And this will allow the emergence
of the axiom of divine impassibility in the doctrine of
God. Therefore, he seems not to allow for any distinction.
In The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Moltmann makes
a difference between the distinction of Trinity based on
the experience of the world and that based on God’s
experience. He contends that "the distinction between the 
Trinity’s immanence and its economy must lie in the Trinity 
itself and must be implemented by it itself". 1 "It must
in LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, 
pp.233-234, n,6.
71 TKG, p.159.
192
72not be imposed on it from outside," By contrast; the
traditional distinction of the Trinity is implemented from
outside.
Correspondingly, this requires a different
understanding of the relationship between the immanent
Trinity and the economic Trinity. However, when Moltmann
arrives at the point that the economic Trinity is the
immanent. Trinity, and vice versa, what does he really mean 
by this? It seems that the immanent Trinity is dissolved
into the economic Trinity and God is dissolved into world
history. The theological consequence of this notion is very
serious. In the following, a further clarification of this
is going to be made.
5.3 Problem and Clarification
5.3.1 The Problem of God’s Self-Realisation in World
History
Actually, when Moltmann proposes to abandon the
traditional distinction between the immanent Trinity and 
the economic Trinity and takes up Rahner’s thesis that "the
economic Trinity is the economic Trinity, and vice versa” 
in The Crucified God, he does not further clarify the
73 Ibid.
73 CG, pp. 238-240.
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meaning of the identity of them. However, as Moltmann 
admits in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, it "sounds 
like the dissolution of the one in the other" , that is, 
it seems that the immanent Trinity is dissolved into the
economic Trinity.
Furthermore, when the cross in the economic Trinity is
interpreted as a dialectical trinitarian event, Moltmann’s
critics incline to understand it in terms of Hegel’s 
trinitarianism, This is because Moltmann employs Hegel’s 
dialectic to interpret the Christ event that God negates
himself so as to take up the history of the world into his 
own history. When God’s history in the cross is identified 
with the history of the world, it seems that God is going 
to realise himself through world history dialectically. In
this way, it is very natural for one to think that
Moltmann, to a certain extent, shares the character of
Hegel’s trinitarianism which is different from that of the
Christian tradition.
In short, when the identity of the immanent Trinity and
the economic Trinity is understood as the dissolution of
the one in the other and Moltmann’s interpretation of God’s 
history in the Christ event in terms of Hegel’s dialectic, 
God’s economic history in the world is comprehended as the 
dialectical process of God’s own self-realisation by most
U TKG, p.160.
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thi s hasof his critics. According’ to Bauckham’s analysis,
two senses.
Firstly, "at worst this means that ‘the dialectic
collapses into identity’, i.e. God empties himself into
what is alien to him in order to resolve identity and non- 
7 Eidentity into a higher kind of identity." Obviously, this 
is an understanding' of Moltmann in terms of Hegel strictly. 
In this sense, W, Kasper asks rhetorically: "Does not the 
danger exist here, that the miracle of God’s love, the
cross, is dissolved in dialectic, which turns into
identity?
Secondly, "at best Moltmann seems to make world history 
77the process by which God realised himself." This does not 
necessarily mean that Moltmann’s trinitarianism is
Hegelian. However, he still cannot avoid Kasper’s 
rhetorical question: "How does he safeguard himself from
75 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Maki ng, pp.106-107.
W. Kasper, "Revolution im Gottesverstandnis? Zur 
Situation des okumenischen Dialogs nach JUrgen Moltmanns 
Der Gekreuzigte Gott" in DGG) p,146. Translation is cited 
from J. J. O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The Christian 
Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the 
Theology of Hope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
p,148,
77 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, pp.106-107.
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the (doubtless not desired) consequence, that God needs 
?8history, in order to come to himself?"
However, no matter what sense it is, as Bauckham 
79analyses, two consequences follow. In the first place,
"it compromises the freedom of God in relation to the 
world",88 If God needs world history to become himself, 
then the world is necessary to God’s being, God’s freedom
is not absolute but relative to the world. The divine
freedom is at stake.
In the second place, it makes evil necessary to God’s 
becoming himself. If God needs world history to realise
himself, then the alienation of the world is a necessary
moment in the divine process. That is, the existence of
evil, the negative element, has its rational necessity in 
the process of God’s self-realisation. It follows that the 
scandal of the cross is turned into a rational necessity as
well,
78 Kasper, "Revolution im Gottesverstandnis? Zur 
Situation des okumenischen Dialog's nach JUrgen Moltmanns 
Der Gekreuzigte Gott'1 in DGG, p.146, Translation is cited 
from O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The Christian 
Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the 
Theology of Hope, p.148. 79 80 * * *
79 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.107.
80 Ibid.
01 W. Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans, M.J.
O’Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1984), p,193.
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-Apparently, the crucial point lies in whether Moltmann
holds the theological view-point that God realises himself
dialectically through the world. Can the dialectical
trinitarian Christ event be interpreted as God’s self­
realisation, God’s self-constitution? This problem is going' 
to be approached in two ways. Firstly, is Moltmann’s 
doctrine of the Trinity the same as Hegel’s that God
realises himself in the Christ event? That is, can 
Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity be understood as Hegel’s 
trinitarianism in the strict sense? Secondly, if it is not, 
does Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity and theology of the 
cross share the same characteristic, that is, the world as 
the process of God’s self-realisation, in his own way, but 
not in Hegelian sense?
5.3.2 A Higher Identity of Identity and Non-Identity?
5.3.2.1 Hegel’s Dialectical Trinitarianism
D.M. Schlitt says: "Hegel’s system as a whole is the
fullest philosophical expression of his trinitarian 
claim," In Hegel’s view, as the major dogma of Christian 
theology, the doctrine of the Trinity expresses the 
principal tenet of his speculative philosophy in the form
For a brilliant discussion of Hegel’s 
trinitarianism, see D.M. Schlitt, Hegel’s Trinitarian 
Claim: A Critical Reflection (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984)
Ibid,, p.5,
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of Vorstel1ung {representation). Indeed, for him,
Christianity has the same true content as philosophy but 
85differs from the latter in form.
Hegel sees deep speculative meaning in the doctrine of
the Trinity: "God is movement, self-transcendence towards
the particular, and return to unity; that his unity is
fundamentally a return of diremption, that he is three-in- 
86one." The Trinity represents the dialectical movement of
the Absolute Spirit. It is through this process that the 
Spirit is truly actual or real (wirklich).
This dialectical self-realising process is constituted
of three movements. The first movement of the Spirit is
within its own essential being. In a second movement,
eternal Spirit goes out of itself into external existence,
coming to exist as an object over against itself. In a
third movement Spirit returns to itself, negating the first
negation. The first is represented by Christian theology in
terms of the immanent Trinity while the second is the
economic Trinity. The last two movements are logically
connected to the first movement. They are the
manifestations of the latter.
c, Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), p.489.
85 G.W.F. Hegel, The Christian Religion: Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Religion, Part III: The Revelatory, 
Consummate, Absolute Religion, ed. and trans, P.C. Hodgson 
(Missoula: Scholars, 1979), pp.291-292.
Taylor, Hegel, p.489.
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In the eternal immanent Trinity the Father begets the
Son and they are united in the Holy Spirit, It is a process 
of God’s "infinite distinction of oneself from oneself",^ 
diremption and return contained within his eternal essence.
In philosophical terms, the universal undergoes diremption
into the particular, and the particular restores to the 
universal in the individual.^ Because such inner divine 
life is abstract for lacking of actuality, God has to go
out of himself as to earn his actuality in the economic
Trinity.
This act of going out, indeed, is one repeating God’s
self-differentiation within the immanent Trinity in another
level. The eternal generation of the Son by the Father is
manifested in the self-negation of the Absolute Spirit as
the world. The immanent Trinity is dissolved in the
economic Trinity by negating itself. The act of returning, 
then, is another one repeating God’s synthesis in eternity
in a true and actual sense. The contradiction between the
Spirit and the world is resolved in a higher identity, 
which in Christian imagery is the unity of the Father and
the Son in the Holy Spirit.
' Hegel, The Christian Religion: Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, pp.67-68.
88 B.M.G. Reardon, Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion 
(London: Macmillan, 1977), p.66.
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Simply, there is a correspondence between the 
on fimmanent and the economic Trinities. "The spheres of the 
immanent divine life are the same as those of worldly life,
and the otherness within God’s life is the truth of
otherness as it appears in the form of the finite world and 
consciousness," The immanent Trinity is reenacted in the 
economic Trinity, the creation of the world and the finite
spirit as other than God and the sublation of the
difference, so as to become an actual God.
In this sense, Hegel says: "Without the world God is
not God.S.J, Grenz and R.E. Olson comment on this
assertion: "By this he meant that God is not a self­
sufficient being in and for himself; rather, God needs the 
world for his own self-actualization, World history is also 
God’s history." P.C. Hodgson also writes: "God is 
dependent or ‘consequent’ upon the world to become God in
the true and actual sense."
5.3.2.2 The Difference of Moltmann from Hegel
P.C. Hodgson, "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel" in 
Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West vol.l, ed. 
N. Smart, J, Clayton, S, Katz and P, Sherry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.101.
91 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
vol.l, trans. E.B. Speirs and J.B, Sanderson (London: 
Routledg’e and Kegan Paul, 1895 ), pp. 114-5, 200.
09 Grenz and Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the 
world in a Transitional Age, p.38,
qq Hodgson, "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel", p.101,
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It is very easy to have the impression of Hegelian
trinitarianism when Moltmann explicitly says;
If one describes the life of God within the Trinity as 
the "history of God" (Hegel), this history of God 
contains within itself the whole abyss of 
godforsakenness, absolute death and the non-God. 4
It remains for us to note that . . . Hegel expressly 
acknowledges the doctrine of the Trinity, because this 
makes it possible to understand the cross as the 
"history of God".
The cross is a moment of the dialectical trinitarian
movement. As the history of God, the cross which is the
climax of God’s self-diremption or self-negating as non-God
will be sublated by the Holy Spirit. The difference between
God and non-God is to be abolished and synthesised in a
higher identity. This Hegelian understanding may be further
supported by Moltmann’s quoting of Hegel’s discussion of
the Trinity in terms of the self-differentiating and the
abolishing of the difference from Lectures on the 
qc
Philosophy of Religion,
Probably this is Kasper’s reading of Moltmann’s 
theology of the cross, Naturally, he asks: Does this means
that God identifies with non-God so as to resolve the
contradiction between these two in a higher identity?
CG, p.246.
99 Ibid,, p.254. 
96 Ibid.
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However, Moltmann’s quotations of Hegel should be read 
as illustrations of the close relationship between the
cross and the Trinity. This is because Moltmann distinguishes his 
doctrine of God from Hegel’s dialectical trinitarianism in
two ways. Firstly, he does not take the movement
within the inner divine life as a dialectical one.
Secondly, he does not consider that God’s relationship to 
the world is a dialectical one as well. These two, indeed,
further show that Moltmann and Hegel have different
understanding of the meaning of ’’other" .
Under what condition can two opposites be resolved in 
a higher identity in Hegel’s dialectic? The contradiction
between these two cannot be external but must be internal.
This internal relationship is expressed in terms of self­
negation. The negation is not from outside but from within.
Then, A self-negates itself to be -A. -A is out of A alone
so that it can return to A in a further negation. This is 
why Hegel calls dialectic "the indwelling tendency 
outwards" {immanente Hinausgehen) .
Hegel’s dialectic affects the meaning of other. Other 
is posited as God the Father’s opposite by the Father
through his self-negation in eternity. This other the
Father confronts actually is not another subject other than
the Father, but the Father’s own negation. The Father
97 ,G.W.F. Hegel, Heg'el s Logic: Being Part one of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science (1830), trans. 
W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), §81, p.116.
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becomes the Son. They are not two different subjects but
two different inodes of one absolute subject. The Trinity
then is three repetitions of One God in a dialectical way.
In this way, the whole dialectical process is a drama
in which the absolute subject plays all the different
roles, not involving any other independent subject. The
higher identity then is an identity in which it overcomes
its own negation.
Moltmann believes that there is no real trinitarian
diversity within God when he is conceived as an absolute
subject who repeats himself dialectically. There are
three divine Persons existing at the same time. As the 
other to each other, the Father, the Son and the Holy
Spirit are all subjects. They are not related to one
another in a Hegelian dialectical way. Otherwise, " the
Person would be nothing more than the triple self- 
99repetition of God". * Rather, "by virtue of their eternal 
love they live in one another to such an extent, and dwell 
in one another to an extent, that they are one"J^ In the 
perichoresis, the three divine Persons are one.
TKG, pp.139-140
Ibid., p.17 3,
142-143.
Ibid .100
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The different understanding of other within God in 
Hegel and Moltmann further leads to different
understanding of the world as other of God.
For Hegels the world is nothing other than the Spirit’s
self-negation, self-estrangement. As in the case of the
divine inner life, the contradiction between the world and
the Spirit is not external but internal. Then, a higher
identity between the Spirit and the world can be arrived at
through another internal negation.
Moltmann does not adopt Hegel’s dialectic in 
understanding the relationship between God and the world.
The world is not God’s self-negation so that a second 
negation is not needed for synthesising these two. When God
the Son identifies with the world by negating himself, he
does not become the world in a Hegelian sense. The Son is
not the world. The world is not the Son but an entity other
than God. The Son just participates in the world and shares
its destiny. His death is not identical with the death of
the world, though they share the same death. His
resurrection is not identical with the renewal of the
world, though their natures are the same. When his death is
negated by his resurrection, the world is not negated to be
synthesised with God.
For Moltmann, God does not identify with the world in
the cross event for the sake of abolishing the ontological
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difference between God and the world in dialectic. Rather, 
in the dialectical Christ event, the cross and the
resurrection, God is going to abolish the death, of the
world which divides God and the world. God the Son
identifies with the world so as to adopt death as part of
his own life. Then in his resurrection he does not merely
abolish his own death but begins to abolish the death of
this world. The resurrection of Christ is the promise to
the godforsaken world that ultimately the death of this
world will be abolished and the world will be transformed
into a new world. Then, in the resurrection God and the
world do not reach a higher identity in a Hegelian sense.
It is the crucified Jesus and the risen Christ who arrive
at a higher identity as the identity in total
contradiction.
Accordingly, the charge of Hegelianism is not justified 
for Moltmann’s dialectical interpretation of the Christ 
event. Even though Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, in 
a certain version, has the meaning that God needs the world 
for his own realization, it is not in a Hegelian way.
5,3.3 God Needs the World?
5.3,3.1 The Cross as the Constitution of God’s Being
Although Moltmann is not Hegelian, he can still be 
charged with holding a certain kind of theology of God
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realising himself in the history of the world which leads
to the justification of the necessity of evil and the 
compromise of God’s freedom in relation to the world. Such 
a charge is based on his discussion of the relationship of 
the cross to the Trinity and God’s inner life, and his
identification of the immanent and economic Trinities, In
this section the former is going to be discussed whereas
the latter is left until the next section.
First of all, Moltmann’s statements about the 
relationship of the cross to the Trinity can be seen in the 
articles "The 'Crucified God’: A Trinitarian Theology of 
the Cross" and "Answer to the Criticism of The Crucified
God" respectively:
. , . any one who intends to speak in a Christian way 
about God must recount and proclaim this story of 
Christ [i.e. the cross event] as the story of God, 
that is, as something which occurred between Father, 
Son, and Spirit and out of which the concept "God" is 
constituted, not only for men but also for God himself. 1
Must the Christian doctrine of the Trinity begin with 
the history on the cross? Yes, it must. Because on the 
cross the One God splits. Therefore, the self­
constitution of the Trinity must be talked of at this 
point.
These statements are considered to be read as either that
"in the event of the cross God becomes Trinity" or that
p.2 96.
102 p.178. The German text: "Mutt die christliche
Trini tat si ehre mit dem Gescheben am Kreuz beg'innen? - Ja, 
sie mutt es, weil anders am Kreuz die Einheit Gottes 
zerbricht. Daruin muB hier von der Selbstkonstitution der 
Trinitat gesprochen warden," My translation.
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"the temporal event of the cross constitutes God’s 
trinitarian being from eternity". if this is the case, 
then God’s history in the world is necessary for the
constitution of his being. God needs the world for his
self-realisation. It follows that evil is the necessary
moment for God’s self-constitution of the Trinity. But 
neither reading is Moltmann’s intention.
On the one hand, when Moltmann says that "on the cross 
the One God splits", he does not mean that God becomes 
Trinity in the most Hegelian sense. It must be read
according to his interpretation of the forsakenness on the
cross. Then, what Moltmann really means is that on the
cross the utmost intimate fellowship between the Father and
the Son turns into the deepest separation.
On the other hand, these two paragraphs seem to be 
about the correct way of talking of the triune God or 
constituting the concept of God. Probably Moltmann intends
to point out that in order to understand God’s trinitarian 
being one has to start from the cross. If this is the case, 
then these are epistemological statements rather than 
ontological. Then the reading of these as God’s self­
constitution on the cross will fall into the fallacy of 
deriving the ontological sense from the epistemological
statement.
103 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.107.
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However, the saying' at the end of the first quotation 
above is difficult to understand: "not only for men but 
also for God himself". It is very odd to say that God has
to start from the cross in order to understand himself.
Probably Moltmann does not merely mean that God has to be 
known starting from the cross, but also tries to express
the point that God is constituted in the event of the cross
as well. Even so, this quotation does not have the meaning
that the temporal event of the cross constitutes God’s 
being' "from eternity to eternity".
Yet there are other statements which strongly suggest
that the cross determines the inner life of God from
eternity to eternity in Moltmann’s writing:
This history does not pass God by without leaving a 
trace. On the contrary, the crucified Jesus becomes 
God’s eternal signature.
... the Son’s sacrifice of boundless love on Golgotha 
is from eternity already included in the exchange of 
the essential, the consubstantial love which 
constitutes the divine life of the Trinity.
The pain of the cross determines the inner life of the 
triune God from eternity to eternity.
What happens on Golgotha reaches into the very depths 
of the Godhead and therefore puts its impress on the 
trinitarian life of God in eternity.
104 FC, p.76.
105 TKG, p , 1 6 8 ,
106 Ibid . , p . 16.1
10? WJC, p.173.
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But the phenomenon that God is constituted in the cross 
does not necessary imply that God ’’needs" the history of
the world to constitute his being, There may be other
reasons that God allows himself to be constituted in the
cross. In other words, one cannot deduce reason from fact.
One cannot draw the conclusion that God needs the world to
realise himself from the fact that God’s being is
constituted in the historical event of the cross.
Nevertheless, an odd consequence cannot be avoided if
the assertion that God is constituted on the cross from
eternity to eternity is insisted. As Bauckham rightly says,
this makes the actual suffering of the cross essential to 
108who God is from eternity. The suffering on the cross
becomes eternal. It follows: "If this does not make evil
necessary, then contingent evil not only affects God in the
course of his trinitarian history, but essentially 
108determines his inner life from eternity."
5.3.3.2 The Dissolution of the Immanent Trinity in the 
Economic Trinity
How should one understand Moltmann’s affirmation of 
Rahner’s thesis of the identity of the immanent Trinity and 
the economic Trinity? Despite Rahner’s own theological
108 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
p.109.Maki ng, 
109 Ibid,
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interpretation of this thesis, the crucial point is what 
Moltmann means by this thesis and how his understanding
affects the problem whether God needs the world.
This identity, obviously, does not mean A ~ A. When 
Moltmann identifies God with his trinitarian history, he 
identifies the immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity.
But is there any remainder? It seems that Moltmann does not
consider there is any nature of God behind his history:
The nature of God then does not stand behind the 
appearance of history and appearance in history as 
eternal, ideal being; it is that history itself.
There is no other divine nature behind God’s history in the
world. What follows from this is that God is dissolved into
history. God is God-in-process. This is another version
that God realises himself by dissolving himself in the 
history of the world. In this sense, God needs the world.
It should be noted that such a view-point emerges in the 
context of Moltmann’s discussion of the relationship of the
cross to God’s nature.
However, he does not intend to dissolve God into world
history, m In The Trinity and the Kingdom of God Moltmann
distinguishes God’s inner trinitarian process from the 
112world process. He refuses to identify the eternal life
FC, p.74.
Ibid., p.75,
TKG, p.107.
111
112
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of God himself with the world process and vice versa.113 
For Moltmann, "what is Other in confrontation with God is 
not identified with the otherness of God",114 115The world as 
other cannot be identified with the Son as the otherness of
the Father within the divine life. Ultimately Moltmann
intends to maintain a certain kind of Christian panentheisin
which does not take the history of mankind as a history of 
i 15God but as a history in God.
In this context, although Moltmann affirms Rahner’s
thesis of the identity of the immanent Trinity and the
economic Trinity, he interprets "the connection not as
absolute identity without distinction but as reciprocity 
1 1 fiand interdependence". In The Trinity and the Kingdom of 
God, Moltmann clarifies what he means by identifying the
immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity:
What this thesis is actually trying to bring' out is 
the interaction between the substance and the 
revelation, the "inwardness" and the "outwardness" of 
the triune God. The economic Trinity not only reveals 
the immanent Trinity; it also has a retroactive effect 
on it.
Moltmann rejects the traditional distinction because he
does not think that the relationship of the triune God to
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. , pp.106-107,
IIP
Grenz and Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the 
World in a Transitional Age, p,183.
117 TKG, p.160,
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himself and the relationship of the triune God to the world 
is to be understood as a one way relationship. He argues 
that the traditional distinction, according to which the 
economic Trinity merely "reflects'' or "reveals" the
immanent Trinity, does indeed separate them too much,"
However, he does not propose that the one way relationship 
of the immanent Trinity to the economic Trinity should be
reversed as the one way relationship of the economic
Trinity to the immanent Trinity. Rather, the correct
relationship should be one of interaction.
Moltmann emphasises that this mutual relationship does 
not mean to "equate God’s relationship to the world with 
his relationship to himself". By this mutual
relationship of interaction Moltmann perceives the 
distinction while holding’ them firmly together.121 What he 
is concerned with is that "God’s relationship to the world 
has a retroactive effect on his relationship to
himself". He still considers that "the divine
1111 Olson, "Trinity and. .Eschatology: The Historical 
Being of God in JUrgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg", 
p.217.
120 TKG, p.161.
121 Olson, "Trinity and Eschatology: The Historical 
Being of God in JUrgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg", 
p.217.
122 TKG, p.161.
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relationship to the world is primarily determined by that 
123inner relationship".
In this way, one cannot charge Moltmann with the
dissolution of God in world history, But this does not
necessary mean that God does not need the world, This is
because the primary determination of God’s inner life to
his act in world history may be not a free one. God may be 
compulsorily determined going out of himself so as to be 
affected by the world. Hence, a further clarification of
the meaning' of this primary determination of God’s
immanence to his economic act is necessary,
5,4 Conclusion
For Moltmann, in the dialectical Christ event, both 
God’s history and the history of the world are interwoven 
with each other. They are inseparable from one another, 
Because this dialectical event is both soteriological and 
theological, Moltmann finds that a revolution In the 
concept of God is required, The trinitarian history of God 
in the cross event is not the moving image of eternity. The 
case that God’s inner life is affected by his outer act 
attracts the charge of Hegelianism,
I bid.123
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Since Moltmann distinguishes himself from Hegel in the 
understanding of other, the charge of synthesis of God and
the world in a higher identity is not justified. However,
his notions of God’s self-constitution in the cross and the
elimination of the traditional distinction between the
immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity can be 
comprehended as God’s own realisation in world history. 
Although such an view-point is not necessarily the only
possible interpretation, it cannot be excluded. In order to 
avoid such an understanding of God’s economic act in the 
world, Moltmann further develops his doctrine of God,
especially the relationship of God to the world. This is
going to be discussed in the next chapter.
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8 God as Love, and God’s Self-Limitation and Self-De-
Limitat ion
6.1 The Primary Determination
Moltmann finds that in the cross event God’s inner life
is affected by his external act in the world. Accordingly,
he claims that the traditional doctrine of Trinity cannot
be held for its one way relationship any more. Rather,
God’s inner life and his outer act mutually affect one
another. That is, their relationship is two way, not one 
way. Furthermore, Moltmann considers that God’s inner
trinitarian being has the primacy in this reciprocal
determination.
However, unfortunately, Moltmann does not further
explicate the meaning of this primary determination
. That is, how does opus trini tatis ad intra determine
opus trinitatis ad extra? If the concrete meaning of this
primary determination is not clarified, then Moltmann’s
proposal of reciprocal relationship becomes meaningless. It 
follows that the interpretation of Moltmann’s elimination
of the traditional immanent-economic distinction as the
dissolution of the immanent Trinity in the economic Trinity
is to be maintained.
TKG, p.161.
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The fact that Moltmann does not. explicitly discuss the
primary determination does not mean that he does not Leave
any clue and trace for reconstructing' its meaning. The
resources can be found in his talking' of the open Trinity
and in the thesis that God is love. Actually, these are two 
prior crucial steps for Moltmann’s full development of the
notion of the dialectical trinitarian history of God.
When Moltmann reaches the primary determination of the
immanent Trinity to the economic Trinity, he touches the 
ontological condition of the initiation of God’s history.
In the Christ event God reveals to the world that God has
a history and the relationship of such a history to world
history. God’s revelation in the Christ event itself is his 
history in. the world. Hence, epistemologically speaking,
God’s history emerges in the context of his revealing' the
future of the world in the promise event of the cross and
the resurrection.
Correspondingly, how is God’s history which emerges in 
the Christ event possible? What is God’s being that allows
himself to be deeply affected in his history with the
world? In trinitarian terms, what is God’s immanent Trinity
that allows himself to be affected in his economic Trinity?
These are questions about the ontological condition that
does not merely make God’s history possible but also allows 
God’s history to have a retroactive effect on hisS inner
being. It is this ontological condition which determines
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how the immanent Trinity determines the economic Trinity.
Or to put it in another way, because this primary
determination is out of the being of the triune God, it is
necessary to ask further what this triune God is so that he
makes such a primary determination. Then, this primary
determination cannot be understood apart from God’s being. 
In Moltmann’s case, the clarification of this primary 
determination is very significant as to whether God’s
history in the world is a kind of self-realization.
However, this is possible only when the ontological
condition is clarified first.
As a matter of fact, Moltmann’s talking' of the open
Trinity and God as love is about the ontological condition
which determines God’s trinitarian involvement in the
world. This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the
first part the ontological condition, that is, the open
Trinity and God as love, will be analysed. Based on this,
in the second part, the trinitarian history of God will be
fully ex am i ned,
6.2 The Open Trinity
6.2.1 Approach to the Open Trinity
According to Moltmann’s theological method, the 
knowledge about God cannot be deduced and asserted by
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speculation. It has to be revealed in God’s concrete act in 
the history of the world, To put it particularly, speaking
of God must not be done apart from the history of God in
the concrete Christ event. Since Theology of Hope on
Moltmann has rejected the theological approaches which
start with universal concept of God. His theological 
method is one that moves from the particular, the history
of Jesus, to the universal, the being of God.
Consistently with Moltmann’s methodology, then, one
cannot directly enter into the discussion of the thesis
that God is love and the way that God as love determines
his outer act. On the contrary, one has to start from God’s
act in the Christ event. However, epistemologically,
Moltmann does not fallow the traditional method of deducing
the actor from the act and the master from the work. This
is because such a method inclines one to view that the act is
accidental to the actor. The act does not have any
influence on the actor. In other words, it sees the
relationship between the actor and the act as one way, not
two way. This is precisely different from Moltmann’s
theological analysis of the Christ event that the
relationship between God’s inner life and his outer act is
reciprocal.
R, Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 
p . 5 9 .
TKG, p.98.3
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This reciprocal relationship does not allow one to
understand God’s being' in terms of the actor or master 
model. It even forces one to give up the traditional 
doctrine of the Trinity and replace it with another proper
one that this reciprocal relationship is determined from
the very beginning,
Moltmann’s main concern is the open Trinity when he 
repudiates the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. It is
clear that God as the triune one opens himself to be
affected in the cross event, Then, does the triune God open
himself to the world only on the cross? If so, then God’s
opening of himself is not necessarily out of his inner
being. That is, the Trinity is not necessarily open to the
world and to the future from eternity, from the very 
beginning. In this way, God’s history in the world would be
fortuitous.
Moltmann’s strategy of inferring that the Trinity is 
open from eternity is simple. He questions back "from the
starting-point of the history of God on the cross into the
conditions of possibility for that history in God . This
inference consists of two steps. Firstly, he has to infer
from the cross event to the starting-point of the history
of God on the cross. And then, he has to infer from this
starting-point to the God who makes this history possible.
FC, p.74.4
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In view of the traditional Christian doctrine of God,
this seems to be an inference from the economic Trinity to
the immanent Trinity. However, Moltmann does not understand 
5these terms in the traditional senses. He even replaces
these terms with the Trinity in the sending and the Trinity
in the origin respectively. Then, the inference is one
which proceeds from the sending to the origin. By doing so, 
Moltmann intends to preserve God’s open character which is
revealed in the cross event in the Trinity in the sending
and in the Trinity in the origin.
Then, Moltmann’s inference from the Trinity in the 
historical sending to the Trinity in the eternal origin has
two functions. Firstly, it ensures that God’s act in the
cross event has to do with God himself. Secondly, it shows
that the Trinity is not merely open in its act in the world 
9but open from eternity.
6.2.2 From the Trinity in the Sending to the Trinity in the
Origin
Doubtless, the cross of Christ on Golgotha gives
content to trinitarian talk about God. But in Moltmann’s
5 Cf. Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making', p.lll.
6 Cf. J. J. O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The 
Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology 
and the Theology of I-Iope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983), pp.125-126.
7 FC, p.85; CPS, p.55.
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view, ’’this does not mean the cross as the isolated fact", 
The cross has its beginning and ending. Christ’s death is 
but the centre and quintessence of God’s whole history for 
the world.It begins with Jesus’ messianic sending and 
will be completed with his eschatological glorification.
Then, how can the history of Jesus have to do with God 
himself? In Moltmann’s wording: "Is the mission of Jesus a 
fortuitous historical event, or does it have its foundation 
in God himself?"^ At this point Moltmann touches the 
relationship of God’s inner life to his outer act, or the 
immanent Trinity to the economic Trinity.
Moltmann clearly says that "the event of the derelictio 
Jesa can lead us to the eternal generatio filii". As R. 
Bauckham paraphrases this, "‘the eternal g'eneratio filii'
could be the prior condition in God for the derelictio Jesu
on the cross, so that God’s history has a trinitarian 
origin before the cross, just as it has a trinitarian goal 
at the eschaton". Obviously, the origin and the eschaton 
correspond to the sending and the glorification
0
8 FC, p.81. 
8 Ibid.
10 I b i d .
11 Ibid,, p. S3.
12 Ibid., P. 74 ,
13' Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.108, Cf, FC, pp.74-75,
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respectively. Between the origin and the goal is the
dialectical trinitarian history of God. The sending has
its origin.
Then, the question is: How can one directly infer from
the sending to the origin? That is, according to what 
principle can one move from the historical relationships of 
Jesus to the Father, of the Father to the Son, and their 
fellowship in the Holy Spirit, to the pre-existent
relationships in God himself? This is possible only when 
there is nothing different in God that precedes his sending
and in which this sending is not already inherent. ' In
other words, in Bauckham’s words, the "economic
relationship between persons correspond to relations in 
16eternity". Only in this case can Moltmann write: "The 
missio ad extra reveals the missio ad intra. 1
In The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Moltmann further
explains the reason on which the correspondence between the
economic relationship and the relations in eternity is
based. It is very simple: There are not two different 
18Trinities. Mol tmann wr i t. e s :
FC, p.92.
Ibid., p. 8 3 .
13 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.111, Cf. FC, pp.83-84; CPS, pp.54-55.
17 FC, p.84; CPS, p.54,
18 TKG, p.153.
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The triune God can only appear in history as he is in 
himself, and in no other way, He is in himself as he 
appears in salvation history, for it is he himself who 
is manifested, and he is just what he is manifested as 
being. '
The God who appears in history is not different from the
God in himself. In this vein, Moltmann goes on:
Consequently we cannot find any trinitarian 
relationships in salvation history which do not have 
their foundation in the nature of the triune God, 
corresponding to him himself, It is impossible to say, 
for example, that in history the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the Father ‘and from the Son’, but what within 
the Trinity he proceeds ‘from the Father alone’. ’
Conversely, the trinitarian relationships in salvation
history must correspond to those in God himself. They have
their foundation in the nature of the triune God, "The
missio ad intra is the foundation of the missio as
extra. »»21
In this way, what is inferred, from the open Trinity
revealed in the cross event and the sending' is that the 
Trinity from eternity is an open one: "It is open for its 
own sending ... It is open for man and for all creation.
The life of God within the Trinity cannot be conceived of
as a closed circle - the symbol of perfection and self­
sufficiency ...The triune God is the God who is open to
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., pp. 15 3-154.
21 FC, p.84; CPS, p.54.
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man, open to the world and open to time."" From eternity 
God is open for affecting the history of the world and
being affected by the world as well.
In other words, the triune God is open in his nature.
Then, a question arises: Does this mean that the triune God
is deficient in his being so that he has to open himself to 
the world and time? Is this opening out of a deficiency of 
God’s being? If this is so, then God’s history in the world 
is the process of his own realization. That is, God "needs" 
the world in order to realise himself. Why does God from
the very beginning open himself to the world and time? For
Moltmann, the answer is: God is love.
6.3 God is Love
6,3.1 The Greek View of Love
In Moltmann’s view, the open nature manifested in the
sending can "be summed up as the love of God issuing from 
23itself". Moltmann understands God’s open nature as the 
love of God. That is, out of his love God opens himself.
However, the love Moltmann talks about is not the kind
of the Greek understanding. What the Greeks understand by
22 CPS, pp. 5 5-5 6.
23 FC, p.85.
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God’s love is his benevolent will and activity to the 
world.As Bauckham points out, "it cannot involve a two­
way relationship in which God can be affected by the 
objects of his love." This kind of love is precisely what. 
Moltmann criticizes. In Moltmann’s view, it has two
problems. Firstly, it presupposes that God is self­
sufficient and perfect. Secondly, it makes God’s freedom be
the first but his love be the second. And these two
problems are inter-related.
The Greek concept of God as love is conditioned by its
understanding of God as self-sufficient and perfect. To put 
it simply, for the Greeks, God must be apathetic and cannot
be affected by anything else. Pathos, in the sense of
either suffering or passion, is the mark of weakness. If
God suffers or is moved by emotions, then he is not self­
sufficient. He is not a self-determining being’. This is
connected with the thought of passivity. But this does
not mean that God can participate in the suffering
actively, because suffering and emotion are connected with
change, The Greeks consider that any change, either out of 
one’s will or imposed on one from outside, could only be 
change for the worse. At any rate, change means
imperfection.
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Maki ng, p.10 3.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.102.
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Therefore: "As actus purus ... nothing' can happen to
God for him to suffer. As the perfect being, he is without 
emotion." "Since he is self-sufficient, he cannot be 
changed. Since he is perfect, he cannot change." In this 
way, God’s love must not be understood as pathos. It is 
impossible to think of God’s love in terms of his opening 
to the world and time. The influence of this thinking on 
Christian theology can been seen in the fact noted by 
Moltmann; "What Christianity proclaimed as the agape of God 
and the believer was rarely translated as pathos.
Then, what is this love? Moltmann points out that this 
love "arises from the spirit and from freedom", y Actually, 
the Greek concept of God as a self-sufficient and perfect
being is ultimately an absolutely free God. The former two
characteristics finally point to the absolute freedom of
God which is in turn expressed in terms of apatheia. The
apathetic God is the free God and vice versa. In this
context, love derives from liberation from inward and 
31outward conditions. And apatheia is taken up as "an 
enabling ground for this love and be filled with it".'
61 CG, p.2 68.
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Maki ng, p.10 2.
29 CG, p.269.
99 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
Ibid.
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Two theological consequences follow. Firstly, God’s 
love for this world is his charitable will and activity, lie
does not need to love this world because he is absolutely
free from this world. The reason that God loves is not that
he is moved by the object he loves. He loves because he is
free to do so. This precisely makes God’s love benevolent
in nature which is very abstract from the concrete
situation of the suffering world. This leads to the second
point, Such a love is secondary to God’s absolute freedom, 
Freedom as the essence of God is incomparable with God’s
act of love. The latter is out of the former without any
necessity. That is, God is free to love or not to love. He
does not necessarily love.
A metaphysical principle of analogy is inherent in this
view of freedom and love. The Greek view of freedom is a
kind of autonomous freedom which is in contrast to freedom 
33m community. ' Autonomous freedom manifests itself in
self-determination, independence, self-sufficiency. In this
sense, if God is free, then he is free for himself but not
for the other. His freedom is a kind of self-related
freedom. As like is known by like, like is freed by like.
Likewise, like is loved by like. God’s love is essentially
self-related. His love for the world is but fortuitous.
Although God loves the world, he is not open himself to be
affected by the world. The inner being of the triune God is
closed and distant from the suffering world.
33 Cf. Ibid., p.56.
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Obviously, a different understanding of God’s love is 
.required. In Moltmann’s view, God’s love must be understood 
as pathos, on the one hand; and his love and his freedom
are inseparable from each other, on the other hand. These
two points are precisely against the underlying axioms 
which dominate the Greek understanding of love: apathetic 
and free from any necessity.
6,3.2 Barth’s View of Love
Barth’s understanding of God’s love, like the Greek 
formally, is subject to his conception of God’s freedom. 
Doubtless to say, the freedom of God is crucially important
Q Jfor Barth in his doctrine of God. As G.S. Hendry says, it
"is a basic constituent of the being of God, and it plays
a central part in the systematic connection between the
being of God and his acts, as that is developed in the 
35doctrine of election , However, it is firstly developed
in Barth’s discussion of the revelation of God along with
0 Athe doctrine of the Trinity.
y C.E. Gunton, Being’ and Becoming: The Doctrine of God 
in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), p.133; T. Bradshaw, "Karl Barth on 
the Trinity: A Family Resemblance", Scottish Journal of 
Theology 39/2 (1986), p.146; G.S. Hendry, "The Freedom of
God in the Theology of Karl Barth", Scottish Journal of 
Theology 31/3 (1978), p.229.
q r Hendry, "The Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl 
Barth", p.229.
1 f1 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics I/l, trans. G.W. Bromiley
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), §8, pp.295-347.
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3?"God reveals Himself as the Lord." ' For Barth, this is 
3Bthe basic axiom of revelation. "Lordship is present in
revelation because its reality and truth are so fully self­
grounded, because it does not need any other actualisation
of validation than that of its actual occurrence, because
it is revelation through itself and not in relation to 
something else . , . " That is, either form or agent or 
content of God’s self-revelation is the expression of his 
lordship, Therefore in the event of his seif-
interpretation, God reveals himself as revealer, revelation 
and reveaiedness, As E. JUngel points out, "in these
capacities God reveals himself at the same time as he who 
can reveal himself, i.e. as the Lord" J® In his self­
revelation God reveals that God himself is the only
grounding of his own revelation. This is precisely the
meaning when Barth writes: "That God reveals Himself as the
Lord means that He reveals what only He can reveal , 
Himself. 1,41
Barth, Church Dogmatics .1/1, pp.306, 314, 324, 332,
E. JUngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being 
is Becoming, trans. Scottish Academic Press (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1976), p.21.
Barth, Church Dogmatics T/l, p.302. 
k n JUngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being is 
in Becoming, p.21. Cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, p.316,
Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, p.307.
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In this sense, God’s self-revelation is his self- 
42 11interpretation:" m revelation God interprets himself as
the one who he is" Revelation "is the statement of God’s
autonomy, that he is a self-subsistent 'I’, addressing’ man 
as ‘Thou’ , and in so doing’ displaying his absolute
independence of us, and thus his lordship , . . over us. u 44
"Lordship means freedom",40 "ontic and noetic autonomy",44>
Either in himself or in his self-revelation God is free.
God is free to reveal himself because "the very being of 
4 7God is a being in freedom". "He is the ground without 
4 $ground,"*
God’s freedom manifested in his self-revelation as
Lord, then, is both negative and positive. The free God is 
unconstrained and self-grounded. On the one hand, God’s
freedom is the absence of limits, restrictions, or
™ Ibid., p.311 .
' JUngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity; God’s Being is 
in Becoming, p,21.
4 4 R.D, Williams, "Barth on the Triune God" in Karl 
Barth: Studies of his Theological Method, ed. S.W. Sykes 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), p.159. Cf. Barth, Church
Dogma tics 1 /1 , p . 3 0 7 .
Barth, Church Dogmatics I/l, p.306.
46 Ibid. , p. 307.
4 7 Hendry, "The Freedom of God in the Theology of Karl 
Barth", p.231.
4 8 Ibid.
4^ Bradshaw, "Karl Barth on the Trinity: A Family 
Resemblance", p.146.
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conditions from outside. On the other hand, his freedom
is the probative of divine sovereignty, the independence of 
everything that is not he. "In this freedom of Ifis, God 
is also unlimited, unrestricted and unconditioned from 
without.” This meaning of God’s freedom can be further 
explicated in the concrete event of God’s self-revelation
w i t h i n t h e imman e n t Tri nity.
God’s self-revelation is an event of "a self­
distinction of God from himself, a being of God in a mode
of being that is different from though not subordinate to 
His first and hidden mode of being as God”. "The very 
fact of revelation tells us that it is proper to Him to 
distinguish Himself from Himself, i.e, to be God in Himself
and in concealment, and yet at the same time to be God a
second time in a very different way, namely, in 
manifestation, i.e., to be God a second time in the form of 
something he himself is not";^ God the Son.
On the one hand, "God in the form He assumes when He
reveals Himself God is free to reveal Himself or not to
K . Bar th, Church 
Parker, W.B, Johnston, 
(Edinburgh, T.& T. Clark,
Ibid,
52 Ibid.
Dogma tics 11 /1 , 
H, Knight and 
1957), p.301.
trans. 
J.L.M,
T . H . L . 
Haire
Ibid.
Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, p,316.
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55reveal Himself", "The fact that God takes form means that
God Himself controls . , , the form in which He encounters
p aman," That is, as JUngel says: "The God. who can reveal 
himself is not obliged to reveal himself."^ Therefore, 
"God’s self-unveiling remains an act of sovereign divine 
freedom." "God as the subject of revelation remains 
distinguished from revelation."^ It is precisely in this 
way that God reveals himself "as the Father of the Son in 
whom he takes form for our sake".0" In the Father’s 
veiledness and mystery God is free.
On the other hand, by nature God cannot be unveiled to 
men, but he transcends his own hiddermessOtf by unveiling 
himself through his own alter ego. In "revealing himself 
under an alien form, 'something He is not’, he shows 
himself to be capable of self-differentiation" J1'1 "He 
differentiates Himself from Himself, being not only God the 
Father but also ... God the Son."^ For Barth, the fact
55
58
5?
58
59
89
Ibid,, p,3 21.
Ibid.
JUngel, The Doctrine of
.Barth, Church Dogmatics
JUngel, The Doctrine of
Barth, Church Dogmatics
the Trinity, p.19
I/l , p.321 ,
the Trinity, p.19
I/l , p.324.
61 Ibid. , p, 315 .
Williams, "Barth on the Triune God", p,160.
Ibid,
Barth, Church Dogmatics I/l, p.320,
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that "God Himself becomes Another in the person of His
Son"^ "consists in the freedom of God to differentiate
Himself from Himself, to become unlike himself".^ In other
words, God is free to have "otherness in Himself from 
6 7eternity to eternity".
In this way, God’s freedom does not primarily derive
from the mode of his relationship to the world. The freedom
of God "is primarily and fundamentally defined as God’s
freedom in Himself".^ This "freedom in its positive and
proper qualities means to be grounded in one’s own being, 
fiQto be determined and moved by oneself." G.S. Hendry
classifies this positive freedom as self-determination:
"This is the freedom to determine what one shall be and do
of one’s own t free will’ and not under external
constraint. H?0 Thi s kind of freedom is seen in the
hiddenness of the Father in God’s self-unveiling' in the
form of the Son.
According to Barth, in
determinative freedom, God
Barth, Church Dogmatics
Barth, Church Dogma tics
Barth, Church Dogmatics
Ibid., p,309.
Ibid., p,301.
Hendry, "The Freedom of
the exercise of this self­
can enter into a real
II/l, p , 31 7 .
I/1 , p. 3 2 0 .
II/l, p.317.
God in the Theology of Karl
Barth", p,234.
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relationship with that which is other than himself/ 
However, this freedom of communion with the other has its
original truth in God himself. That is, in eternity God
becomes another in the Son so that he has otherness in
himself from the very beginning. This is precisely the
event that God’s self-distinction happens in his self­
unveiling in the form of the Son. In this way, Barth
writes: "The existence of the world is not needed in order
n jthat there should be otherness for Him." 1 The world exists 
because God elects to communicate with it through the
election of the Son. Then, God’s freedom of communion with
the other means that God can go out of himse.] f to have
relationship with the other but he need not to do so. That
is, he is not obliged to enter into such a relationship,
just as it is the case that he is not obliged to reveal
hiraself.
To sum it up, for Barth, as freedom in himself, God’s 
freedom is primarily understood as self-grounded and 
unconstrained. His freedom of communion with the other,
then, is freedom in the sense that he can but he is not
obliged, In this way, before God communicates himself to
the other, he has to make a decision firstly. Then, freedom
Barth, Church Dogmatics II/I
Ibid., p,317,
Ibid.
p. 309
U I b i d ,
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as choice of act or not becomes a necessary precondition
when God does entei* into fellowship with the other.
However, this kind of understanding of freedom is
different from that of Greek. The Greek views God’s freedom
as being free from any external or internal condition
because God is self-sufficient and perfect, God’s self­
determinative nature must be grasped in this sense. Then,
either passively or actively God is not allowed to enter
into communion with the other. At this point Barth differs
from the Greeks. When God’s freedom is primarily understood 
as the freedom in himself, he, certainly, is unconstrained
from any external factor. But this does not mean that he is
limited from being conditioned by such external factor.
Because he himself is freedom, he can transcend this
limitation as well. Otherwise he is not absolutely free.
The crucial point of the difference between, the Greeks and
Barth on God’s freedom lies in that the former views God’s
freedom from the mode of God’s relationship to the world 
while the latter views it from God himself. Consequently,
these are two different kinds of freedom: relative freedom
and absolute freedom.
However, for Moltmann, Barth’s problem lies in the
introduction of freedom as choice of act o.r not into the
discussion of God’s fellowship with the other. This further 
affects Barth’s understanding of God’s love. He writes:
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"His loving is ... utterly free, grounded in itself, 
needing no other, and yet also not lacking in another, 
but in sovereign transcendence giving, communicating 
itself to the other. In this freedom it is the divine 
loving. But we must also say, conversely, that only in 
this divine loving is the freedom described by us 
divine freedom."
"God’s love would not really be divine love unless it were
free." God is love but he does not need the other to
love. "God would be love even if there were no men around 
7 7for Him to love." ' He loves the other only when he
determines solely on his own to love the other. This
meaning is very clear in the following passage:
"God in his love elects another to fellowship with 
himself. First and foremost this means that God makes 
a self-election in favour of this other. He ordains 
that He should not be entirely self-sufficient as He 
might be. He determines for Himself that overflowing, 
that movement, that condescension."
When God freely determines to love the other, neither his
love nor freedom is limited by the other. As G.E. Gunton 
writes, "it is the trinitarian grounding of the divine 
freedom that enables Barth to conceive as a unity the acts
of love and freedom in which God relates himself to what is
not himself, and yet in doing so remain free".^ Barth
Ibid., p.321.
K J.D. Bettis, "Is Karl Barth a Un i ve r s a I i. s t ? " ,
Scottish Journal of Theology 20/4 (1967), p.428.
Ibid.
K. Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2, trans. G.W. 
Bromiley, J.C. Campbell, I, Wilson, J.S. McNab, H. Knight 
and R.A. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), p,10.
79 Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in 
Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, p.198,
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considers that God’s loving cannot be separated from his
exercise of freedom and vice versa. When God determines, he
determines to love the other, When God loves the other, he
is free to do so. However, such an understanding of God’s
freedom as choice has problems.
In the section "God’s Freedom" of The Trinity and the
Kingdom of God Moltmann criticizes such a view-point on 
80God’s freedom and love. Simply, a contradiction within 
God’s nature in eternity emerges. The crucial point lies in
that God’s decision of will to love carries time’s
"beforehand - afterwards" structure into the divine 
81eternity. Then, there are two different divine natures.
One is before the decision and the other is after the
decision, The problem is that these two divine natures
are not complementary to one another; rather they
contradict each other. Moltmann clearly points out: 
"describing his nature before his self-determination, we 
would have to say that God is in himself blessed and self­
sufficient; whereas describing his nature afterwards, we
would have to say that God is love - he chooses man - he is 
not self-sufficient".8'’ God does not correspond entirely to 
himself.
80 TKG,
81 Ibid.
pp.52-56.
, p.53. Cf. GC, P. 82 .
82 Ibid. , pp,53-54.
83 Ibid. , p . 5 4 . C f . GC, p, 82 .
237
6.3.3 Moltmann’s View of Love
For Moltmann, the polarity between freedom and
necessity is not real in God. The emergence of such a
contrast is not accidental. This is because this kind of
freedom is understood in terms of freedom from any internal
and external condition. It is expressed concretely in the 
notion of freedom as arbitrary choice, "a type of freedom 
itself often exhibiting the structure of the master-slave 
relationship". ' Moltmann does not agree with this view of
God’s freedom.
Moltmann criticizes this nominalist doctrine of
decree as the formalistic concept of liberty. it is 
formalistic because it excludes not merely the external 
necessity but the internal necessity as well. If God’s
freedom is grasped in this sense, then God is even free 
from his own being. A freedom involving no necessity, in 
Hegel’s view, is abstract, Likewise, Moltmann says: 
"without the substantial notion of freedom, freedom of
FC, p.77.
8° J. J, O’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in 
Recent German Theology", Heythrop Journal 23/2 (1982),
p.164. Cf. TKG, pp.5 4, 5 6,
86 TO, p.52, 
ibid., p.54.
88 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science (1830), trans, 
W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), §35, p.55,
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89choice is an empty concept," Speaking strictly, such an 
indeterminate freedom cannot determine anything' because it
cannot justify any determination out of itself.
Therefore, Moltmann calls for a material concept of
God’s freedom,99 He refers to Baron Friedrich von HUgel
that freedom of choice is by no means freedom’s highest 
91 •stage:' "Liberty exists in various kinds, and the Perfect 
92kind - Perfect Liberty - excludes Choice,"' He further 
points out that "the freedom of having to choose between 
good and evil is less than the freedom of desiring the good 
and performing it".' The reason is that "the person who 
chooses has the torment of choice". On the contrary, "the 
person who is truly free no longer has to choose",99 This 
is because whatever he does is good. How can this be
possible? This is possible only when freedom is understood
as love. Moltmann writes:
Freedom arrives at its divine truth through love. Love 
is self-evident, unquestionable 'overflowing of 
goodness’ which is therefore never open to choice at
03 GC, p.82,
90 TKG, p.54,
91 Ibid., p.55.
92 Baron Friedrich von HUgel, Essays and. Addresses in 
the Philosophy of Religion, Second Series (London and 
Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1930), p.202,
93 TKG, p.55. Cf. TGG, p.173.
9^ Ibid.
99 Ibid.
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any time, We have to understand true freedom as being 
the self-communication of the good,*'
In a word, "in the substantial sense the truth of freedom 
is .love"^ which "is the self-communication of the good".* 98
God’s freedom is no longer arbitrary choice but his love, 
the inner necessity of his being, God’s freedom is the 
freedom of the good which overflows itself.99 Therefore, 
God’s freedom must not be comprehended apart from his love. 
Obviously, Moltmann critically inherits Barth’s conception 
of the inseparability of God’s freedom and love but 
abandons his understanding of God’s freedom as choice.
However, according to Moltmann, love as the overflowing 
of God’s goodness is not a natural event. That is, God’s 
overflowing of his goodness to the other is not an event
without his own determination. Rather, God’s free self­
determination belongs to his essential nature J" But this 
self-determination is at the same time the overflowing of 
God’s goodness.Moltmann considers that the origin of 
God’s love must have these two sides because it is "only 
when we see both sides that God’s self-determination ceases
98 Ibid.
JGC, p.8 2.
98 Ibid.
99 O’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Recent 
German Theology", p,164.
100 TKG, p.54.
101 Ibid.
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to be something arbitrary, and the overflowing of his 
102goodness ceases to be a natural event". In this vein,
1 inGod’s decision is a disclosure of himself, God’s love is
his liberty and God’s liberty is his loveJ^ That is,
God’s "self-communication of the good can only take place
in freedom" It is in this sense that "freedom and love 
1 ft fiare synonymous".
In contrast to Barth, Moltmann considers that "God is
not entirely free when he can do and leave undone what he
likes; he is entirely free when he is entirely himself".1^
This is because "if we start from the Creator himself, the
seif-communication of his goodness in love to his creation 
1 OSis not a matter of his free will",
It is the self-evident operation of his eternal 
nature. The essential activity of God is the eternal 
resolve of his will, and the eternal resolve of his 
will is his essential activity. y
102 Ibid.
103 I bid.
104 Ibid, p. 1 51 .
105 GC, p..82,
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.,, pp.82-83
108 Ibid.., p . 8 2 .
109 Ibid.
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In God’s love necessity and freedom coincide.4^ In this 
way, there is not any contrast between necessity and 
freedom in God’s relationship to the world from the very
beginning.
If God’s love is understood as the overflowing of his 
goodness, then God "neither will nor can be without the one 
who is beloved"As Moltmann quotes Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
wording: "Love does not permit the lover to rest in 
himself. It draws him out of himself, so that he may be
entirely in the beloved." This love cannot be limited 
within God’s inner life, It drives the lover to go out of 
himself. Therefore, the beloved object is not limited
within the triune God. Otherwise, the Trinity will become 
a circle closed to the other and this is against the
going out nature of love,
For Moltmann, although within the Trinity the Son is 
other than the Father, he is not other in essence J'4 The 
inner-trinitarian love is merely the love of like for like,
but not the love of 115the other. However, God has to
communicate his love to the other who is essentially
110 Cf. TKG, p,107.
111 TKG, p . 58 . .
ibid.
113 FC, p . 78 .
114 TKG, p . 5 8 .
115 Ibid. , p.106.
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different from him. He does not merely love "the Other in 
1 1 fthe like" but also loves "the like in the Other".
Moreover,, God has to love "the unlike in the Other" in his
history with the world. God’s love in the cross is the 
117"creative love for what is different, alien and ugly". 
God’s goodness has to overflow beyond himself to the one 
other than the triune God, not merely the like in the other
but the unlike in the other.
These two kinds of love, love for the like and love for 
the other which includes like and unlike, to put it simply, 
are God’s necessary love and free love, internal love 
and external love respectively. However, this distinction
is not based on different natures of God’s love but
different beloved objects. God’s love is called necessary 
and free because the Son necessarily responds to the 
Father’s love while the world responds to God’s love in 
freedom according to their different natures. Likewise,
God’s love is called internal and external because the
beloved are within and without the triune God respectively.
Furthermore, as God’s love, this inner-trinitarian love
and this extra-trinitarian love are not separated from each
other. Rather the former is the foundation of the latter.
Because the Father loves the Son, he creates the world.
118 Tbid. , p. 59.
117 CG, p.28.
118 TKG, p.58.
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Because the Son loves the Father, he redeems the world. The 
love for the world expressed in God’s creation and 
redemption is the love of the triune God for each other. 
Moltmann writes: ’’Creation is a part of the eternal Jove
affair between the Father and the Son. It springs from the 
Father’s love for the Son and is redeemed by the answering
love of the Son for the Father. God’s love for the
world is simultaneously the interplay of the love of the
triune God.
In this way, God’s freedom cannot be understood as
self-related freedom but other-related freedom, because
God’s love is ultimately other-related love. The former is
a kind of freedom which seeks to be free from any external
compulsion and manifests itself in terms of self­
determination. The latter is another kind of freedom which
is "based on the community of friendship, a relationship 
grounded in affection and respect". For Moltmann, God’s
self-determination is not abolished in the freedom in
community. When God’s freedom is grasped as the self­
communication of the good, he is self-determinative as
wel 1,
Ibid. , p.58, 
i 90 O’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Recent 
German Theology", p.164, Cf. TKG, p.56.
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From eternity God’s essence as love makes the divine 
Trinity not a closed circle of perfect being in heaven,
God opens himself to the world, and time not out of any lack
in his own being but from his own interior fullness , He
does not need the world to realise himself, but he needs
the other for his glorification. And in loving the world 
God is entirely free because he is entirely himself, 
"Because his freedom is his love, he is in himself related 
to the world as the Trinity from eternity open to world
history.
Furthermore, out of his love the triune God does not
merely determine to open himself from eternity, but also
determines the way of opening himself at the same time, The
determination of opening and the determination of the way 
of opening are simultaneous, This is because the way of
opening is inherent in the nature of the opening for the
other,
Since the beloved objects are different, essentially 
alike and essentially different, God cannot love the latter
CG, p.255.
O’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Recent 
Theology", p,164. Cf. FC, p.86; CPS, p.56.
O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The Christian
Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the 
Theology of Hope, pp.148-149. Cf. DGG, p.155,
TKG, p.55.
125 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.109,
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in the same way as he loves the former. In other words, the
way God loves the other in the like is different from the 
way he loves the like in the other. If God’s love for the 
other in the like is analogical love, then his love for the
like in the other is dialectical, love. Apparently, these
two are parallel to God’s two ways of revelation:
analogical and dialectical. God .in his love opens himself 
dialectically. That is, for Moltmann, "from eternity God’s 
essence as love has been not only the love of like for like
but the dialectical love for his other which Is open to
the world". “ This dialectical love is completely and 
radically manifested when the Son is crucified on the cross
for the unlike in the other.
Actually, this dialectical love is in essence
passionate love or suffering love. As noted by Bauckham, 
Moltmann understands love as passion in the double sense of
pathos: passionate devotion ( Le.idensc.haft) and suffering
(Leiden). " These two senses are not separable but 
integrated as "passionate concern which involves 
vulnerability to suffering, God's passion is "itself 
the passion for life which is prepared for suffering".^
126 Ibid,, p.108.
127 Ibid., p.103,
128 OC, p. 25 .
129
Making,
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In this sense, as Moltmann emphasises, God’s suffering
is active suffering. Out of his passionate love God
voluntarily lays himself open to another and allows himself 
1)1to be intimately affected. ' In other words, God’s
passionate love requires God himself to enter into a
reciprocal relationship with the other in which he is ready
to suffer even to the point of sacrificing' and giving
himself up.
Then, God’s suffering in his economic activity in the
world does not means that he is affected by the suffering
world passively. God is not subject to suffering fatefully.
Rather, from eternity he has determined by himself to love
his other dialectically. Therefore, because God is love,
God’s economic activity can be understood as being
determined by his immanent life from the very beginning. 
Firstly, God’s love is communicating love so that he 
determines to open himself to the world from eternity.
Secondly, God’s love is passionate love so that he 
determines to open himself to the world in a dialectical
way,
6.4 From the Trinity in the Origin to the Trinity in the
G1 o r i f i c a, t i o n
131 Ibid.
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If the Trinity is open in love, then the Trinity will
be closed in love, This is because God’s love is a
dialectical one. The triune God manifests his dialectical
love in a dialectical way. Therefore, one cannot talk of
the opening of God’s trinitarian being in the origin 
without mentioning his closure at the end.
Inferring from the cross event through the Trinity in
the historical sending back to the Trinity in the eternal
origin, Moltmann reaches the point that the triune God is
open .from the very beginning. However, since the cross is
not separable from the resurrection in the dialectical
identity of Jesus Christ, one cannot neglect the
eschatological Trinity at the eschaton which is promised in 
Christ’s resurrection. God’s history with the world does 
not merely have a trinitarian origin, but also has a 
trinitarian goal at the eschaton, God’s opening in the 
origin is not without goal. When this goal is fulfilled, 
the Trinity is closed. Then, the Trinity is not open 
forever without ending. It has its moment of being closed.
From the Trinity in the origin through the Trinity with 
the history of this world to the Trinity in the goal, God 
experiences a dialectical process; self-limitation and 
self-de-limitation. Because of this dialectic, the 
eschatological Trinity will not be the same as the Trinity
in the origin. The trinitarian goal at the eschaton is not 
the repetition of the trinitarian origin.
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To put it simply, on the one hand, the triune God
limits himself so as to become historical in his
involvement with his creation; on the other hand, he has to
de-limit himself so as to gather ail men and women and
indeed the whole creation into God, Or to put it in another
way, the Trinity is open by limiting God himself whereas
the Trinity is closed by de-limiting God himself.
These two divine movements are God’s seeking' love and 
his gathering' love respectively. When God’s work of
gathering love is completed, God will be fully glorified.
Moltmann calls this goal "the Trinity in the 
,133glorification", Bauckham points out: "'Glory’ is the
biblical term for the divine splendour in which the whole
creation will participate in the End". Then, a genuine
135panentheism will take place. God will be all in all.
However, the triune God will be all in all only when he
has involved himself in a dialectical process which is
eschatologically oriented, And this is so because God is
love. Out of his dialectical love God acts dialectically,
13?‘ O’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Recent 
German Theology", p,164; Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic 
Theology in the Making, p, .11 2 . Cf, FC, p.95.
134
FC, p.88,
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the
Making, p. 112 .
135 0’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the T r i n i t y i n Recent
German Theology", p, 165.
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Only in this way is God’s love fully manifested. In the
following' sections this process will be analysed in detail,
6,5 God’s Self-Limitation and Self-De-Limitation
Moltmann writes: "Between the Trinity in its origins 
before time and the eschatological Trinity at the end of 
time lies the whole history of God’s dealings with man and 
creation,"^0 Then the divine life can be divided into 
three different stages: the Trinity before time, the
history of the triune God with the creation, the Trinity at
the eschaton. Although Moltmann does not express the
connection of these three stages in terms of dialectic in
any sense, within his theology such an understanding of the 
divine life is not without basis. The proceeding of these
three stages can be expressed in terms of God’s initial
self-limitation in the creation, the climax of his self­
limitation and the beginning of his self-de-limitation in
the Christ event, the ultimate self-de-1imitation at the
eschaton,
6,5,1 God’s Initial Self-Limitation in the Primordial
Moment
136 FC, p. 92 ,
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God is a creative God, However, God’s creation must13?
be understood as a trinitarian interplay of God’s love.
According to Moltmann, it is because the Father loves the
Son that he becomes the creator. This means that the
Father creates the world by virtue of his love for the
Son. His love for the Son is not merely limited within
the Trinity but overflows to the one who is other than the 
triune God. God’s inner-trinitarian love is not merely a 
kind of self-related love, it is also a kind of other-
related love. In this sense, Moltmann claims that "the idea
of the world is already inherent in the Father’s love for
the Son",
Therefore, creation is a fruit of the triune God’s love
for his other. However, the process of creation is not
simply an outward act. The problem is: "can the omnipotent 
and omnipresent God have an 'outward’ aspect at all?" In 
eternity God’s power and presence are all in all. There is
nothing other than God which can co-exist with God, There
is nothing non-divine outside God. There is no room for
this non-divine entity outside God. Therefore, Moltmann 
comes to the point that "in order to create something
137
138
139
140
141
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‘outside’ himself, the infinite God must have made room for 
this finitude beforehand, 'in himself
Moltmann employs Isaac Luria’s kabbalistic doctrine of 
zimsum {self-limitationto assist him in developing
this aspect. The doctrine of zimsum is developed from the
ancient Jewish doctrine of Shekinah (God’s indwelling'), 
"according to which the infinite God can so contract his 
presence that he dwells in the temple" J44 Luria transforms 
this into "the doctrine of God’s concentrated inversion for 
the purpose of creating' the world" J4^ Consequently,
The existence of a world outside God is made possible 
by an inversion of God. This sets free a kind of 
"mystical primordial space" into which God - issuing 
out of himself - can enter and in which he can 
manifest himself.’
Therefore, the very first act of God is "not a step
‘outwards’ but a step ‘inwards’, a ‘self-withdrawal of God
from himself into himself’ ... a limitation on God’s part, 
14 7not a de-limitation",
142 Ibid, p.109.
' For an account of Isaac Luria’s theology see G.G. 
Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: 
Schocken, 1954), pp.244-286.
1“ GC, p.87.
145 TKG, p. 109
146 GC, p . 8 7 .
TKG, p.110
God’s self-limitation is not an inward act of a
"single" subject. Rather, it is a trinitarian interplay of 
God’s love. God’s primary act of self-withdrawal means that
the Father, through an alteration of his love for the 
son (that is to say through a contraction of the 
Spirit), and the Son, through an alteration in his 
response to the Father’s love (that is, through an 
inversion of the Spirit) have opened up the space, the 
time and the freedom ...
Because the Father’s love for the Son and the Son’s
responsive love for the Father overflow beyond themselves,
a space has to emerge through the contraction and inversion
of the Spirit so that God’s beloved who is other than God
can be created.
Here one thing has to be noted. This primal,
space is not merely one in which God calls forth
divine created world, but also the ceded space
yields up for creation’s own being. In other 
is not merely a space for God’s act of creation, 
one for the existence of creation’s own being.
this space is not the negation of God in the
sense, Certainly, it cannot be understood apart
nature of God’s self-limitation in this primordial
mystical
the non-
tbat God
words, it
but also
However,
Hegelian
from the
1 moment.
118 Ibid . , p, i 11
149 Ibid ., p.uo
150 GC, p . 8 7 .
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God’s withdrawing his presence and power means that he
negates his omnipresence to a certain extent. In other
words, God is not all in all any more. It is in this sense
that Moltmann calls this self-limitation God’s seif- 
negation.4^ Corresponding to God’s act of self-negation, 
then, is the emergence of the primordial space. Because
this space is conceded by God’s self-negation, it is a
godforsaken space, hell, absolute death that is itself a 
15?partial negation of the divine being. ' Hence Moltmann
calls it nihil, Nothingness.
However, being a godforsaken space, this Nothingness in
the primordial moment does not threaten anything yet
because before God’s creation ad extra there is not
anything in the primordial space for it to annihilate.
Moltmann says to the point:
makes creation possible, the
annihilating character. 1,433 It
the existence of God’s creat
admits that "this implies
ann ihi lat ing Not hingne ss"
distinguishes three related
regard to three different
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., p . 8 8 ,
154 Ibid. , p.87.
155 Ibid.
"As a self-limitation that
nihil does not yet have this
is merely a precondition for 
154ion. On the other hand, he
the possibility of the
. ' Moltmann carefully
senses of Nothingness with
objects: non-being of the
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creator, non-being of creation non-being of the
156creature. These three can be viewed as corresponding to 
three different stages with creation as the reference: 
Nothingness before creation in the primordial moment, 
Nothingness at creation, Nothingness after creation.
Certainly, God’s initial self-negation is only partial, 
not total. Otherwise, God will become nothing. It is only 
on the cross that God the Son becomes nothing. He totally 
negates himself unto death. However, in the primordial 
moment the triune God just withdraws partially so that
Nothingness is merely a partial negation of the divine
being. It is only on the cross that God the Son’s self­
negation reaches its climax.
In this way, God himself does not pass into Nothingness
in order to create something. That is, God’s initial self­
limitation cannot be understood in terms of the Hegelian 
dialectic of Being, Nothing and Becoming. According to 
Hegel, Being negates itself so as to be its opposite,
Nothing whereas Nothing negates itself so as to be its
opposite, Being. In these movements, Being and Nothing 
immediately vanish in their opposite. v The mutual passing 
over of Being and Nothing, then, is Becoming." The
156 Ibid, , p.88.
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A.V, 
Miller (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp.82-83.
158 Ibid.
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emergence of Nothingness and creation out of nothing, in
Moltmann’s doctrine of creation, is not the same case.
Although Moltmann names this Nothingness the non-being of 
159God, he does not intend to mean that Nothingness is part 
of God’s being from the very beginning. Rather, in the 
sense that Nothingness is out of God’s withdrawing, it can 
be said that Nothingness is the non-being of God.
In sum, God and Nothingness are not two sides of the
same coin, God does not negate himself so as to be
Nothingness. Rather, he withdraws himself so as to let
Nothingness emerge.
Accord ingly, such an act of God in the primordial
moment before creation ad extra expresses that "God’s self­
humiliation does not begin merely with creation, inasmuch 
as God commits himself to this world; it begins beforehand, 
and is the presupposition that makes creation possible" 
God’s self-limitation in the primordial moment is the
ontological condition for his act of creation. It is under 
this condition that God’s history with the world which 
begins with creation is possible.
Furthermore, Moltmann asserts that "the initial self­
limitation of God ... assumes the glorifying, derestricted
159
160
GC, p.88.
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boundlessness in which the whole creation is
1 f 1transfigured". Obviously, this is to say that God’s 
initial self-limitation points to his ultimate self-de­
limitation. The former will be negated by the latter. That 
is, God’s initial withdrawing his presence will be negated 
by his ultimate derestricting of his glory. Moreover, if 
the initial self-limitation is for the sake of creating the
world, then the ultimate self-de-limitation is for the sake
of transfiguring the whole world.
Between God’s initial self-limitation and. ultimate
self-de-limitation is God’s history of dealing with his 
creation. indeed, this is a process of overcoming 
Nothingness by God’s dialectical history with his creation
through which God arrives at his full de-limitation.
6.5,2 God’s Self-Limitation in His History with the World
6.5,2.1 God’s Self-Limitation through the Spirit’s
Indwel1ing
"God withdraws into himself in order to go out of 
himself,However, God’s act of going out of himself is
not a simple, direct act of de-limitation, He does not go
out of himself to abolish Nothingness immediately so that
his power and presence can be derestricted. This is because
161 Ibid. , p.89.
162 Ibid., p.87. Cf. TKCt, p.lll.
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creation ad extra, has to take place in the space conceded
j coby God himself. If Nothingness is abolished immediately, 
then the world cannot be created out of nothing.
God’s creation ad extra is an act in which "the Father
utters the eternal Word in the Spirit and breathes out the
Spirit in the eternal utterance of the Word". On the one
hand, the Father creates the world through the Son because
he creates the world in his love for the Son. Therefore,
1 fifithe Son is the Logos in relation to the world. ' He is the
ground of the existence of the world. On the other hand,
the Father creates the world through the operation of the
Holy Spirit. The creation and preservation of the world is
impossible without the operation of the power of the Holy
Spirit. This is because Nothingness will annul anything, 
including God’s creation, within its sphere.
According to Moltmann, "Christian theology talks about 
1£7'God’s indwelling’ in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit".
It is the power of the Holy Spirit in which "the Father, 
through the Son, has created the world, and preserves it 
against annihilating Nothingness" The power of the Holy
163 Ibid., pp.88-89
164 TKG, p .108.
165 Ibid., p . 11 2 .
166 Ibid., p.108.
167 Ibid,, P . 110 .
168 , p. 96 .
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Spirit is not only creative but also emanated. This means 
that "in the Spirit the Creator himself is present in his 
creation",1^ ’’Through the presence of his own being, God 
preserves his creation against the annihilating
l?0Nothingness."
his Spirit from
The creation "would perish if God withdrew
it" ,171 "If the worId were complete1y and
wholly godless and forsaken by the Spirit , it would have
become nothing (Ps . 104.29); it would have ceased to
exist."112
In this way, creation ad extra is an act consisting of 
two simultaneous moments: the calling forth by the Holy 
Spirit and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. When the
world is created, it is indwelt by the Holy Spirit. From 
the very beginning of God’s creation out of nothing, the 
Holy Spirit is present in the creation. His indwelling is 
God’s self-humiliation. "For through his Shekinah God 
participates in man’s destiny, making the sufferings of his 
people his own".1'*1 "Through the Spirit he suffers with the 
sufferings of his creatures. In his Spirit he experiences
their annihilation. " This is why the Holy Spi rit sighs
169 Ibid .
170 Ibid.
171 TKG, p .111.
172 Ibid,, p.102.
173 Ibid., p . 11 8 ,
174 GC, p. 97 .
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with the whole creation and cries out for redeeming freedom 
175in enslaved creation.
Although God does not abolish the power of Nothingness
when he goes out of himself to create ad extra, his
creation and preservation of the world is an act of 
inhibiting Nothingness from annihilating his creation 
immediately. In a certain sense, this is a kind of negation
of Nothingness. In this sense, Moltmann writes:
Creatio ex nihilo in the beginning is the preparation 
and promise of the redeeming’ annihilatio nihili, from 
which the eternal being of creation proceeds. The 
creation of the world is itself a promise of 
resurrection, and the overcoming of death in the 
victory of eternal life (I Cor. 15.26, 55-57). So the 
resurrection and the kingdom of glory are fulfilment 
of the promise which creation itself represents. 1
Creation out of nothing, then, is a promise event. On the
one hand, God further* limits himself when the Holy Spirit.
goes out himself and indwells in his creation so as to
share the threat of Nothingness. On the other hand, the
creation and preservation of the world through the
creativity and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is at the
same time the denial of the annihilating power of 
Nothingness over his creation. "The Spirit suffers 
creation’s tendency to close in on itself and die, keeps it 
open beyond itself to life and to the future, and thereby 
turns creation’s history of suffering into a history of
TKG, p.lll. Cf. GC, p.97,
GC, p.90,
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177hope". The divine immanence in the world, that is , the 
indwelling of God through the Spirit in the world, then, 
"is a kenotic, suffering, contradicted presence, which can 
do no more than point towards the future kingdom of 
glory".* 1’8
The triune God does not merely permit the world which
is other than him, but also indwells in it through the
Spirit. This self-humiliation reaches it climax in the
death of God the Son on the cross. Conversely, his
resurrection is the beginning of overcoming Nothingness.
6.5.2.2 God’s Self-Limitation on the Cross
The self-limitation and self-de-1imitat ion of the
triune God are perceptible in the Christ event. The kenosis 
i 7*)of God which is realised in the cross 1 is different from
the indwelling of God’s Spirit in his creation. On the
cross, God does not merely enter into the situation of
godforsakenness, he also adopts and accepts it himself as 
part of his own eternal iifeJ^ In the surrender of his
177 R. Bauckham, "Evolution and Creation: In Moltmann’s 
Doctrine of Creation" Epworth Review 15/1 (1988), p.77. Cf. 
GC, p.102.
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own Son God "exposes himself to the annihilating 
1 8 1Nothingness", ' Moltmann writes:
-.• by yielding up the Son to death in God­
forsakenness on the cross, and by surrendering him to 
hell, the eternal God enters the Nothingness out of 
which he created the world ... It is the presence of 
his self-humiliating, suffering love far his creation, 
in which he experiences death itself. '
It is only at the cross that "God actually 6 adopts5 human 
experience into his own being, so that he now suffers 
’infinite pain’".* 488
The Son takes up this experience of annihilation into
his life because he is the Logos through whom the Father 
184creates the world. He is "the ground for the existence 
185of the whole creation, human beings and nature alike".
That is, he is the mediator of creation and the centre for
j ggthe whole creation. Therefore, the incarnation of the 
187son and its completion in his abandonment on the cross 
1mean that God preserves the world.
101 GC, p.91.
482 Ibid.
488 P.S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1988), p.9.
184 TKG, pp.112, 117.
185 GC, p.94.
188 TKG, p.112,
187 Ibid. , pp.118-119.
188 Ibid. , p. 108.
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The cross is not merely the climax of God’s self­
limitation, but also the climax of the Son’s responsive
189love for the Father which begins when he becomes the
Logos of the world at the creation. The Son abandons
himself on the cross in love for the Father whereas the
Father abandons the Son on the cross in love for the Son.
This is because they both love the world so that their love 
for each other is expressed on the cross. "To put it in
trinitarian terms - the Father lets his Son sacrifice
himself through the Spirit. The Father is crucifying love,
the Son is crucified love, and the Holy Spirit is the
unvanquishable power of the cross. "I" jt is through the
Holy Spirit that the Father and the Son can both sacrifice
themselves, though in different senses, and the Son in 
191forsakenness can be .joined and united with the Father,
When the Son on the cross takes up the experience of
annihilation into his being', the Trinity is open to the 
world. This does not means that the Trinity is merely open
at the cross. To put it in another way, it is at the cross 
that the opening of God’s very inner being reaches its 
climax. In the Spirit’s indwelling in the creation God is 
open to experience its annihilation but as far as death,
whereas on the cross through the Son God’s own self is open
and exposed to the annihilating Nothingness so as to gather
189 Ibid, , p. 121 .
Ibid., p.83.
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19?that Nothingness into his eternal being, ' The latter is
a radical opening of the being of the triune God in his
history with the world.
6.5.3 God’s Self-De-Liinitat ion in His History with the
World
6.5.3,1 God’s Self-De-Limitation in the Resurrection
The resurrection of the Son marks the beginning of 
God’s setf-de-1imitation in his history with the world,
This is because the resurrection is the negation of the
cross. If on the cross the Son is annihilated by
Nothingness, then in the resurrection the annihilating 
power of Nothingness begins to be overcome, The Nothingness 
is gathered .into God’s eternal being on the cross so that 
God can overcome it in himself through the resurrection. It
is in this sense that the resurrection of the Son is called
the promise of God to the world, Obviously, this is the
culmination of God’s promise since the indwelling of the 
Spirit in the creation.
"When the crucified Jesus ‘appears’ in glory to the
women and the disciples after his death, this then means
the pre-reflection of his future in the coming glory of 
193God." Although the resurrection means that "Christ is
192 pp.91, 93,
TKG, p.83.193
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raised from the dead into God’s eternal life", it also 
means "at the same time the transfiguration of the 
humiliated and crucified Jesus into the glory of God"J^ 
Actually, God’s self-glorification begins with the
resurrection of Jesus Christ, though his glory will be
fully de-limited at the eschaton.
How can Jesus be raised from death? It is the Father
who raises the Son through the Spirit. “ If the Son is 
delivered up by the Father through the Spirit, then he is 
raised by the Father through the Spirit. Accordingly, 
Moltmann writes: "God the Father glorifies Christ the Son 
through his resurrection, while the Son glorifies the
Father through his obedience and his self-surrender. The
event of their mutual glorification is the work of the Holy 
Spirit." ‘ As the soteriological significance of the cross 
is shown only against the background of the resurrection, 
the glorifying significance of the Son’s obedience and
sel f-surrender is manifested only in the context of the
Father’s glorifying the Son through his resurrection.
Nevertheless, the resurrection of Christ is the 
197Spirit’s first eschatological work. Therefore, "with
194 Ibid.,, p . 1 2 3
195 Ibid.,, p . 8 8 .
196 I bid.
197 I bid.
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Jesus’ resurrection from the dead, history’s last day is 
beginning","with the Spirit the End-time begins" J99
6.5.3,2 God’s Self-De-Limitation through the Outpouring and 
Glorification of the Holy Spirit
If the Son is surrendered for the world, then he is
raised for the world as well. Because the Son is the Logos
of the whole creation, his resurrection is the foundation
of the new creation. If Jesus’ resurrection is the work of
the Holy Spirit, then this world will be renewed through
the Son as the mediator in the operation of the power of 
the Spirit. Therefore, "with Jesus’ resurrection, 
transfiguration, transformation and glorification, the
general outpouring of the. Holy Spirit 'on all flesh’ 
begins"299 so as to transfigure the whole creation.
The Father sends the Spirit through the Son to the
world so that the Spirit glorifies the Father through the 
Son by transfiguration of the creation. On the one hand, 
"in the outpouring of the Spirit on men and women, the
___ ____ k _» 201 i_Spirit comes from the Father
other hand, "in t h e wake of
praise and the unity proceed
198 Ibid. , p . 8 5 .
199 Ibid. , p,124 .
200 Ibid,
201 Ibid, , p . 1 2 6 .
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202Son to the Father". The Spirit is passive in the former 
20*1while in the latter is active. “
This sending of the Spirit is out of the love of the
Father and the Son. They express their love for each other
through their love for the creation which drives them to
send. the Spirit so as to begin the transfiguration of
the suffering creation.
"In the Spirit people already experience now what is 
still to come." ' However, this experience can only be the 
foretaste of the coming glory. The annihilating Nothingness 
is not yet completely overcome until the eschatological 
moment in which the presence of the Spirit is in full and
complete form.
Corresponding to this eschatological outpouring of the
Holy Spirit is the initial indwelling of the Spirit at
creation. But there is a difference between these two acts
of the Spirit. To put it simply, the latter is God’s self­
limitation while the former is his self-de-1imitation.
Without the indwelling of the Spirit in the creation the
transfiguration of the world is impossible. The latter
precedes the former while the former presupposes the
202 ibid.j, p.127.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.;, pp.124-125
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latter. These two acts are connected because they proceed
from the same Holy Spirit.
6.5.4 God’s Ultimate Self-De-Limitation in the
Esc h a t o 1 o g i c a 1 M o m e n t
The eschatological moment is the moment in which the
triune God completes his gathering of love in the creation.
This moment corresponds to the primordial moment in which
the triune God withdraws into himself for the sake of
searching love in the creation.
In this moment the "eschatological creation of the
kingdom of glory ...
and death, that 
Nothingness".^ In
proceeds from the vanquishing of sin
annihilating
annihilating
is to say, the
other words, the
Nothingness which threatens God’s creatures is completely 
abolished when God’s power and presence are fully 
derestricted in the creation by totally renewing it.
As a. matter of fact, the condition of abolishing the
annihilating Nothingness in the eschatological moment is
precisely opposite to that of the emergence of Nothingness
in the primordial moment.. That is, God derestricts himself
by totally transfiguring the whole creation and God
withdraws himself from himself to himself so as to create
the world respectively. It is for the sake of the world
GC, p.90.206
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that God is going to abolish in the eschatological moment
the annihilating Nothingness which emerges in the
primordial moment. It is in this sense that the
eschatological moment is the negation of the primordial
moment.
About this moment, Moltmann writes:
The original divine self-limitation which made the 
time and space of creation possible gives way to God’s 
all-embracing', all-pervading derestriction of himself. 
What now comes into being is the new creation of all 
things in which, as Dante says, 'His glory, in whose 
being all things move, pervades creation’. Then the 
time of creation will become the eternal aeon of 
creation, and the space of creation will become the 
cosmic temple for God’s indwelling. Created beings 
emerge out of time into the aeon of the divine glory 
through the raising of the dead and the cosmic 
annihilation of the power of death. Then all things 
will be brought hack again from time, and will be 
gathered together.
All people and things, world and time are gathered into the
glorification of the Son and the Father through the Spirit 
203in order to become God’s world. In this way, they are 
209united with God and in God himself. ' From this moment on
the triune God is all in all: creation is glorified through 
its participation in the divine life and God is glorified 
in his indwelling of his creation.^
WJC, p.32 9.
208 TKG, pp.126, 127.
209 Ibid. , p.126.
2^ Bauckham, ’'Evolution and Creation: In Moltmann’s 
Doctrine of Creation", p.75.
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6.6 Conclusion: Dialectical Love as the Ontological 
Condition of God’s History with the World
Obviously, in Moltmann’s view, the trinitarian history
of God with the world is initiated by his love. God’s love
is the ontological condition that makes his history with
the world possible, Because of this love, there are
creation, liberation and glorification. However, this love
must be understood as dialectically structured. And out of
it God acts dialectically.
First of all, this love is not self-related, selfish­
ness, but other-related, selflessness. It is an external
love in that the beloved is not God himself. It is this
other-oriented nature that makes this love dialectically
structured. Since this other is essentially different from
God himself, God cannot love it in the way God loves 
himself within the immanent. Trinity. The inner trinitarian
love is analogical because the beloved is the other in the
like. God cannot directly go out of himself to love the
other. Rather he has to withdraw himself first. God’s self­
humiliation precedes his creative act; God’s self­
limitation points to his self-de-limitation. These two acts
are the manifestation of God’s two kinds of love.
The dialectical structure of God’s love can be
expressed in Moltmann’s terms: suffering love and creative
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211love. Likexvise, "God’s creative love is grounded In his 
212humble, self-humiliating love",
Out of God’s suffering Jove, God withdraws himself from
himself to himself so as to make room for the other which
is not God, However, this conceded space will become
annihilating Nothingness after creation. Therefore, from
the very beginning God calls forth and indwells in the
world through the Holy Spirit so as to preserve its
existence against the annihilating Nothingness. By his
self-limitation in the world, God begins his history with 
the world, a history of overcoming the annihilating power.
This self-humiliating history reaches its climax in the
death of the Son on the cross. God’s initial self­
limitation, then, is further manifested in his history with
the suffering world, He does not merely spare space for the
existence of the world, but also enters into its forsaken
situation and even adopts it into his life.
Out of God’s creative love, God begins to de-limit his 
power and presence starting with the resurrection of the
Son. Because in the cross God takes up death into his very
inner being, in the resurrection God shows that the
annihilating power will be ultimately abolished. With the
outpouring of the Holy Spirit God’s history with the world
moves towards the ultimate glorification, In the
Ibid,, p,59.
GC, p.8 8,
211
212
271
eschatological moment, the annihilating Nothingness is 
totally abolished so that the world can be united with the
triune God and in the triune God himself. There is no
obstacle existing between God and his creation. God’s power 
and presence pervade and embrace all. In this sense, the 
triune God is omnipresent.
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7 Historical Transformation of the World
7.1 The Nature and Task of Christian Theolog'y
7.1.1 Introduction
Reflecting the features of his theology in "My 
Theological Career”, Moltmann says: "1 am attempting to 
reflect on a theology which has a biblical foundation, an 
eschatological orientation, a political responsibility.”1 
This means that Moltmann’s theology is eschatoLogically 
oriented with political significance, As pointed out by 
J.J. O’Donnell, "there has always been a messianic aspect 
to Moltmann’s theology and the conviction that every 
theology is perforce a political theology”.“ In Moltamnn’s 
view, there can be no apolitical faith in Chris t i ani ty. 
Therefore a certain kind of political theology is inherent 
in Moltmann’s eschatological oriented theology as well.
As a matter of fact, Moltmann’s view-point towards the 
political significance of theology cannot be separated from
! HTG, p.182.
J. J. O’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in 
Recent German Theology" , Heythrop Journal 23/2 (1982),
p . 1 6 6 .
3 T, Cabestrero, Faith: Conversations with Contemporary 
Theologians, trans. D.D. Walsh (New York: Orbis, 1981), 
p.13 5; HD, p.9 9.
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his eschatologically oriented theology. To put it simply, 
Moltmann’s theology is necessarily political because it is 
eschatologically oriented. It is the nature of the
eschatologically oriented theology that unavoidably at the
same time makes itself political. When theology is
constructed eschatologically, it is political. In other 
words, Moltmann’s conception of theology from the very 
beginning determines the political shape of his theology.
Moltmann does not explicitly discuss the proper task 
and nature of Christian theology in his writing. However,
when he examines several different interpretations of 
Christian theology and sees the whole Christian theology in
an eschatological perspective, his view-point of this
matter is expressed simultaneously. In the following, what
the proper task and nature of Christian theology is and is
not, according to Moltmann, will be examined firstly. Then,
a further investigation will proceed focusing on the
relationship of his eschatologically oriented theology to
the political theology.
7.1.2 Hegel’s and Marx’s Conception of Reality and Theory
In his Theology of Hope Moltmann makes a decisive
statement:
The theologian is not concerned merely to suppLy a 
different interpretation of the world, of history and
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of human nature, but to transform them in expectation of a divine transformation J
Apparently, Mo11 m a n n 4 5s p re feren ce o f t ran sfo rma t i o n to 
explanation is parallel to K. Marx’s famous eleventh thesis 
on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point is to change .it.”
Surely, both Moltmann and Marx do not mean that the
theologian and the philosopher have to give up their
intellectual activity and involve themselves in the
practical activity so as to change the world. Rather, it is
about the nature and the task of theology and philosophy.
Obviously, both of them are not content with the reflective
nature and the interpretative function of theology and
philosophy respectively. The point is: As a theory about
reality, how does theology or philosophy relate itself to
reality? The answer to this question presupposes the answer 
to another question: what is the nature of reality?
N. Lobkowicz notices that there are two different view­
points towards reality in philosophy that can be 
represented by Aristotle, and Hegel and Marx respectively,
Aristotle philosophizes out of "wonder", out of an 
intellectual, curiosity which is half awe, half the 
desire to adjust man’s existence to the order of 
thing', the cosmos. Both Hegel and Marx, on the 
con tr a ry, ph ilosophize o u t of unh ap p i ne s s a n d
4 777, p.84.
5 K. Marx, Early Writings, trans, R. Livingstone and G.
Benton (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p,423.
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dissatisfaction, out of the "experience” that the 
world is not as it ought to be. Accordingly, while 
Aristotle primarily aims at understanding, at 
discovering structures and laws to which man’s thought 
and actions have to adjust, Hegel and Marx aim at 
"reconciling" and/or "revolutionizing". In Aristotle 
nothing is or even can be wrong as in correcting the 
universe or in making* it rational; it consists in 
discovering its inherent order and rationality and in 
adjusting' oneself to it. In Hegel and Marx almost 
everything is wrong and consequently has to be 
aufgehoben, transfigured, transformed, revolutionized. 
In this respect the only truly important difference 
between Hegel and Marx is that Hegel is still enough 
committed to the Greek philosophical tradition to 
believe it possible to reconcile man with universe by 
teaching him adequately to understand it, while Marx, 
disappointed with Hegel’s speculative transfiguration, 
has no faith In the healing and reconciling power of 
mere thought,
Accordingly, reality can be viewed as ready-made and non­
ready-made, perfect and imperfect. These two contrasted
views of reality lead to two different kinds of theory of
truth. If reality is viewed as objective, ready-made, then
truth is statements describing the structures and laws of
such a reality. And the relationship of the theory about
reality to reality is merely reflective. That is, the
function of theory is merely reflecting reality. Therefore,
such a theory of truth is called correspondence theory of
truth.
However, when reality is viewed as non-ready-made and
imperfect, for Hegel and Marx, "the truth” lies only in the
N. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: History of a 
Concept from Aristotle to Marx {Notre Dame and London: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp, 340-34.1,
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whole, the "negative totality"/ Since Hegel confines 
himself to the Greek philosophical principle of the
identity of thinking and Being, his view of the task of 
ph1 1 osophy is simi 1 a.r to tha t of the Greek : "To comprehend 
what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, 
is reason,From this vantage point, philosophy "is its 
own time apprehended in thoughts". On the one hand,
reality as history is the realisation of the Absolute
Spirit. On the other hand, this is the same Spirit which
manifests itself as subjective Spirit in human being so as
to grasp itself in its self-realisation in history. It .is
precisely for this reason, Hegel writes: "As the thought of 
the world, it appears only when actuality is already there
cut and dried after its process of formation has been
I p
completed." ' Therefore, "philosophy grasps that which is, 
and expresses the reality of its age in thoughts"/1 In 
this way, philosophy, instead, of criticising the existing
reality, merely tries to understand it.
Marx does not agree with Hegel that philosophy is 
merely a moment of the Absolute Spirit grasping itself and
H. Marcuse, feason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise 
of Social Theory (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities, 1983), 
p.313 .
G . W » F. Hegel, Hegel ’s Phi 1 o sophy o f Right, trans. 
T.M. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.11,
Ibid.
Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, pp.12-13,
' Fiorenza, "Dialectical Theology and Hope, III", 
Heythrop Journal 10/1 (1969) p.32.
2 77
truth is the Absolute Spirit’s self-understanding' of .its 
c o n c r e t e re a 1 i 2 a. t ion i n h i s t o r y t h r o u g h t h e s u b j e c t i v e 
Spirit. Such a philosophy "can therefore provide only a 
post factum interpretation of history".u Marx believes 
that "not only the past but also the future is capable of 
interpretation, involving not onl y a passive understanding, 
but also action with an awareness of its significance and 
extent" J3
"Although Marx rejects a theory that understands itself 
as a synthesis which completes and reconciles the world in 
a system, he does not reject theory as critique"In J. 
Habermas’ view, for Marx, philosophy as critique "is aware 
that philosophical contemplation is an expression of the
alienation of the philosophical self-understanding with its
false conception of its own theoretical character, of its
assumed but non-existent theoretical autarchy" . 
Obviously, Marx criticizes Hegel’s understanding of
philosophy as alienation of its real nature, that is,
abandoning its critical function so as to be the mirror
reflecting existing reality.
Ibid.
13 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 3 4 .
J. Habermas, "Ein Marxistischer Schelling - Zu Ernst 
Blochs spekulativem Materialismus" in Theorie und Praxis 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), p.349f. This article is not
translated and collected in the English version Theory and 
Practice. Cited from Fiorenza, "Dialectical Theology and 
Hope, III", p.34.
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Marx steps beyond Hegel to requires a different
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p h i 1 o s o p h y . H e i s e s s e n t i a 1I y d i f f e r e n t
from Hegel at the point that he "relocates or redefines the
centra.! motor of historical development and self- 
16actualization": "Instead of denoting the steady unfolding
of idea, or spirit, actualization now means the progressive
display of human productive capabilities . . .
Correspondingly, philosophy is no longer the self­
reflective-understanding of the Absolute Spirit, but human 
being’s critical interpretation of the reality.
Then, philosophy, as theory about reality, does not
offer a reflective interpretation of the world but
criticises reality as imperfect so as to provoke practical
activity transforming it, There is not any immediate
corresponding relationship between theory and the present
reality. In this sense, theory is not pure but critical.
Truth is not abstract statement about reality but concrete
transformation of reality. The human subject thus is
actively involved in the articulation of truth. Therefore, 
for the anti-ref leetionist Western Marxists, "truth is
conceived as essentially the practical expression of a
subject, rather than the theoretically adequate 
representation of an object".1
I fi F.R. Dallmayr, (J.ff.F. Hegel: Modernity and Politics 
(London: Sage, 1993), p.193.
17 Ibid.
R. Bhaskar, "Truth" in A Dictionary of’ Marxist 
Thought, ed. T. Bottomore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p.493.
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Philosophy, for Marx, .is critical theory rather than
pure theory.
7.1.3 Christian Theology as Pure Theory
According to Moltmann, Christian theology as pure 
theory "did not arise until the Middle Ages".'9 Under the 
i. n f 1 u e n c e of A r i s tote 1 i a n p h i 1. o s o p h y , T h o in a s A q u i n a s 
defines this kind of theology as theory about God which is
different from theology as practical theory concerned with 
the history of salvation.2" Theology becomes theoria in the 
Aristotelian sense. For Aristotle, theoretical activity is
one that acquires knowledge of the eternal and 
unchanging.2' Such a life, the bios theoretikos, is the 
life devoted to intellectual contemplation. 2“ Aquinas 
follows Aristotle in understanding theory in terms of the
universality of all speculative knowledge which only takes 
God, being, etc. as its object.19 20 21 22 23
19 CG, p.66.
20 Ibid.
21 ♦N. Lobkowicz, "On the History of Theory and Praxis"
in Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives, ed. T. 
Ball (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 
p . 1 6 .
22 •W. Post, "Theory and Practice" in Sacramentum Mundi: 
An Encyclopedia of Theology vo.1.6, ed. K. Rahner el al , 
(London: Burns and Oates; New York: Herder and Herder, 
1970), p.246.
23 Ibid., pp. 24 6-24 7.
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However, this does not mean that God can be
contemplated directly. Rather, theology is the intellectual 
activity through ’'the likenesses of God in nature, history
and tradition, which indirectly reflect and .reveal 
something of God himself"2' to grasp God himself. In other 
words, it is an activity of knowing like through like but
not unlike. Theology as knowing God is an indirect
intellectual activity. Yet the character of such a way of
d o i n g t h eo .1 o g y c 1 e a r 1. y i s r e f 1 e c t i v e .
Moltmann finds that in the course of the history of
Christian theology, such a kind of Christian talk of God
has been manifested in three great schemes of verification
of Christian truth.' They are cosmo-theology or historico-
theology, ethico-theology or existential theology and onto- 
theology.' They all share the same feature that "a .reality
in the disclosure of which revelation can be shown to be
meaningful, necessary and useful" is presupposed.1" That
is, in order to vindicate the existence of God who is
proclaimed in the Bible, they presuppose that there is a
corresponding relationship between reality and God. It is
in this context that Christian theology becomes theological
CG, p.68.
25 HP. p . 4 .
26 Ibid., pp.5-15; 771, pp. 272-281.
22 Ibid., p. 4 .
22 Ibid., p . 1 5 .
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reflection starting' with a certain sense of reality so as 
to prove God’s existence and understand his nature as well,
This kind of theology interprets God by interpreting
reality, The cosmo-theology argues from the unity of
reality as cosmos to the one divine arche whereas the
historico-theology argues from the unity of reality as 
history to the one God of history. 23 For the existential 
theology "God can be grasped only when men grasp their 
existence . . , only where man chooses himself as his own 
possibility'’.' For onto-theology "to think of God means to 
rethink his thoughts of himself and what is thought of by 
him". Clearly the method of such theological thinking is 
reflective, Interpretations then, means reflection. The
cosmos-theology reflects God through reflecting reality as 
the whole cosmos whereas the historico-theology reflects
God through reflecting reality as the whole of history. The
existential theology reflects God through reflecting
reality as authentic human existence whereas the onto-
theology reflects God through reflecting reality as God’s 
se 1 f-refI ec tion/self •-i nterpre tat i on . On the one hand , i t
takes reality as a mirror reflecting God. On the other
hand, it reflects God through the mirroring reality.
23 777, p.77.
3 Ibid., p. 2 7 4 . 
31 HP, pp. 13-14.
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This kind of theology assumes that there is already
something in reality, no matter what this reality is,
either cosmos or history, human existence or God’s word, 
through which God is revealed. As Moltmann points out: "AIL 
proofs of God are at bottom anticipations of that
eschatological reality in which God is revealed in all
things to all. They assume this reality as already present 
3?and as immediately perceptible to every man". in other 
words, such reality is completed and finished.
Then, the knowledge of God becomes possible only when
this kind of reality is reflected, Christian theology is
merely reflection of God through a correlate reality, In
this way, pure theory of God is merely contemplation of God
which "abandons the realm of the transitory, of mere 
appearance and uncertain opinion, and finds true, eternal, 
being in the logos"That is, the unredeemed reality is
abandoned in the process of this kind of Christian
thinking.
To sum it up, because reality reflects God, theology
can reflect God through reflecting the correlative reality,
The reflective character of Christian theology is
determined by the reflecting relationship of reality to
God, There are two reflections which happen. One is between 
reality and God whereas the other is between theology, and
,)Z TH, pp.281-282,
33 CG, , p.68.
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reality and God. Theology, then, is pure theory of grasping
this relationship and understanding God’s existence and
nature through this relationship. Truth "is experienced in 
correspondence, conformity and agreement" between word and 
cosmos or history, word and existence, word and name 
r espe c t i ve 1 y . 1t me re 1. y re q u i r e s c o n t emp 1 a. t ion r a t ii e r
than praxis.
Nevertheless, a point should be clarified here. Does
Moltmann totally reject pure theory? As a matter of fact, 
Moltmann refuses to view Christian theology as pure theory 
not requiring praxis, In other words, for Moltmann, 
Christian theology in general cannot be pure theory; pure 
theory is not the essence of Christian theology. This does 
not necessarily exclude pure theory having a position in 
Christian theology. Actually, Moltmann allocates pure 
theory a proper place according to his eschatologically 
oriented theology. To put it simply, pure theory is
possible only when it is considered as doxology.
in doxology, "
works but in his
wo r sh i pped and
s a .1. v a t i. o n ’ s sake",
that " C h i’ i s t i a n
God i s recognised, 
goodness itself"
not only in his goodly
"God is ultimately
loved for
. However,
doxology
himself, not merely f o r
Moltmann fu rther poi n t s o u t
always ends with the
HP, p,I6.
35 TKG, p.153.
36 Ibid.
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eschatological prospect, looking for fthe perfecting of thy 
37kingdom in glory In this sense, doxology is merely
a foretaste of participating in the fullness of the divine
life. It is only when the history and experience of
salvation are completed and perfected that men and women
can kn o w God in the ir e te r n aI p ra ise an d wo r s hjp.
Morever, this kind of Christian doxology, because it is
based on the experience of salvation which directs one 
3 8towards God himself, is inescapably bound to Christian
praxis. As Moltmann put it: ’’Mediation can never lead to 
flight, from the Christian practice required of us, because,
being Christian mediation, it is ineditabio passionis et
mortis Christis. Practice can never become the flight from
mediation because, as Christian practice, it is bound to 
discipleship of the crucified Jesus.”37 38 9 40
7.1.4 Eschatological Theology and Political Theology
In his first important book Theology of Hope Moltmann
plainly claims: "Christianity is eschatology ... it
4 n(.eschatology! is the medium of Christian faith as such".
Molt m a n n c h a r a c t e r i s t i z e s Chris t ian t h e o 1 o g v a. s 
eschatology. "Hence eschatology cannot really be only a
37 Ibid,, p.161.
38 Ibid.., p.I53.
39 l'bid., p.8. Cf. TT, pp,92-94.
40 777, p.16,
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part of Christian doctrine. Rather, the eschatological
outlook is characteristic of all Christian proclamation 
nil That is all theological statements must
constructed and understood within the framework of
eschatology. "For Moltmann eschatology is the be-all and 
the end-all of theology; it forms the ‘foundation’ and 
‘mainspring’ of all theological thought."'3 In Moltmann’s
be
wording, eschatology is the universal horizon of all
theology as such. In this way, the nature and task of
Christian theology is determined by the character of its
eschatology.
Then, what is the character of this eschatology? This
has to do with the content of Christian eschatology.
Simply, if is about the future. But if does not speak of
the future as such. "It sets out from a definite reality in
h i s t o r y a n d a. n n o u n c e s t h e f u t u r e of t h at re a .1 i t y, its
future possibilities and its power over the future ... Tt
recognizes the reality of the raising of Jesus and 
proclaims the future of the risen Lord."44 Therefore, this 
fu ture is not the con11 nuati on or regu.1 ar recurrence of the
present. If cannot be spoken of in the form of the Greek
logos, which refers to a reality which is there, now and
Ibid.
4 ?6 H. Zahrnt, The Question of God: Protestant Theology 
in the Twentieth Century, trans. R.A, Wilson (London: 
Collins, 1969), p.197.
43 Cf, 271, p.137.
44 Ibid . , p . 1 7 .
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always, but only in "the form of statements of hope and of
■ „ 45promise .
Here a significant point should be noticed. There is
not any correspondence between the statements of
eschatology and the present reality. In other words, the
statements do not correspondingly reflect the status quo,
Rather they primarily point to the outstanding future which 
is different from the present. Moltmann’s speaking of the 
nature of hope’s statements of promise in contrast to that
of doctrinal statements clearly expresses this point:
"The truth of doctrinal statements is found in the 
fact that they can be shown to agree with the existing 
reality which we can all experience. Hope’s statements 
of promise, however, must stand in contradiction, to 
the reality which can at present be experienced."^
Then the truth of hope’s statements is not the concurrence
between those statements and the present experienced
reality, but between those statements and the future. In
this way, when Christian theology is characteristized by
eschatology, it is no longer a theory mirroring the
existing reality but pointing out its changeableness and
transformableness. When Moltmann says that "a proper
theology would therefore have to be constructed in the 
light of its future goal",9 then its task is not offering
Ibid.
ibid., p . 1 8 ; c f . p . .118 .
Ibid., p.16.
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explanations or interpretations for the existing reality.
As Mo1tmann wr i t e s :
. . . in the medium of hope our theological concepts 
become not judgements which nail reality down to what 
it is, but anticipations which show reality its 
prospects and its future possibilities. Theological 
concepts do not give a fixed form to reality, but. t^tey 
are expanded by hope and anticipate future being."
Then what is the relationship of theology to the present
reality? Moltmann shares with the merit of Hegel and Marx 
that reality is not ready-made. However, he tends to agree 
with Marx’s critique of Hegel’s conception, of theory. 
Whereas Hegel writes: "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings 
only with the falling of the dusk", Moitmann writes: 
"They [theological concepts] do not limp after reality and 
gaze on it with the night eyes of Minerva’s owl, but they 
illuminate reality by displaying its future.Like Marx,
Moltmann considers that theology does not merely interpret
the world but changes it.
In his article "What is 'New5 in Christianity" Moltmann
says that "an eschatological 1 y oriented faith ... .is not 
interested in an event that took place at the beginning of
time or in explaining why the world exists and why it is as
it is. It ... wants to change the world rather than explain
Ibid., pp.35-36.
Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, p,13. 
50 Til, p.36.
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it, to transform existence rather than elucidate it", lie
clearly points out that it is the eschatological nature of
faith which requires to change the world.
However, the relationship between such a faith and the
practical activity of changing the world is not that
between pure theory and the app1i cation o f pure theor y.
This kind of relationship is mutually external. That is,
theory does not necessarily require application and
application is not essential to the nature of theory. On
the contrary, in Moltmann’s case, praxis is out of the
nature of the eschatological theology and in turn
provisionally realises the truth of the latter within the
history of this world. Their relationship is internal.
In a word, when Christian theology is comprehended in
terms of eschatologically oriented faith, it criticises the
present reality so as to provoke concrete practical
activity that transforms the present reality and in turn
confirms such a faith provisionally. The demand and
requirement for changing and transforming the world is not
arbitrary but necessary. In this way, Christian theology is
not pure theory but critical so that praxis is involved
necessarily. That is, IL is the critical character of the
eschatological faith that requires transformation of the
present reality. In this way, praxis is a necessary
critical moment of this eschatological faith.
51
51 RRF, p.5.
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This praxis is not limited to any definite sphere since
against the horizon of God’s eschatological promise every 
aspect of the whole creation is to be changed. Because
Moltmann apprehends politics as "the inclusive horizon of 
the life of mankind , this praxis is political then. It
follows that the eschatological theology is political as
we 11.
In this sense, political theology is not a regional
theology and a kind of applied theology, As J.B. Metz
points out: "political theology is not primarily a new
theological discipline among others, with a regional task
of its own. And it is not simply a sort of ‘applied
theology’ - theology applied to politics and human 
5 3society." Political theology is not the application of 
the eschatological theology.
Furthermore, in Moltmann’s view, political theology 
"does not want to make political instead of theological 
questions the central concern of theology but, the
reverse". "It wants to be thoroughly Christian in the
r rpolitical functions of theology,"1 This is because, in 
Moltmann’s theology, the political theology declares
52 p.98.
53 J.B. Metz, "Political Theology" in Sacramen turn Mundi 
vol.5, ed. K. Rahner et al, (London: Burns and Oates/New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p.35.
77P, p.99, Cf. EH, p.102.
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eschatology as the foundation and medium of Christian 
theology, the roots of political theology lie in "the
C A
theology of hope". In other words, political theology is 
defined by the eschatological theology so that its function 
is not "to give political systems and movements religious 
support , but to criticise and to provoke transformation
of the present reality.
In sum, there is an inner logic between Moltmann’s
eschatological theology and his political theology, 
eschatological faith and political praxis. Actually, in 
Moltmann’s theology, political praxis is a mediated human 
action through which the eschatological faith derives the
historical transformation of the world. That is, political 
praxis is required by the nature of such an eschatological 
faith so as to transform the whole world historically.
Because political praxis and historical transformation are
inseparable, they can be seen as two different sides of the
same process.
In the following a further discussion will be pursued 
focusing on the objective and subjective conditions for the 
historical transformation. Simply, the objective condition
is the possibility of transformation of the world whereas 
the subjective condition is the emergence of humanity’s 
critical consciousness. After that, the critical function
58 Ibid. , p.100.
EH, p.102.
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of such a eschatological-political faith which provokes
praxis for historical transformation is going to be
examined. That is, its critique of idolatry and the
correlative reality will be analysed so as to disclose the
deep structure of the present reality and the direction for
subjective praxis and objective historical transformation.
7,2 The Conditions for Historical Transformation
How can the reality of the world be transformed
historically? Under what conditions is the world
transformable? The possibility of transforming the reality 
of the world, in Moltmann’s case, is grounded in the 
eschatological-dialectical Christ event. That is, the world
is transformable only when God eschatologically and
dialectically acts in the Christ event. God in the Christ
event does not merely open the possibility of transforming 
the reality of the world but also provokes the subjective
praxis of transformation by arousing one’s critical
consciousness. In other words, in the Christ event God
establishes the objective and subjective conditions for the
histoi’i c a 1 transforma11 on of the world.
In the following these two conditions for the world
transformation will be discussed in regard to the
eschatological-dialectical Christ event.
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7.2.1 The Eschatological-Dialectical Nature of the Christ
Event
These two natures, eschatological and dialectical, for
Moltmann, are not isolated from each other, but are inter—
related to one another. To put it simply, the Christ event 
is simultaneously "dialectical" eschatological and 
"eschato1ogical" di aIecti cal. The di a1ecti ca1 mean i ng o f 
the Christ event and the eschatological meaning of the
Ch r i s t e v e n t a r e mu t u a 11 y c on t r*o 1.1 ed .
The Christ event is eschatological because it is
firstly to be understood as God’s self-revelation in the 
context of the Old Testament history of promise. The 
"divine act of raising the crucified, dead and buried Jesus
to new life is an event - the definite event - of
eschatological promise",' It is dialectical because in the
resurrection God negates his seif-negation in the cross.
The Christ event is a dialectical movement of God’s self­
negation and negation of negation.
When the eschatological Christ event is grasped as 
dialectical, it means that the eschatological resurrection
is not a sequential fact of the cross event. When the
dialectical Christ event is comprehended as eschatological, 
it means that the negation in the resurrection represents
R. Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope 
Revisited", Scottish Journal of Theologv 42/2 (1989),
p.203.
293
the beginning of the "ultimate'' sublation. In a word, the 
Christ event is God’s eschatological-dialectical act,
With this understanding one can proceed to the
discussion of the transformabi1ity of the reality of the
world.
7.2,2 The Transformabi1ity of the Reality of the World
The eschatological-dialeetieal Christ event is a
soteriological event. In the cross Jesus Christ identifies
himself with the world by negating himself unto death. His
destiny is interwoven with that of the world. However, God
the Father negates the cross by raising God the Son from
death in the eschatological resurrection. In the cross God
accepts and adopts all negative elements of this world so
that in the sublation of the crucified Jesus God begins to
abolish those negative qualities of the present reality.
The eschatological resurrection of Christ is not merely the
promise for the ultimate future of the present world but
also the soteriological event which opens the way to this
future.
Apparently, when God identifies himself with the
present reality in the cross, the world will participate in
the destiny of the risen Christ in turn. The present
reality will be sublated in the eschatological future, like
the sublation of the crucified Jesus in the risen Christ.
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Then this world has two different kinds of reality.
What is the relationship of these two realities? Because of
God’s identification with the world in the crucified Jesus,
the relationship of the cross to the resurrection
determines that of the present reality to the future
reality of the world. In this context, as Bauckham points
out: " T o M o 11 m a n n ’ s d i a 1 e c t i c a. ] C h r i s t o 1. o g y - i n w h i c h t h e
resurrection contradicts the cross - corresponds a
dialectical eschatology, in which the promise contradicts 
,59present reality,' hike the total contradiction of cross 
and resurrection,^ the contradiction of the present 
reality and the promised future reality is total as well.
However , thi. s absoIu t e contrad i c t ion i. n 1-he dial ect ica 1
Christology and the dialectical eschatology must be
understood in terms of the Hegelian dialectic. As the 
dialectic happens in the Christ event, the present reality 
of the world is sublated in the future reality of the
world. There is continuity in radical discontinuity,
identity in total contradiction,Of this, Bauckham speaks 
to the point: "God’s promise fin the resurrection! is for
a radically new future, but a radically new future for this
world. Just as it is the same Jesus who was crucified and
Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope Revisited’’,
p . 2 0 4 .
60 TH, p.199.
61 Ibid., pp, 199-200.
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raised, so God’s promise is not for another world, but for 
fi?the new creation of this world."
In other words, what contradict each other are not this
world and another world but the present reality and the
future reality of the same world. It follows that what is
abandoned is not the world itself but its present reality.
There are not two different worlds but two different
realities of the same world. Then R.A. Alves’ and W,
Pannenberg'’s interpretation of Moltmann’s dialectic as "a
90-degree rotation of the idea of transcendence of the 
63early Barth” is a mis-reading, Moltmann’s dialectic,
apparently, is very different from the Barthian dialectic.
The contradiction of present and future is resolute in the
former dialectic while the contradiction of time and
e t e r n i t y i n t h e 1a 11 e r dialecti c i s unresolved.
In this way, the contradiction of the present reality
and the promised future reality means that the world will
be transformed from the present reality to its
contradiction, the future reality. This is to say that the
reality of the world is transformable, not fixed.
fi ? Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope Revisited”,
p. 204 .
63 R.A. Alves, A Theology of Human Hope (Indiana: 
Abbey, 1975), p,61; cf. W. Pannenberg, Christian
Spirituality and Sacramental Community (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1983), p.51; L.B. Gilkey, Reaping the
Whirlwind: 4 Christian Interpretation of History (New York: 
Seabury, 1976), pp.229-230.
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However, one point has to be clarified. The
transformability of the reality of the world primarily
means that the godless and godforsaken present reality can
radically change to a totally different future in which
suffering and death are overcome. In other words, the
reality of the world is understood as changeable firstly in
the eschatological sense. It is the eschatological future
that make this transformability eschatological.
This is very different from that within the present
reality of the world. The latter is a. historical one to
which corresponds a historical future. Then, there are two
different kinds of transformabi1ity and correspondingly two
different kinds of future. The question is; What is the
relationship between these two?
Simply, it is the eschatological future that makes the
historical future possible. That is, the eschatological.
future is the ontological condition for the historical
future. Likewise, the historical transformabi1ity is
ontologically determined by the eschatological 
transformabil1ty. How does this happen?
First of all, the ultimate eschatological future is one 
that is open to the concrete present reality, That is, an
ultimate future which is different from the concrete
present is open to the world. Because the concrete present
is not yet transformed into the ultimate future, it then
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can be transformed into the concreLe historical future.
That is, before the concrete present is sublated in the
ultimate future, it can be transformed historically. In
this way, a different historical future can be created from
the historical present.
However, on the one hand, because when comparing with
the ultimate future every historical future is not absolute
but relative, then every historical moment is not fixed but
transformable, On the other hand, the most significant
r e a s o n f o r f u x* the r future transfer m a t i on is t h at ever y
historical future will be permeated by the annihilating
power of death and turned into godlessness and
godforsakenness. Therefore, the historical transformation
cannot cease until the world arrives at the ultimate future
through the eschatological transformation. Although every
historical future will be annulled by the Nothingness,
there is still an outstanding future open for the world
because of the not yet existing ultimate future. The world
has a historical future because the history of the world
has an u11imate eschato1og i c a 1 future. And corresponding to
the dialectical eschatological transformation, such a
transformation is dialectical historical. It is in this
sense that, reality is understood as history.
Therefore, Moltmann claims that "Christian revelation
does not introduce something which was already there
independent of it, something which was always beginning or
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is eternal " J1' Rather it announces a. reality which does not 
yet exist but contradicts the present reality when God
reveals himself in the resurrection of the crucified one.
In Moltmann’s view, this contradiction "can become not only
an argument against what is Christian but even become an
argument against reality". There is not any7 ready-made, 
completed and finished reality mirroring God’s nature, but 
one that "is already transformable in the direction of its 
future eschatological transformation”.
In this way, God is the wholly transforming one who
makes the reality of the world eschatological1y and
historically transformable in the Christ event.
7.2.3 The Emergence of the Critical Consciousness
T h e e s c h a t o 1 o g i c a I - d i a. 1 e c t i c a 1 C h r i s t e v e n t i s
soteriological as well as revelatory. This in turn brings
out two consequences. Firstly, the reality of the world is
transformable, either eschatologically or historically.
Secondly, when one is confronted by this revelatory Christ
event, his or her critical consciousness will be awakened.
I-Iow does this happen?
HP, p.15.
65 Ibid. , p, 16.
0 Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope Revisited",
p. 2 0 4 .
2 99
Firstly, the reality of the world is disclosed in the
Christ event. Moltmann says in his study of Bonhoeffer:
"The revelation of Jesus Christ is not just revelation of
God, his being' and his actions, but is at the same time a
revelation of the reality of the world." This statement 
is appropriate in understanding of Moltmann’s theology as
weil. Secondly, according to R.A. Alves, it is the promised
future revealed in the resurrection that arouses one’s
cri ticai consciousness.
Man is immersed in the power of "what is", without any 
critical distance to negate it, without any future 
dimension. His consciousness is thus definitely prey 
to the power of "what is’. It is only the word of 
promise that accordingly creates a new dimension, the 
inadequabio rei et intellectus. Promise is thus the 
e 1 e m e n t w h i c h , i. n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e i n t. e 11 e c t, gives i t 
the critical distance to negate "what is".
Because of its total difference to "what is", the promised
future revealed in the resurrection awakens one from the
present reality. The promise "gives the believer a critical.
distance from his present so that he can recognise its 
deficiencies".*^ In other words, the critical distance 
created by the contradiction between the promised future
and the present makes one aware that his present has t.o be
R 7 .Die MUndige Welt, vol.JIT (Munich: Christian Kaiser. 
195 5-1963 |. vols.l-IVj), p.45. Cited from H. Pfeifer, "The 
Form of Justification: On the Question of the Structure in 
Bonhoeffer’s Theology" in A Bonhoeffer Legacy: Essays in 
Understanding, ed. A. J. Klassen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1981), p. 31 .
Alves, A Theology of Human Hope, p.59.
69 R. Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 
p.42.
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criticised. Then in addition to that the historical
transformab.il ity of the reality of the world is disclosed,
one’s critical consciousness is awakened, in this sense,
Moltmann says: ’’Hence it [God’s promise] does not give rise
to powers of accommodation, but set loose powers that are 
7 0critical of being, "r
However, this does not necessarily mean that Moltmann 
merely thinks that "there is one transcendental hope
(because not related to any specific situation) that makes 
man aware of the pain of his present". 1 The resurrection, 
on the one hand, points to the not-yet realised different
future, and on the other hand, presupposes the cross in 
which God ident i Ties wi t.h the pr e sen t siJ f f er 1 ng rea 1 i t y , 
When one is confronted by the Christ event, he or she is
not merely confronted by the resurrection but also by the
cross. That is, one can be aware of the suffering of his or
her present,
This is because the Christ event is not merely God’s
promise but also the way God gives his promise. It is God’s 
dialectical way of giving promise to the world that reveals
God himself, In this context, one comes to know the reality
of the world and the reality of God in the Christ event 
simultaneously. Apparently, God through his self-negation 
and negation of negation in the Christ event gives his
?0 77/, p . 11 9 .
71 Alves, .4 Theology of Human Hope, p.59.
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eschatological promise to the world, Tn this way, for the
sake of the world, God shares the destiny of the world in
the cross so that a different future for the world is open
in the resurrection. Then, one cannot know the world apart
from knowing God in the Christ event. Through knowing God’s
self-negation and negation of negation one comes to know
the reality o f th e world.
Then what does this have to do with the awakening of
one’s critical consciousness? Simply, God’s destiny in the
Christ event does not merely make one know the reality of
the world but makes one conscious its severity.
In the cross, God the Son is crucified. Jesus Christ in
his suffering and death identifies himself with the world.
On the one hand, this discloses that the present reality of
the world is subject to the power of godlessness and
godforsakenness. On the other hand, it discloses that even
God the Son is annihilated by Nothingness.
In the resurrection, God the Son is raised from death.
The crucified Jesus is sublated in the risen Christ, On the
one hand, this discloses that a totally different but not
yet realised reality for the world is open. On the other
hand, it discloses that God is a God who does not
a c comm o da t e to t h e p resent realit y but negates t h e
a n n i h i. 1 a t. i n g p o w e r o f N o t h i n g n e s s ,
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In this context, one can understand M.D. Meeks’ saving 
of the critical awakening function of God’s act in the 
cross; "The primal protest-character of man . , , .is awakened 
by God who suffers in the cross''.^ The cross makes one 
a ware of t he se r i ousness o f t h e pre s e n t abandoned situ a tion
that even God the Son is forsaken on the cross and thus
provokes one to protest against it. Both the cross and the
resurrection, in different way, awake one’s critical
consciousness toward the present reality. in the
resurrection God’s act of raising Jesus Christ from death
does not merely give a promise to the world so that one can
criticise the present, but also strengthens and reinforces 
one’s protest consciousness provoked by the cross.
The resurrection arouses human being’s negating 
consciousness by revealing that God negates the present
reality through raising Jesus Christ from death. The cross 
awakens one’s protest consciousness by revealing that God
protests against the present reality through Jesus Christ’
utter involvement in suffering. In other words, it is the
critical character of the Christ event that makes one’s
c r i t j. c a .1 consciousness a wak ened . A p pa r e n 11 y , th i s c r i t i c a i
character is out of the dialectical nature of the Christ
event. The resurrection is God’s negation of the suffering 
reality whereas the cross is God’s protest against the same 
reality because it is God’s seJf-negation. Then in a sense
M.D. Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope 
(Philadelphia; Fortress, 1974), p.153.
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it is the dialectical Christ event that arouses one’s
critical consciousness towards the present reality of the
world,
To sum it up, one’s critical consciousness is aroused 
by both the promising content and the way of promising for
the world in the eschatological-dialectical Christ event,
With the realization of the trans f ormabi 1 i ty of the
reality of the world and the awakening of the critical
consciousness, one then comes to change the world in the
direction of its promised transformation by realising the
objective possibilities in the present which is open by the 
ultimate future, In the following the character of
historical transformation will be discussed firstly before-
analysing the critique of idolatry and reality in the
Christ event.
7.3 The Character of Historical Transformation
Basically, Moltmann does not discuss the historical
transformation of the world much. However, there are
several characteristics worth noting and clarifying when it
is compared with the eschatological transformation and
historical evolution.
7.3.1 Non-U!timate but Relatively Corresponding
3 04
As discussed above, there is a causal connexion between
eschatological transformation and historical
transformation. However, the causal connexion cannot be
reversed, Alt hough eschatological t rans forma ti on
o n t o J o g i c a i .1 y o p e n s the p o s s i b i 1 i t y for h i s t o r i c a I
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n the latter does not create the
eschatological future. They are two different kinds of
t rans f or m a t io n H i s t o r i c a I t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s no t
e sc h a to1ogical tr an s f o rma 11o n.
When compared with the radical, total, whole
eschatological transformation in the sense that suffering
and death and transitoriness are completely overcome, 
historical transformation is non-ultimate. That is, through
historical transformation the world will not automatically
arrive at the ultimate future. This is because the world
"has no immanent possibility of transcending its own
tendency towards nothingness"," The novum in the eschaton
is placed in God5s hand^ but not in humanity’s hand. It is
only God who can create a qualitatively new future for the 
75world out of nothingness, 1
IJ Bauckham, Moltmann:
Making, p. 42 .
U HP, p.183.
n Bauckham, Mo 11mann:
Maki ng, p.42.
Messian ic Theology i n the
Messian ic Theol ogy i n the
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Although the kingdom of God is not "seen in a historic
transformation of the godless state of man and the 
world’’/0 its relative correspondence can be seen in 
history. That is, historical transformation in a sense is
humanity’s endeavour of seeking "in the inadequate
materials of transitory history that which bears
correspondence to God’s future", ' The non-ultimate
character of historical transformation merely means that
historical transformation is not absolutely identical with
eschatological transformation. It does not exclude that the
former relatively corresponds to the latter. For Moltmann,
"in the expectation of divine transformation we transform
ourselves and the conditions around us into the likeness of 
the new creation",^
This character of relative correspondence is expressed
in two points; first, the nature of the future which the
transformation aims at; second, the way of the 
transformation. Although every concrete historical future 
does not radically overcome the power of Nothingness, if
does negate its manifestation in a concrete historical
present in the socio-political reality and its relationship
to the natural reality. Although such a transformation does
not operate dialectically once for ail, it really is a
dialectical process in which every particular forsaken
76 TH, p.221.
77 RRF, p.122.
7$ Ibid. , p ,139,
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present is to be negated by another new historical future.
This two points are going to be further explicated in the
follow i n g i mme d i a t e1y.
7.3.2 Non-Evolutionary but Dialectical 1y Transformative
In "Hope and Development", Moltmann explicitly 
expresses his view-point towards the development of the
world:
... it is not permissible for faith to develop 
society’s future in an evolutionary way. It must 
develop it dialectically and in representation for 
those who have become, and are going to become, the 
victims of previous and present evolution.
Obviously, Moltmann does not agree with the evolutionary
way but proposes that the world has to be developed
dialectically. It seems to Moltmann that these two ways of
development are mutually exclusive. However, what Moltmann
opposes is that the world can be exclusively developed in
an evolutionary way. This does not mean that to a certain
extent such a way is not valid and legitimate. Then why
does Moltmann oppose taking evolution as the exclusive way
of world change? And to what extent is such a way
acceptable?
T h e r e 1 a t i v e I y c o r r e s p o n d i. n g h i s t o r 1 c a .1 f u t u r e c a n n o t
be reached by evolution if the concrete historical present
already totally contradicts the ultimate future. For
79 FC, p.57.
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Moltinann5 it can be brought forth only by critical negation
of the present. Here two different kinds of historical
future emerge. The first one is called fuburum derived from
the present. The second one is not derived from the present
but is the negation of it. However, these two are possible
becau se o f adven bus or Zukun f t,
"Adventus has its equivalent in the Greek word 
parousia" ' which theologically means "the unique and then 
final coming of God and a world which is in total
correspondence to him - their coming to the godless and
0 IGodforsaken". In other words, this adventus is the
ultimate future not emerging from the present but from God
himself. It can "bring something which is principally new
and radically transforming, which is neither in its reality 
0>)nor in its potentially already in existence". b Therefore,
future as adventus means that the reality of the world is
not fixed and prescribed but open with possibility.
W i t h t h i s u nd e r s t a nd i n g Mol t m a n n c a n t a I. k o f f h e
historical future in the senses of evolution and revolution
as stated above, Because of the openness, the concrete
present can be either developed out of its potential into
an extrapolated future or dialectically transformed into a
different new future. Although these two futures are still
80 FC, p.29; cf. p.55.
Ibid.
82 FH, p,15.
3 08
under the power of Nothingness so as to be non-u 1timate,
they are different from each other in nature, As Moltmann
says, the future "in the sense of Futur is the temporal 
prolongation of being", ' "an extrapolated and extended 
present".‘ On the contrary, the historical transformed 
future is not of such a kind. Through the anticipation of
the ultimate future, this historical future is created by
negating the present which does not correspond to the
e s chat oIo g i c a J future. In sum, as a non-- f i xed .real it v , the
world is open to change in £a. e v o 1 u t i o n a r y way or i n a
r e vo 1 u t i o n a r y way. That is, one can develop the wo r I d
e vo1u t i onar i1y or revo 1 ut i on£3.r ily.
B u t u n d e r wh a. t c o n d i t i o n is e v o .1 u t i o n a r y d e v e 1 o pm e n t
allowed? For Moltmann, the answer is obvious: fuburuin
corresponds to adventus. Apparently, this is possible only
when futurm is extrapolated from a historical present 
which relatively corresponds to the eschatological future,
A corresponding concrete present is to be presupposed. To
this extent, planning taking place by extrapolation for
development is allowed and necessary.
On the other hand, Moltmann considers that "in actual
practice we have constantly bo link the two [extrapolation 
and anticipation] together This implies that one
83 FC, p.30.
Ibid . , p .43.
8,) Ibid,, pp . 5 5 - 5 6 »
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cannot totally negate the present while there is still the
possibility for developing' a better future out of it. For
Moltmann, one has to "realistically recognise and accept 
the real and objective possibilities that bear some
correspondence with the future set before him". In this
way, planning is needed as well but under the direction of
hope so as to seek the real possibilities of the present
which correspond to the desirable future projected by 
87hope.' Then evolution is still allowed while the present
is not totally corrupt, that is, there are new realms of
possibilities in the present reality for further
realisation. However, it must be guided by hope. Otherwise
any evolution will benefit only those who possess and
dominate the present and neglect those who have been left 
be hi nd , 88
In this context, Moltmann stresses the feed-back
relationship between hope and planning: "The impulse of 
hope must be controlled in the effect of planning and, 
conversely, the effects of planning must be controlled in
the intentions of hope. "89 In D.L. Migliore’s words:
"Without hope, planning loses its origina1 impetus and i f.s
gu1din g v isi o n, W i thout planning , hope becomes
86 FRF, p.122,
87 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology / n 1: h e
Making, p.44.
00 Cf. FC, pp.43, 57. 
89 HP, p.193,
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unrealistic."' On the one hand, planning is a way through
which historical transition from the possible to the real 
91is consciously made and completed. On the other hand,
hope demands planning which realises the possibilities
inherent in the present real1ty not merely for the
establis h in e n t
92neglected.
but also for the oppressed and t h e
In this way, dialectic is introduced .into the
development of the world that the over domination of the
establishment is to be negated by creating a different
future for the have-nots, the suffering and the guilty
through the realisation of the not. yet exhausted
possibility in the present. Therefore, even though the
future is developed out of the present, it contradicts the
present. It is hope that makes the present possibility
realised corresponding to the ultimate future so as to
contradict the present reality. In this sense, the world is
t rans fo r med dialect ic a11y.
However, when the concrete present is totally corrupted
and the possibility for change from within does not exist,
i t seeins to Moltmann that revo 1 ution is unavo idabIe . I-Ie
writes: "... revolutions begin ... because the conditions
90’ D.L, Migliore, "Biblical Eschatology and Political 
Hermeneutics", Theology Today 26/2 (1969-1970), p.128. Cf. 
Bauckham, Moltmann; Messianic Theology in the Making, p,44.
91 HP, p.194,
92 Cf, PC, pp.56-57; HPM, 56-57.
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and institutions of the present are no longer capable of 
coping with the problems of the future".^ Obviously, this 
means that revolutionary change takes place when the
possibility of change within the concrete present is
exhausted. Revolutionary change is not unconditional but
under the condition stated above. Therefore, a new
d i f f e r e n t his t o r i cal f u t u r e f u 1.1 o f p o s s i b i 1 i. t y f o r f u r * t h e r
development is created. However, since it. is still under
the power of Nothingness, a further corruption seems to be
unavoidable, As Moltmann writes of this,
it is impossible to anticipate the end of history 
under the conditions of history, that it is impossible 
under the conditions of estrangement and as one who 
himself is estranged to anticipate the home of true 
humanity, that it is impossible as a sinner to 
overcome sin. Thus out of this battle always new
history emerges, new estr sin”?4 angernent of man and new
Ne ver t h e1ess, w i t h in i t s h i story , the world is
transformed dialectically. This can be understood in two
senses. Firstly, the possibility within the concrete
present is sought and realised under the direction of the
hope for the ultimate future so as to negate the injustice 
of the present. The present is transformed by realising its 
internal possibility of change. Secondly, the possibility 
within the concrete present for realising a different
future is exhausted so that, a radical transformation is
needed. The present is transformed by negating it. Either
FH, pp, 48-4 9.
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sense of transformation is historical not ultimate so that.
it has to be continuously transcended.
7.4 The Critique of Ideology and Reality
Praxis presupposes critique. The revelatory character
of the eschatological-dialectical Christ event does not
formally awaken humanity’s critical consciousness, but with 
content. The critique offers direction as well as grounding
for p o1i tica1 praxis.
7.4.1 The Realm of Critique
Critique is a preceding moment of praxis, but they
share the same realm. What is going' to be criticized is the
same as what is going to be transformed through praxis.
M.D. Meeks points out that "in taking up the ancient
concept of theolog'ia politica, Moltmann means ‘politics’ in
the most comprehensive sense'. Although Moltmann
"apprehends politics, in the Aristotelian sense of the 
Q fword, as the inclusive horizon of the life of mankind", ' 
he does not limit the realm of politics to socio-political 
reality. Rather, he writes that the "field of politics 
designates the extensive field of constructive and
95 Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, p.131.
38 RR.F, p.98.
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destructive possibilities of the appropriation and
utilisation of nature’s power as well as of human 
9?relationships by human society”.'
Politics is an activity of human being, but it does not
merely affect the socio-political reality. The natural
reality .is involved as well. Apparently, against the
background of the eschaton the whole creation, including
the socio-political and natural reality, is going to be
transformed ultimately. Correspondingly, the historical
transformati on of the worId involves bo th the soc i o-
political reality and the natural reality. "Not only man’s 
destiny but also nature’s destiny seems to be more and more 
found in the realm of politics.
Therefore, the object of the critique is not limited to
the socio-political reality itself but also its
relationship to the natural reality. The point most worth
noting is that human being plays a very crucial role within
the historical transformation because he or she is the
active agent who does not merely construct the socio­
political reality b u t a 1 s o t r a. n s f o r ra s t h e n a t u r a 1 r e a 1 i t y .
7.4.2 The Critique of Christian Theology
97 Ibid. , p.218.
Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope., p.331.
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In his "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, Introduction" Marx claims that "the 
criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all 
criticism".") Formally similar to Marx^ Moltmann proceeds 
the same way in criticising religion, Marx’s critique of 
religion has two senses relating to his two different
conceptions of religion.
Firstly, religion is the expression of real misery and
protest against real affliction, Secondly, religion is
taken as mere fantasy, the opium of the people.'^ Marx’s
criticism of the latter is negative because such a religion
offers an "otherworldly eschatology which provided a merely
illusory compensation for human misery and thereby helped 
102to perpetuate the conditions which caused it". However,
Marx positively criticises the former as the transfigured 
reflection of and protest against the real misery?)' 
Therefore, "Marx’s project was to inherit the religious
Marx, Early Writings, p.243,
EH, p.43. Cf. Migliore, "Biblical Eschatology and 
Political Hermeneutics", p.123; Bauckham, Moltmann: 
Messianic Theology in the Making, p p . 4 8 - 4 9 .
RRF, p.94; Migliore, "Biblical Eschatology and 
Political Hermeneutics", p,124.
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Making, p.48.
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protest against human misery in the form of political
action to change society. ,,104
Parallel to Marx, Moltmann, on the one hand, criticises
those theologies that perpetuate the status quo, or only
explain and express misery but do not provoke
"revolutionary realisation of freedom within present, 
situation";^'* on the other hand, "finds in messianic 
Christian faith a protest against real misery and
simultaneously . . . the categorical imperative for
revolutionary realisation of religious concepts in
political and economic 1 iberation" In Moltmann’s view,
"when we understand the cross of Christ
‘expression’ of real human affliction,
resurrection of Christ acquires the significance of the 
true ‘protest5 against human affliction."^ In a word, 
Mo 1 tmann i s no t c on t en t w i t h an y t h e o 1 og y wh i c h u 11 imat e 1 y
maintains the existing situation but advocates the
eschato1o g i ca1 Ch r i s t i an f a i t h whi ch a r ou se s revolu t i ona ry
transformation of the present reality.
as an
then the
Bauckham, Moltmann; Messianic Theology in the
Maki ng, p.4 4. C f. Migliore, "B iblical Eschatology and
Political Hermeneutics", p,I24 ; FH, p.41.
105 RRF, p.95.
.Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the
Making, p.44, Cf. RRF, p.95.
I0? RRF, p.96.
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It is in this context that Moltmann explicitly 
criticises existential theology for the flight from
affliction into the transcendental subjectivity of human 
being, ’ However, Moltmann does not merely criticise a 
certain type of theology. Rather, his spearhead is pointing 
to all theology that results in maintaining the status quo.
For Moltmann, the emergence of such a consequence is
not accidental. It is the necessary outcome when Christian
theology is treated as pure theory of God. Essentially, 
pure theory does not claim that God can be seen in the 
realm of the transitory J" Its Platonic analogical 
principle of knowledge, like is known by like, manifests 
itself in different schemes of knowledge of God; known by­
likeness in creation, history, human existence, or in his
own Word Jesus Christ The former two do not take the
misery of the world seriously while the latter two notice
the suffering world but escape from it into the 
transcendental realm. In other words, God’s analogical way 
of self-revelation, in different versions, affirms the
status quo either positively or negatively. They share the
s a m e a 1111 u d e t h a t t h e y d o not p r o v o k e p ra .v i s t o t r a n s f o r m
the present world. Or to put it in another way, God does
not reveal himself in a way that provokes praxis for
re vo .1 u t i onary t ra n s f o rma t i o n,
108 277, pp.3.11-316; REF, pp.94-96 ; A/, pp.39-41.
109 Cf, CG, p.68.
110 CG, p.26.
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However, Moltmann finds in the eschatological-
dialectical Christ event that Christian theolog'y is not a 
pure theory of God but a critical, theory of GodJ^ This is 
because "in the crucified Christ? abandoned by God and 
cursed, faith can find no equivalents of this kind which
provide it with an indirect, analogical knowledge of God,
but encounters the very contrary". God’s self-revelation 
in the cross is a protesting way of exposing the
unspeakable suffering of society and nature. All kinds of
analogical knowledge of God must be criticised for their
affirmation of the present reality in different ways.
Because God reveals himself in the opposite, the
present reality is not the likeness of God. Because God
dialectically reveals himself, this world is not to be 
abandoned and replaced by another one. On the contrary, 
God’s action on the negative in the resurrection does not 
merely further disclose his protest against the suffering
reality, but shows that the present reality has to be
transformed. In other words, the dialectical Christ event.
is precisely to reveal that God will. dialectically
transform this world as he sublates the crucified Jesus in
the resurrection. In this way, Christian theology j. s not
one that neglects the suffering present or escapes from i t
but one that critically discloses it so as to arouse
hi.stori cal transformat 1 on ,
111 Ibid,, p.69.
112 Ibid. , p.68.
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Here one thing has to be noted. Christian theology 
becomes pure theory of God because it takes the analogical 
principle of knowledge as the way of God’s self-revelation.
In other words, what is ultimately to be criticised is such
a principle. However, this does not mean that it should be
abandoned. Rather, for Moltmann, analogy "will be possible
ultimately in the eschaton, when God will be all in all,
and when the world will correspond to God’s purposes for 
1 1
his creation". “ However, it is the dialectical principle 
that makes the analogical principle possible/44 Dialectic 
is "the basis and starting point of analogy" In other 
words, Moltmann criticises that it is inappropriate to
apply the analogical principle when the present reality is
not analogical to God. Otherwise, the theological
consequence will be either sanctioning the status quo in
nature and society, as in the cosmo-theology and the
historico-theology, or leaving the suffering world for a
transcendental realm, as in the existential theology and
the on to-theology.
For Moltmann, the cross event does not merely criticise
Christian theology as analysed above, as a critical theory
it "destroys illusions and exposes the falsity of existing
113 ■J.J. O’Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The
Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology 
and the Theology of Hope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983), p.116.
114 CG, p.27.
115 Ibid., p.28.
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society and its values" This is a further critical
function of Christian theology when it starts itself with
t h e C h i* i s t event,
7.4.3. The Critique of Idolatry and the Correlative Reality
For the Marxists the misery of human being is
represented in his political and economic slavery.
Therefore, their critique is directed at the political
domination of human over human and the economic
exploitation of human by human,* ' What they are concerned
with is simply human being’s not-yet-realised 
118possibilities, When such possibilities are fully
realised, the misery of human being will be overcome. They
do not further ask the negative element which hinders or
obstructs the realisation of the possibilities of reality.
However, Moltmann does not merely share the critique of
the real misery of humankind in the political and economic
sphere with the Marxists. He goes further to point out that
besides suffering from the economic exploitation of man by
man and the political oppression of man by man "people are
suffering from the cultural alienation of man from man
through r a c i s m a n d sex u a 1 d i s c r i m i n. a t i o n ... the empt i ness
116 Bauc k h am, Mo11mann: Messi anic Theo Jogy i n i-he
Maki ng, p . 6 6 .
117 RRF, p.78.
113 1 bid.
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of their personal life, which disappears so meaningless!y 
among the structures of a technocra.t ic and bureaucrati c 
society"?1'' These different forms of suffering in the 
present reality all have their root in sin and death.
For Moltmann human misery has its profounder sense: "He 
is enslaved under the domination of sin, that is, the
failure of life because of selfishness and fear. He is
handed over to death, transitoriness, and nothingness."4 ' 
Be s i d e s pollti ca1 do m i na t ion and e c on oro i c exploit a ti o n , 
cultural alienation and meaninglessness of life, Christian
makes such domination
mean i ng1e ssness happen.
sees slavery to sin and death as the deeper human misery.
This slavery to sin and death is not just another kind of
human misery. Rather, it is precisely this misery that
exploitation, alienation and
It is 1 his dee p 1 y i n g r a i n e d
primal fear of death and nothingness which makes people so 
aggressive and inhuman towards other in social, political, 
economic spheres.119 120 21 12
In this sense, Moltmann writes: "Death is the evil 
power already existing in life’s midst, not just at its 
end." “ lie goes on: "Here is the economic death of the
starving, there the political death of the oppressed. Here
119 FC, p.97. Cf. CG, pp.329-332.
120 RR.F, p.142.
121 FC, p.96.
122 EG, p.32.
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is the social death of the handicapped; there the noisy
death through bombs; and here again the silent death of 
petrified soul," ' All these different forms of death in 
the midst of life manifest themselves through different
forms of idolatry which arises out of the anxiety of death,
Under the threat of death and nothingness, human beings
practise different forms of idolatry in order to secure
themselves. That is, idolatry is humanity’s mediated
activity through which one tries to escape from the threat
of death and nothingness. However, every form of idolatry
in turn constructs a, correlative reality in which the human
being suffers from different forms of misery. Furthermore, 
for Moltmann, not only do human beings cry out from being
exploited, oppressed, alienated and fragmented, but nature
cries out from being turned into material for human beings’ 
exploiting domination.' ’ In other words, human beings 
construct a reality which does not merely enslave
themselves but also dominates and distorts the natural
reality.
In the context of the fact that "Marx identified his
critique of religion as the 'beginning of every critique’", 
Moltmann understands thaL his "analysis of religion is an
Ibid,
Ibid,, p , 9 8 .
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analysis of idolatry. He goes on to point out that
Marx’s later critique of capitalism follows the same 
p r i n c i p 1 e , 29 1 d o I a t r y e m e r g e s i n t h e r e .1 i g i o u s s p h e r e a s
well as in the political and economic sphere. However,
Moltmann does not Just confine himself to the analysis of
different forms of idolatry in depth. Rather, he goes
further to analyse and criticise the deep structure of
idolatry itself.
As observed by G. Hunsinger, for Moltmann, ’’anxiety 
(Angst) ... is the root cause of idolatry, including such 
modern forms as racism, anti-Communism, and the arrogance 
of power". This is not an ordinary anxiety but one that 
springs from the deeply ingrained primal fear of death and
nothingness. This is why human beings need the idols which
are projected as omnipotent and eternal, incapable of
suffering and dying so as to help impotent and mortal 
man. Moltmann stresses: "The religion of anxiety runs
straight through all the public religions that we know, It
also runs straight through the ideologies and institutions
that we have. It is a widespread phenomenon." In other
CCR, p.38.
126 Ibid. Cf, EH, p.113.
127 * —G. Hunsinger, "The Crucified God and the Political 
Theology of Violence: A Critical Survey of JUngel
Moltmann’s Recent Thought: II", Heythrop Journal 24/J 
(1973), pp.384-386. Cf, CCR, p.37; EH, pp,112-113; CG, 
p.302.
128 Cf. CG, p.303,
129 CG, p.302.
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words, all spheres of human activity, either political or
economic, cultural or ecological, are permeated by such an
anxiety. Therefore different idolatries emerge in different
spheres.
Moltmann, on the one hand, inherits Luther’s analysis
of idolatry, on the other hand, goes beyond Luther by
introducing a psychological analysis of idolatry. Luther
follows Paul’s analysis of justification by works. Paul
does not merely take up the Second Commandment of the Old
Testament prohibition of images, but transforms it in the 
criticism of "works righteousness".'^ That is, the human 
being "not only makes images of gods and so serves the 
creature instead of the creator, but also divinizes
everything that he does in order to appear to live
righteously, compelled to do this by his desire for self­
justification". d "Therefore, argues Paul, justification 
by works is idolatry." ' Luther goes on to expose that 
idolatry is "not only in the worship of idol but 
preeminently in the heart that seeks help and comfort from
creatures, saints and devil but ‘receives not God 
himself’". " Then idolatry is a way of gaining self­
confirmation and self-security so as to release one from
138 EH, p ,112; CCR, p.36
131 CCR, p , 3 6 ; c f. EH, p
132 ibid .
133 I b i d . , p , 3 7 .
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his or her unfathomable anxiety, though it cannot really
make one free from his or her insecurity.
Nevertheless, idolatry has its deeper psychological 
reason and serious effect on the constructing of one’s
reality. It is in this context that Moltmann goes further
to analyse idolatry from a psychological point of view. In
the practise of idolatry, in whatever form, human beings
identify the symbols, idols, and values which they create 
with themselves so as to confirm their existence.1'5'1 
Actually, an idol is the projection of one’s anxiety self. 
Then, one’s identification with the idol is merely an 
i den t i f i c at i on w i t h one’s idolised s e 1 f . Fu r t he rmo re , 
according to Moltmann, "this inner compulsion to idolise 
the self is a cramping self-justification that invariably 
leads to the oppression of those who are ‘otherJ'3 those 
who are different from oneself. Thus, two consequences of
human relationship happen.
On the one hand, as Moltmann points out: "He loves only 
what is like and only acknowledges people who believe,
think, love and do the things that he does," This is
because "people like himself support him, and he needs this 
] 3 7support to suppress his anxiety". '
131 ibid. , p.37; EH, p.112 .
135 Ibid. , p . 3 7 .
136 CG, p .302; c f, EH, p.112
137 I b i d .
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On the other hand, "he remains unfree to affirm , . . the 
very different life of another".'” This is because "people 
who differ from him disturb him ... question his idols and
laws and thus his world”, "put him in question and make
him uncertain",jn a word, "those who live very 
1t 1differently threaten his idolised self", ’
Here Aristotle’s principle of society "like seeks after 
like" dominates one’s relationship to the other. Idolatry 
does not merely mean the human’s worship of idol, but the 
human’s seeking after .like and oppressing of unlike. "So he 
loves only those who are like him, and hates other mari."^ 
This is why all forms of idolatry, either political
domination or economic exploitation, cultural alienation or
ecological crisis, are only different forms of oppression 
in different spheres. Through the psychological analysis of
1 d o 1 a t r y , M o 11 m a nn exposes t he u nde r 1 y i n g p r i n c i. p 1. e t h a t
governs the present reality in which some people are
oppressed by other people who are enslaved by those idols
they have made. In this way, society is constructed as an
a J. i e n a t e d r e a 1 i t y,
138 CCR, p.37; cf, CG, p.3 0 2.
139 CG, p.302.
140 £77, p . 11 2 .
141 Bauckham, Mo Jtmann: Mo asJanic
Making, p.73.
Theology in
CG, p . 3 0 2 .
(; h e
142
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Furthermore, when people relate themselves to nature
according to the same principle, the result is that they
conquer nature instead of co-operating with nature. Tn
other words, people change nature as object according to
their own will but do not consider it as the human’s
environment with respect.They adopt a master-servant
model to relate themselves to 144nature. This model ailows
people to impose t h e i r p o w e r o v e r n a t u r e s o a s to change i t
in accord w i t h i.heir .interest alone. In this process "the
sciences, together with technologies, have grown up out. of
particular human concerns" ' which never take nature’s own
interest into account seriously. Consequently, nature is
destroyed in favour of human’s own advantage either in the
capitalist societies or in the socialist industrial states. 
However, since nature is the environment of human being,* 1'"' 
its destruction brought by human being in turn has "a
destructive retroactive effect on the societies themselves, 
evoking a loss of values and crises of meaning’ J'r
Therefore, the critique of idolatry has a profound
implication of criticising the social principle which
constructs the present reality. Jn Moltmann’s view, the
crucified one as the image of the invisible God forsakes
143
144
145
146
14?
Cf. CG, p.334.
I b 1 d .
GC, p.23.
CG, p.334.
GC, p.24. Cf. CG, p.334.
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and destroys all earthly images and representations of the
divine in all spheres, The cross even directly negates the
analogical principle of society, Of this, Moltmann writes:
... for the crucified Christ, the principle of 
fellowship is fellowship with those who are different, 
and solidarity with those who have become alien and 
have been made different. Its power is not friendship, 
the love for what is similar and beautiful (phi/ia), 
but creative love for what is different, alien and 
ugly (ag’ape). !
On the one hand, God’s self-negation in the cross makes a 
person "ready to accept his humanity, his freedom and his 
mortality'*. On the other hand, God’s negation of
negation in the resurrection releases people from their 
a n x i e t y o f d e a t h a n d n o t h i n g n e s s . T h e y c a n "1 e a r n t o a c c e p t
i p n
themselves and to accept the ‘other’".1 They can open 
themselves to suffering and to l.oveJJl
Moreover, "Jesus died the death oT all the living . . ,
Through his death struggle he par ti c ipated in the f a te of
everythi ng that lives - n o t merely the fate o f human
beings; f o r all living thi rigs desire to live and have to
die".1*2 In the cross J e s u s even dies for t h e natural
world. This means that God’s relationship to nature is not
H9
150
Making,
151
152
CG, p.28.
Ibid., p.3 0 3.
Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
p . 7 3 .
CG, p.303.
WJC, p.168.
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that between lord, and slave. Nature is not the tool and
property of God but the object he loves. The resurrection
of Christ as the resurrection of nature points to the
cosmic horizon of expectation that nature is not subjected 
to human being but "a brotherly and sisterly relationship 
to fellow-creatures will spring up” J'1’ Then the natural 
world is not. an object to conquer and dominate and exploit 
but to fellowship with in mutual perichoresis. In this way, 
the model of master-servant which allows human beings to 
impose their will on the natural world without any respect 
f or 1t s o therness , a 1 ong w1 th the correspond 1 ng rea 1. i t. y, 
are both criticised and negated.
In a word,
g r e a t p r o t. e s t
man i. f o 1 d f o r m s
already in the
for Moltmann, the resurrection is "God’s 
H154against death’ ' and "against ail the
of evil and suffering which death takes
midst of 1 i f e ” .1
To sum it up, Moltmann criticises the concrete present 
reality through his critique of idolatry. However, he does
not merely expose the idolatrous character in different, 
spheres of human activity, but further goes on to analyse
the deep structure of idolatry itself and its way of
constructing correlative reality. Although there are
Ibid.,, pp.270-273, Cf. GC, p.J86.
154 EG, p.31.
155 it' Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope Revisited",
p.205 .
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different modern forms of idolatry, their emergence is no
accident and is rooted in people’s deeper anxiety and fear
of death and nothingness. It follows that the analogical
principle of society and the master-slave model become
their underlying ideology of treating the others, human
beings and nature respectively, That is, the present,
reality is constructed according to such a principle and
model so that some people are oppressed by other people and
the natural world is oppressed by human beings, However,
the cross and the resurrection renounce such ideology as
falsity and disclose that the oppressing relationship of 
human beings to human beings, human beings to nature has to
be replaced by another kind of relationship, fellowship 
with one another. The Christ event criticises the present
reality and reveals the ideal reality simultaneously, This
in turn provides a direction for the human’s praxis for the
historical trans formation of this world.
7,5 Conclusion
Moltmann writes: ‘’Christian eschatology is not, only
receptive but also productive, not only passive but also
militant hope for the future. On the one hand, the
u11 imate fu t u re i s n o t built w i t h hu ma n h and s b u t c ome s 
3 57towards this world from God. ' On the other hand, one can
156 FW, p.46.
157 Tbid. , p,4 9,
change the historical present into a different historical
future because the ultimate future already promised in the
Christ event contains initiative for the transformation of
the world. This has three senses.
Ontologically, the reality of the world becomes
historically transformable when an ultimate future is
promised to the world by God. Its culmination in the
dialectical Christ event expresses that this world is not
abandoned but sublated. This has two senses. Firstly, this
world is not unchangeable. Secondly, it is not to be
replaced by another world. It is this eschatological-
dialectical transformability that makes this world
historically changeable. A different historical future
which relatively corresponds to the not-yet reached
ultimate future, then, is possible for this world. In this 
way, human praxis can take place in front of "the universal
eschatological horizon which the resurrection of Jesus
projects" .
At the same time, the eschatological-dialectical Christ
event awakes the human being’s protest and critical
consciousness through its revelation of the reality of this
world, the present and the ultimate future. On the one
hand, the difference between these two makes one aware that
the present reality can be and should be transformed. On
158’ Bauckham, "Moltmann’s Theology of Hope Revisited”, 
pp.204-20 5 .
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the other hand, the way of God’s revelation of the reality
of this world, that is, the cross and the resurrection,
provokes human beings’ protest against the present reality
so as to transform this world.
Furthermore, the Christ event simultaneously discloses
and falsifies the deep structure of the present reality and
offers a direction for the transformation in the history of
the world. In other words, the Christ event criticises the
present reality not formally but with content, God’s act in
the Christ event destroys all forms of idolatry in the
modern society and criticises the correlative realities.
Actually, idolatry itself as the projection of people’s
anxiety of death and nothingness has a very profound effect
on human being's relationship to human beings and their 
natural environment. It makes people adopting analogical
principle and master-slave model while constructing the
present reality in different spheres to cause different
modes of death, either political or economic, cultural or
ecological. However, in the cross God’s self-revelation in
the opposite is at the same time his fellowship and
communion with this forsaken world. He does not follow the
analogical principle to reveal himself and to communicate
with other. God’s act in the Christ event presents another
kind of relationships which will constructs a different
reality. It criticises both the Christian theology and the
.ideology which allows the analogical principle is taken as
the principle of constructing reality. Consequently, it
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follows that the historical transformation of this world is
a process of abolishing the relationships which are
dominated by the analogical principle and establishing new 
re1ati onsh i ps according to the d i a1ectica1 princ ip1e as 
shown in the Christ event, a process of abolishing 
different modes of death and establishing a different
reality of life.
In this way, the history of this world is initiated in
the direction of corresponding to the ultimate future.
33 3
8 Conclusion: God Has a History
8.1 An Analytical Summary
8.1.1 Approach to God’s History
8.1 . 1 . .1 Starting Point: God’s Concrete Act
God has a history. However, in Moltmann’s theology, 
God’s history is not unde.rsi.ood in terms of itself. That
is, Moltmann does not talk of God’s history as such, or
God’s history in general. If one talks of God’s history in
this way, then one will confine his or her discussion to
the ontological level, that is, to God’s being alone. It
follows that such a kind of discussion of God’s history is
merely about his ontological movement in eternity.
On the contrary, Moltmann considers that God’s being
must be understood In terms of his concrete activity in the
history. He does not start from the being of God but rather
from the act of God. He does not start from God’s act as
such but from God’s concrete historical act of self­
revelation, This has two senses. Firstly, one can talk of
God only when God reveals himself by himself. Secondly, one
can talk of God’s history only when God reveals himself in
the history of the world by himself.
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8.1.1.2 Framework: Revelation as Promise
However, Moltmann does not consider that
himself merely for the sake of seif-disclosure
God reveals the future for the world that
himself. This kind of revelation is manifested
of promise. When God reveals the future of the
promise, he at the same time reveals himself.
God reveal, s
. It. is when
he re vea 1 s
i n the form
world in the
God ’s self-
revelation and his revelation of the future of the world
are two sides of one coin.
The consequence of such a kind of God’s self-revelation
is that God is present in the future reality analogically.
This does not merely mean that God is not present in the
present reality analogically, but also implies that God is 
not known or revealed in any kind of "present" or "eternal" 
analogue, either nature or history, human existence or
God’s logos. In this way, it denies all forms of God’s 
self-revelation in the epiphany. God’s being', then, is not
u n d e r s t o o d a. s e t e r n a 1 p r e sene e .
God’s promise becomes eschatological, when it ultimately
points to the eschaton in which death and nothingness will
be totally overcome and a wholly new reality of this world
will be created. For Moltmann, God gives this promise to
the world not merely in his words but also in the Christ
event. In other words, the Christ event has to be
understood within the framework of God’s self-revelation as
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promise. God’s revelation in the promissory Christ event 
means that God reveals the eschatological future of this
world through his concrete act in history. This at the same
time reveals that God is not merely a God of the future but
also a God of the present. Furthermore, as the promise the
Christ event is dialectically structured as xvell. It is
precisely because of this dialectical structure, that God’s
future and present are not identical, with one another but 
the former negates the latter so that God’s history is
init i ated dialectically.
In this way, God’s revelation as promise is a necessary
framework in understanding that God has a history.
8.1.1.3 Centre: The Christ Event
In Moltmann’s theology the Christ event is the centre 
of understanding God’s history from the very beginning io 
the end. As the culmination of God’s promise to the world,
God’s concrete act in the Christ event is the climax of his
participation in and the beginning of his salvific act for?
the suffering history of this world. Its dialectical.
structure, that is, the dialectic of the cross and the
resurrection, discloses God’s deepest dialectical presence 
in the world. Therefore the Christ event is the unique 
event through which God’s history from the origin to the
goal, can be derived.
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Accordingly, the cross and the resurrection, on the one 
hand, point back to God’s initial involvement with the
world; on the other hand, they point forward to God’s
ultimate liberation of the world. This means that God’s
history does not only happen .in the Christ event but starts 
from his creation and finishes at the eschaton. Basing on 
the dialectic in the Christ event, Mol tmann goes on to 
derive not only God’s dialectical history between the
origin and the goal but also God’s initial and ultimate
dialectical movement in the moments of creation and
recreation respectively.
Moreover, grasping the Christ event as a trinitarian
event, Moltmann further takes God’s history with the world
as a trinitarian one in which the three persons interact
with one another dialectically for the sake of this 
suffering world. God’s history, then, is not merely 
dialectical, but dialectical trinitarian from the very
beginning,
Obviously, the underlying principle of inferring from
the Christ event, to God’s history from the .initial moment 
to the ultimate moment is a principle of correspondence. For
Moltmann, this principle can be applied in understanding of
God’s nature as well; "The missio ad extra reveals the
missio ad intra. The missio ad intra is the foundation of
the missio ad extra,"1
FC, p,84; CPS, p,54.
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8,1.2 From God’s History to God.’s Historicity
8,1,2,1 God’s History as .Dialectical and Other-Related
God’s history is inseparable form the history of this
world, in both a noetic sense and an ontic sense.
Noetically, one cannot understand God’s history apart from 
the history of the world because God’s history in the
revelatory Christ event is a history with this world,
Ontically, from the very beginning' God does not merely
start his history along with world history but interweaves
with it by participating in the history of the world
d i a 1 e c t i c a 11 y .
In a word, God’s history is not self-related but other- 
related. God’s other-related history is simultaneously a 
dialectical one. This is not accidental. Obviously, God’s
acts of creating the world, liberating the world and
transforming the world are dialectical. To put it in
another way, all these dialectical, acts are related to the
world. They are other-related but not se1f-related. God
relates himself to the world in a dialectical way.
However, this does not mean that the world as the other
is God’s self-negation, that is, the otherness of God, For
Moltmann, this world is not understood in a Hegelian sense.
The world as the other is essentially different from God
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himself but not the self-negation of the Absolute Spirit.
Therefore there is not any Hegelian dialectical
relationship between God and the world.
It is precisely because the world is different from God
in nature that God has to move dialectically so as to
relate himself to it. In Moltmann’s term the world is God’s
like in the other but not his other in the like.
F u r t h e r m ore, u n d e r t h e t h r e a. t o 1' d e a t h a n d n o t h i n g n e s s t h e
like in the other becomes the unlike in the other.
Therefore, God cannot relate himself to the unlike in the
other in an analogical way but only in a dialectical way.
God’s dialectical history with the world is his seif- 
limitation and self-de-limitation in his indwelling in and 
identifying himself with the creation, preserving and
transforming the world. God’s dialectical movement in the
history is the act of withdrawing and de-withdrawing his
glory for the sake of the unlike in the other.
In Moltmann’s theology, God’s other-relatedness is 
manifested in God’s dialectical movement. Apart from his
dialectical movement there is no other-re 1 atedness of God,
Conversely, other-relatedness is the essence of God’s
dialectical movement. These two things in God’s history are 
inter-connected. In this sense, God’s history is a
dialectical history with the world.
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8.1.2.2 God’s History as Confronting Nothingness and
Sel f-Di f f erentiating
God’s dialectical history with the world is a history
of confronting Nothingness as well. In the course of
confronting Nothingness, God differentiates himself that
the utmost intimate fellowship within the divine life among 
the three persons turns into separation. Likewise, God’s
self-differentiation and his confrontation of Nothingness
a r e i n s e pa rable,
Because Nothingness as the annihilating power permeates
the world to make it the unlike in the other, God’s
dialectical act in the history is an act of confronting
this annihilating power unavoidably. God’s dialectical acts
of indwelling in and preserving the creation, identifying
with and transforming the world mean not merely that the
triune God interacts with the world but further that the
triune God encounters the annihilating power.
God’s encounter with Nothingness is not immediate bin.
mediate. This has two senses, firstly, God negates himself
by seif-limitation so as to indwell in and identify with
the suffering world, In this way, God enters not merely the 
world but Nothingness. However, God does not directly enter 
Nothingness to negate it. Rather, he enters Nothingness 
through participating in the world. In this way, God’s
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overcoming Nothingness in the preservation of the world and
the resurrection of Christ is a promise to the world.
Secondly, God’s encounter with Nothingness is a 
dialectical trinitarian event. The three divine persons do
not indwell in and identify with the world altogether. This
follows that they do not enter Nothingness altogether. As
seen in the Christ event, it is only the Son who directly
enters into Nothingness. Likewise, in the creation it Is
only the Holy Spirit who indwells in the creation so as to
share its suffering from the threat of annihilation.
However, in the Christ event it is not only the Son who
suffers separation from the Father but also the Father who
suffers separation from the Son as well, Furthermore, in 
this deepest separation and bifurcation the Holy Spirit 
shares their s u f f e r i n g t h r o i .1 g h hold i. n g t h e tn t o g e t h e r. In 
other words, through the Son’s dialectical act the divine 
life within the triune God is affected. Through .Jesus 
Christ the triune God exposes himself to Nothingness. 
Apparently, such a kind of dialectical trinitarian event is
a process of God’s sel. f-d i ff erent i ati on in the sense that 
the th r e e per so ns suf fe r fr om s e p a ra t ion in d i ffere n t w ays.
When the triune God relates himself to the world
dialectically, he inevitably involves himself in the
confrontation with Nothingness. When the triune God
confronts Nothingness, his .intra-divine life is unavoidably
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differentiated. In this way, God’s dialectical history with
the world is a history of confrontation with Nothingness
and s e 1 f - ci i f f e r e n t i a 11 o n w i t h i n t h e di v i n e t r i un e 1 i f e .
8.1.2.3 God’s History: Suffering and Liberating with the
World
The triune God encounters Nothingness which threatens
the existence of the world through participating in the
world dialectically. This explicitly means that the kind of
annihilating power which God and the world face is the
same. However, the most significant point is that God
suffers in the same way with the world. Because God suffers
in the same way with the world, his destiny is interwoven
with that of the world.
Within the annihilating power of Nothingness the world
suffers from godforsakenness whereas the triune God
experiences the pain of separation in his intra­
differentiation. Both of them are in a situation of
b 1 f u r c a t i o n o f r e .1. a t i o n s h i p s . T h e r e f ore G o d ’ s s u f f e r i n g
with the world means that God shares the same
relationlessness of death with the world in his acts in the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit and in the cross of Jesus
Chri st.
However, God’s suffering with the world is not the end 
of his dialectical history but the act preceding his
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negation of negation, The indwel1ing of the Holy Spirit 
precedes the glorification of the Holy Spirit whereas the
cross precedes the resurrection. God’s acts of seif- 
negation or self-limitation is the acts of exposing himself 
to Nothingness so as to overcome it in his subsequent acts 
of negation of negation or se 1 f-de-1 imitation. God’s
suffering with the world is the prelude of his liberation 
with the world, in this wav, the breaking of relationships 
will be reconciled with the abolishment of Nothingness.
Here, one point should be noted, Ail God’s acts of
negation of negation in history are not ultimate but
pointing to the ultimate. God’s acts in the resurrection of 
the Christ and the transfiguration of the Holy Spirit are
me r e1y t h e s t a rt i ng po int of o v e rcom i n g No t h i n g n e s s , T h a I 
is, the annihilating power is not completely abolished in 
the history. The world is still under the threat of being
annihilated, in this way, his liberation of the world from
suffering in the history is merely temporary and a
foretaste of the ultimate deliverance. God has to continue
his struggle against Nothingness with the world in the
history until the ultimate eschaton.
In this sense, God’s dialectical history with the world
is a history open towards the ultimate eschatological
future in which both God and the world are delivered from
the suffering history by radically overcoming the
a n n i h i 1 a t i n g p o w e r of N o t h i n gn e s s . Me a n w h i 1 e , t h e t r i u n e
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God will reach an intimate communion not. merely among the
three divine persons of the triune God but between God and
the world: God is in the world and the world is in God.
8.1.2.4 God’s Historicity:
T h e hist o r y of Go d
conditions of possibility
about the orientation
no t only a bout God ’ s
God ’ s
serve
the character
God’s historicity cannot
be derived from his concrete
character of God’s history
that his historicity can be
i t.
Dialec ticai Love
leads one to ask abou 1 t h e
for such an even t,“ " 11 is t. a I k
in God to history.'"* Then one talks 
history but about.. God ’ s historicity,
historicity as the inner being of God does not merely
as the grounding of God’s history but also determines
of God’s history. However, for Moltmann,
be known by speculation but must
history. In other words, the
has to be clarified firstly so
derived transcendentally from
As mentioned above God’s history is dialectical and
other-related, confronting Nothingness and se1f-
differentiating, suffering and liberating with the worid.
In sum, God’s history is a dialectical history open to the 
other, to suffer with the other and to liberate with the
other in the future. Therefore God must be an other-
J.J. O’Donnell, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in 
Recent German Theology", Heythrop Journal 23/2 (1982),
P . 1 5 9 .
Tbid,
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related, suffering and Liberating God, Tn Moltmann’s
theology such a God can be understood only in terms of
love. God as love is the ontological condition of 
possibility for God’s dialectical history with the world.
When God’s inner being is understood as love, his 
relationship to the world is not a kind of dependence. God
does not need or depend on the world to realise himself.
His love is the overflowing of his goodness in which God is
free to be himself. Since the world as the other is
necessary as the beloved when God overflows his goodness,
the other-reIatedness of God’s love is the essential nature
of God’s historicity. Because God and the world are
essentially different from each other, his other-
relatedness is dialectical. That is, God’s love is
dialectical so that he can relate himself to the world
which is different from him.
In other words, corresponding to the dialectical 
character of God’s history with the world, God’s love is
dialectical also, This dialectical love is structured in
terms of suffering love and creative love. God’s suffering
love means that for the sake of the world God limits
himself In history by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit so
as to preserve the existence of the world, and by the Son’s
identification with the world so as to enter into its
forsaken situation. God’s creative love means that for the
sake of the world God begins to de-limit himself in history
34 5
by raising the crucified Christ from death and transforming
the suffering world through the Holy Spirit, in a word,
God’s dialectical Jove determines that, the triune God goes
out of himself to relate himself with the worid
dialectically. The historicity as the condition for God’s
history then is to be understood as his dialectical love.
8.1.3 The Grounding of Hope and Praxis in the World
When God’s history is a. dialectical history with 1 lie
world, the world has a history. This means that the world
has a historical, future for it to pursue and realise. God’s
history with the world, is the grounding of the history of
the world.
Ontologically, the reality of the world is open to the
eschatological future as revealed and grounded in the
Christ event. This world will not be replaced by another
world but sublated into a totally new reality of the world.
in this way, the reality of the world is eschatologically
transformable. The Christian does not hope for another
world but another reality of the same world, in front of
the eschatological future every concrete present is not
ultimate and fixed but historically transformable. Thai is,
a different future within history is open for the world to
r e a 1 i s e t h r o u g h p ra x i s.
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Practically, people’s critical consciousness is aroused
when God reveals himself in the dialectical Christ event.
Praxis is further provoked to transform the present reality
so that it. will relatively correspond to the ultimate
future. Therefore it is possible for people to hope for a
better historical future by involving in the critique of
and the trans fo rmation of the present reality of the wor1d.
God’s dialectical act in history simultaneously 
determines that praxis and transformation within history
are not once for all but a continuous process. Because the
annihilating’ power of death and nothingness is not totally 
overcome in history, every concrete endeavour and struggle
for a concrete historical future will be negated af a
certain moment. However, this does not abolish the
possibility of historical transformation until the ultimate
t r ansf orma t i on i n tIte escha t on. The n t fte c r i t i qu e o f and
t h e t r a n s f o r m a fi o n of a11 modes o f d ea t h a pp ea ri n g i n
ideology and the correlative reality are to be put in
praxis.
In sum, God’s dialectical history with the world
creates the objective and subjective conditions for the
historical transformation of the world. God’s revealing and
grounding the ultimate future for the world in his history
does not merely give hope to the world to live on, but also
awakes people’s critical consciousness and provokes their
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transformation for a historical future relatively 
cori'esponding to t.he u 11 ima.te future,
8.2 An Appreciative Appraisal
8,2.1 One History, not Two
Moltmann is one of the contemporary systematic
theologians who take history and eschatology as the themes
when developing his own theology. Obviously, his
understanding of history is very different from K. Barth’s 
a n d R . B u 11 m a nn 1 s , Basically, he i s n o t c o ri t e n t w i. t h t h e
fact that they take different strategies to protect God and
h i s h i s t o r y f r o m b e i n g o b J e c t i f i e d w h i 1 e a b a n d o n i n g t h e
world and its history. Rather he re-affirms the historicity
of the world without dispensing with the subjectivity of
God. In this sense, he is pos t~.Bar th i an and post-
Bu 1.tmanni.an .
Barth contrasts God’s history as Geschichte which is
determined by lirgeschichte with the history of the world as
Historic. Although God touches the world by not touching it
in his seJf-revelation, the history of Jesus Christ in the
world is an eternal recapitulation of what God already is.
While Barth locates God’s history in Geschichte. but not in
Historic, Buitmann dissolves God’s history into the
historicity of human existence, Buitmann contrasts the
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history of authentic existence as Geschichte with that of
inauthentic existence as Historic, He takes the latter as
secondary which is derived from humanity’s authentic
existence* Either case proposes a view-point of dual tracks
of history, Moltmann g'oes beyond this.
Moltmann abolishes these dual tracks of history bv 
understanding God’s self-revelation in the form of promise
for the future of the world, The result is that both God
and the world have a shared future for the former to
fulfill and for the latter to pursue, Actually Moltmann
.justifies the historicity of the world through asking and
a n s w e r 1 n g t. he question w h i c h is n e g 1 e c t e d b y B a. r t h a n d
Bultmann: What is the condition of the possibility of the
history of the world? When Moltmann anchors the history of
the world in God’s promise for the world, he indeed grounds
it in God’s history because God’s promise culminates itself
in the Christ event. In essence, God in the Christ event.
does not experience a history which is different from that
of this world; rather he shares all the negatives with it, 
God’s history is not his movement in eternity but suffering
with and overcoming suffering with the world. Therefore,
there are not two histories but only one history which is
shared by both God and the world, in this way, Moltmann
overcomes B ar t h’s a n d B u11 man n’s d u a 1 i s m o f hi s t o ry a n d
stands in line with the view-point of liberation theology.
8.2.2 Dialectical Christology and Soteriology
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Moltmann is the contemporary systematic theologian who
employs Hegel’s dialectic in understanding God’s history in 
the Christ event. He does not merely Inherit M. Luther’s
theolog'y of the cross but integrates it in his dialectical
Ch r i s to 1 og y through t he Hege 1 i an d .1 alec t i c .
Instead of starting with the traditional doctrine of
the two natures of divinity-humanity, Moltmann follows
Luther in concentrating on God’s concrete historical act in
the cross event and integrates the cross with the
resurrection by means of Hegel’s dialectic. In this way.
Moltmann arrives at a new understanding of the identity of
Jesus Christ: an identity in the total contradiction of
death and life, cross and resurrection.
Because of its dialectical nature, such a Christology
is not merely a doctrine about the .identity of Jesus Christ
but involves Soteriology as well. Or to put it in this way,
that who Jesus Christ is cannot be separated from that what
Jesus Christ does to this world in history. God’s
soteriological act in the Christ event is not one that has
no influence on God the son, Rather God’s self-negation and
negation of negation .in the Christ event precisely
expresses that God’s inner divine life is involved. In this
sense, Moltmann’s contribution is that he establishes an
internal .relationship between Christology and Soteriology 
through HegeI’s dialectic.
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Within this dialectical framework Moltmann understands
that God the Son is who! ly dead on the cross and who I ly
raised in the resurrection. On the one hand, Moltmann opens
a way of affirming that God can suffer even unto death. He
makes the theme "suffering God" be "the new orthodoxy" in
the iate twentieth century. On the other hand, Moltmann
offers a contemporary version of G. Aulen’s classic theory 
of the atonement which has been abandoned for a long time.
When the death of Jesus Christ is understood as God’s
self-negation in a Hegelian sense, Moltmann goes beyond the 
limitation of the doctrine of the two natures of divinity-
humanity. It is only when God the Son is wholly dead that
he can enter the Nothingness so as to overcome it in his
resurrection. in this sense, Moltmann’s dialectical
understanding of the Christ event seems to be a commentary
of D. Bonhoeffer’s famous and often-quoted statement: "The 
Bible directs us Lo God’s power1essness and suffering; only 
the suffering God can help”.' Furthermore, while Auien
describes the classic theory of the atonement in 
mythological, terms3 that ''the risen Christ had brought new 
possibilities of life to humanity through his victory over
4 D . B o n h o e f r e r , L e 11 e r s 
R.H. Fuller, F. Clarke, J. 
1972), p.361.
and Papers from Prison, trans, 
Bowden {New York: Macmillan,
J C. Gunton, "Christus Victor Revisited. 
Metaphor and the Transformation of Meaning", 
Theological Studies 36/1 (1985), p.129,
A S t u d y i n 
Journal of
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the powers of evil”, Moltmann employs Hegel’s dialectic:, 
self-negation and negation of negation, to express the
battle between God and the annihilating power of
Nothingness. In this way, while Aulen is criticised for 
o f f e r i n g " n o r a t i o n a 1 . j u s t i f i e a t i o n for t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h 
the forces of evil are defeated through the cross jand the
resurrection J of Christ”, this theory provides a new
version with sufficient rational justification in 
Moltmann’s dialectical Christology and Soteriology.
Furthermore, the most significant point of Moltmann’s
dialectical Christology and Soteriology is its
eschatological nature. In contrast to any version of
Soteriology which neglects the eschatological dimension
Moltmann emphasises that there is something which has yet
to happen. This is because the dialectic of the Christ
e v e n t i s o p e n t o the e schatologic a J f u t u r e i n w h i c h a 1 1
negative element will be abolished. Moltmann’s proper use 
of Hegel’s dialectic in his Christology and Soteriology
shows that both God and the world have the same history to
go through.
8.2.3 Tr 1. n i t ar 1 an Panen t he i sm
A.E. McGrath, Chris tian Theology: An Introduction 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p.347, Cf. G, Aulen, Christus 
Victor: A Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the
idea o f t h e A t on emen t, brans. A.G. Hebert (London: SPCK
1931), pp.4, 59 .
I b i d . ,, p.348,
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Moltmann is one of the contemporary theologians who
revitalise the doctrine of the Trinity. However, Moltmann
differs from Barth, who develops the doctrine of the
Trinity in eternity, in that he does not isolate his
understanding of the Trinity from the dialectical Christ
event in history, That- i. s , he abandons any specu 1 at i ve
thinking about the Trinity but starts with the concrete
historical act of the triune God. Moltmann reverses the
traditional approach which begins with the unity of God and
then goes on to ask about the Trinity, Such an approach
leads inescapably to the reduction of the doctrine of the
Tr inity to monothe isni. On the contrary , Mo 11mann beg irts
with the Trinity of the persons, that is, the affirmation
of the distinct subjectivity of the Father, the Son and the
Holy Spirit, and goes on to ask about the unity. This
r e s u 11 i n a t r i n i t, a r i a n p a n entheisin.
This trinitarian panentheism goes beyond theism and
pantheism, On the one hand, the traditional theism
s e p a r a t es t h e i mm a nen t T r ini t y f r o tn t he e c o n o m i c T r i n i t y,
God from the world too much. On the other hand, pantheism
abolishes the distinction between the immanent Trinity and
the economic Trinity, God and the world. The crucial .point
lies in the relationship between the immanent Trinity and
the economic Trinity and the relationship between God and
the world,
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In contrast to the traditional theism which allows only
a one way relationship of the immanent Trinity to the
economic Trinity, God to the world, Moltmann proposes that
their relationship is two way. In other words, while the
influence of the triune God on the world is maintained, the
retroactive effect of the world on the triune God is
allowed. However, Moltmann holds a balance between these
two so as to avoid dissolving the triune God into the
history of the world. Otherwise, pantheism emerges and
there will be no difference between God and the world, The
reciprocal relationship leads to the trinitarian
panentheism: the difference between God and the world is
not abolished while God participates in the world and is
affected by the world. In sum, Moltmann reshapes
Christianity as a trinitarian panentheism which provides a
proper understanding of the appropriate relationship
between God and the world.
This is significant for the response to protest 
atheism: God is not indifferent to the suffering world but 
rather takes up the suffering of the world into God’s being
in the trinitarian dialectical Christ event. One can even
speak of the death of God in the trinitarian framework in
the sense of the death of Jesus Christ. God’s omnipotence 
and omnipresence then is understood totally differently
from that of traditional theism and protest atheism. In 
this trinitarian panentheism, omnipotence means that God is
capable of suffering and overcoming suffering; omnipresence
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means that God can be present in death and Nothingness and
takes up it in his being. In this way, Moltmann reaches the
concept of the absolute God in the Hegelian sense that an
absolute God is a God who is not excluded from his opposite 
but integrates it in his being.
Furthermore, Moltmann is the first theologian in the
twentieth century to emphasise the role of the Holy Spirit
in the trinitarian history of God with the world. The Holy 
Spirit in Moltinann’s trinitarian panentheism is not merely
a bond of love between the Father and the Son but the
person who preserves God’s creation by indwelling in it and
transforms it starting with the resurrection of the Son.
Actually, Moltmann offers a very contributive discussion of
the doctrine of the Holy Spirit by displaying that the Holy
Spirit is another distinct subject having intimate
communion and interaction with the other two and playing 
different roles in different stages of God’s history with
the world.
8.2.4 Human Praxis in the World
Moltmann is one of the contemporary theologians who
emphasise human praxis in the world for transforming
history. Firstly, he establishes that praxis is a necessary 
critical moment of eschatological faith. Secondly, he 
allocates human being’s endeavour of changing the world a 
proper place. On the one hand, the possibility of
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eschatological and historical change is not inherent in the
world itself but is given by God in the Christ event, On 
the other hand, although the eschatological future is 
realised in the eschaton by the triune God alone, humanity 
can undertake historical transformation which relatively 
corresponds to the eschatological future by realising the 
historical possibility continuously. In this way, Moltmann 
holds a very good balance and relationship between God’s 
eschatological transformation and humanity’s historical
transformation.
Such a conception of human praxis opens a way for
dialogue with M. Horkheimer’s, T.W. Adorno’s, H. Marcuse’s 
and J. Habermas’ Critical Theory. While Moltmann shares 
with Critical Theory the same interest in the emancipation
of modern society from various ideologies and oppressing 
reality, he further provides a theological grounding for 
humanity’s praxis which is lacked in the latter. Because
Critical Theory tends to de-metaphysicise the foundation of
socio-political praxis but focuses on the immanent critique 
of the conditions for oppression, alienation, estrangement, 
it avoids the problem: How is it possible for humanity’s
socio-political praxis when all earthy possibilities are
swallowed in nothingness? In other words, Critical Theory
does not take the power of evil or nothingness into account
radically adequately. This is precisely the area in which 
Moltmann’s eschatological theology emerges.
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8,3 Conclusion
Moltmann’s theology as a whole is impregnated with a 
sense of that God has a history. Moltmann’s theology as a 
whole is intertwined by many significant breakthroughs and
profound insights into various Christian doctrines. All
these breakthroughs and insights indeed can be seen as
different threads interwoven in a picture of God’s history.
This history is not a history of God himself ajone bu i a 
history with the world. In this history God does not only affect 
the world but allows himself to be affected by the world. 
Simply it is a history of interaction and interplay. As
Moltmann writes in The ffay of Jesus Christ; "History is 
what takes place between God and human beings, human beings 
and God.Through this history, God is ail in all: God in
the world and the world in God,
WJCJ p,245.8
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Abbreviations
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Present
OC The Open Church
RRF Religion, Revolution and the Future
TH Theology of Hope
TKG The Trinity and the Kingdom of God
TT Theology Today
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WJC The Way of Jesus Christ 
FC The Future of Creation
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